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Gentlemen:
The Boeing Company is pleased to submit the technical reports of the work accom-
plished under Voyager Phase 1A, Task B. Together with the reports of Task A,
they represent to us a substantial contribution to our understanding of the
objectives of the Voyager Project. As a corollary, it is believed they will
demonstrate to you a dedication for, and a capability to perform, those tasks
so important to fulfilling the Spacecraft Contractor's responsibilities.
The recently announced delay in the Voyager Program will test the dedication of
all parties concerned. Despite our disappointment, we wlll not let this tempor-
ary setback deter our proceeding on a rational basis to be ready when funding
levels again allow the program to proceed. It is important to note that the
Task B documentation has been submitted as if no change had occurred in the
Voyager Program. It should be recognized that corporate and group commitments
contained in the documentation, in the areas of facilities and personnel, will
be reconsidered when the Voyager program proceeds. At that time, Boeing will
update and reaffirm the resources necessary to support the Voyager program.
Because of the cancellation of the Phase IB, Part 2 Request for Proposal, we have
chosen to highlight some of our management philosophy and organization rationale
in a summary document, D2-82709-00. To place this in perspective, we have also
summarized the salient features of the spacecraft design. Further, we have
postulated some advanced missions, using the 1971 design_ for further exploration
of the solar system. This latter item is the basis for part of our continuing
Voyager work.
Little more remains to be said except to restate that the Voyager Spacecraft
System represents to us, more than a new product objective; it is an opportunity
to participate in the extension of scientific knowledge in the universe and to
contribute to national prestige.
Very truly yours,
THE BOEING COMPANY
A. Wood
Group Vice President-Aerospace
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INTRODUCTION
This document, D2-82709-6, (Volume A, Part I), "Preferred Design for
Flight Spacecraft and Hardware Subsystems" is submitted by The Boeing
Company in response to Contract 951111, Phase IA9 Task B, dated
November 2, 1965. It supplements D2-82709-I (Volume A, Part I) sub-
mitted July 29, 1965, following completion of Phase IA, Task A. The
complete technical report in response to Contract 951111, Phase IA9
Task B consists of the following:
VOLUME A
D2-82709-6
AND
D2-82709-9"
PREFERRED DESIGN FOR E:I.IGHT SPACECRAFT AND HARDWARE
SUBSYSTEMS
PART I
SECTION I VOYAGE.R 1971 MISSION OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN
CRITERIA
SECTION 2 DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS AND RESTRAINTS
SECTION 3. SYSTEM LEVEL FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
PART II
SECTION 4 -FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF SPACECRAFT HARDWARE
SUBSYSTEMS
SECTION 5 - PROGRAM SCHEDULE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
VOLUME B DESIGN FOR THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
D2-82709-7
VOLUME C ALTERNATE DESIGNS CONSIDERED FOR SPACECRAFT PROPULSION
D2-82709-8 SYSTEMS
AND
D2-82709-I0"
*CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO V,OLUME A AND C RESPECTIVELY
The highlights of the above documentation and management planning are
summarized below.
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During the period covered by Contract 951111, Task B, Boeing has revised
the preliminary design of the Voyager Spacecraft System in consonance
with the statement of work. As part of this effort, Boeing has:
i) Verified and revised the requirements and constraints which are
imposed upon the Voyager Spacecraft System by the Voyager 1971
Mission.
2) Reviewed and revised the preliminary Flight Spacecraft design for
the Voyager 1971 mission_ including the study of alternate designs
for the spacecraft propulsion systems.
3) Selected a preferred design which reliably and effectively achieves
the objectives of the 1971 mission.
4) Reviewed and revised the functional descriptions for the Flight
Spacecraft and for each of its hardware subsystems.
5) Reviewed and revised the preliminary requirements and functional
description for the Operational Support Equipment (OSE) necessary
to accomplish the 1971 mission.
Updated and revised the schedule of the Voyager Implementation Plan.6)
The Boeing Voyager Spacecraft System organization, shown in Figure I-l,
is under the direction of Mr. Edwin G. Czarnecki. Mr. Czarnecki is the
single executive responsible to JPL and to Boeing management for the
accomplishment of the Voyager Spacecraft Phase IA, Task B work and will
direct subsequent phases of the program. He reports directly to
Mr. George H. Stoner, Vice President and Space Division General Manager.
Although Boeing has capability in all aspects of the Voyager Program it
is planned to extend this capability in depth through association with
companies recognized as specialists in technologies critical to Voyager
I-2
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performance. The following team members have been chosen because of
their experience and past performance:
Autonetics, North American Aviation, Anaheim, California
Autopilot and Attitude Reference Subsystem
Mr. R. R. Mueller, Program Manager
Philco, Western Development Lab 9 Palo Alto, California
Telecommunication Subsystem
Mr. G. C. Moore, Program Manager
£1ectro-Optical Systems, Inc., Pasadena, California
Hlectrical Power Subsystem
Mr. C. I. Cummings, Program Manager
These subcontractor team members have been associated with Boeing on
the Voyager Program for periods of 7 to 14 months. As a result of this9
there has been sufficient exchange of information to make possible imme-
diate implementation of the project with a Boeing team capable of satis-
fying the JPL requirements.
The preliminary design approach by the Boeing team has emphasized
• High probability of mission success.
• Conservatism, simplicity, selective redundancy in critical areas,
and the use of Mariner experience.
• Versatility to accommodate a wide range of payload, mission, and
data requirements.
The Voyager Flight Spacecraft, shown in Figure I-2, has the following
principal features:
i) A capability to meet or exceed all mission requirements established
in the Voyager 1971 Preliminary Mission Description.
I-4
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Figure I-2: Voyager Mars
I-5 & I-6
Mission Configuration
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2) A high probability (approximately 80 percent) of returning science
data from at least one spacecraft in Mars orbit. The reliability
of the Spacecraft Bus improved from .82 in Task A to .90 in Task B,
primarily because of additional redundancy in the telecommunications
system.
3) A spacecraft with subsystems sized to accommodate the range of
anticipated Mars missions. The 1971 mission capability includes a
93-day launch period, periapsis altitudes as low as 400 km, orbit
periods as low as 2.8 hours9 and solar occultations as low as 3.7
hours.
4) A single propulsion module capable of fulfilling all Mars mission
propulsion requirements from 1971 through 1977 without resizing or
changing the propellant quantity.
5) Electrical and electronic systems designed so that no single failure
will cause a catastrophic effect on the mission.
6) A computer and sequencer designed so that completion of a nominal
mission can be accomplished with programs stored on-board and with-
out ground command intervention unless required by trajectory disper-
sions or biasing. The ground system can override and back up these
programs and command midcourse and orbit corrections when necessary.
7) Space is provided for 16 standard equipment assembly packages_ 16" x
32" x 8.5", fastened to the lO-foot-diameter cylindrical structure
and thermally interconnected. Fourteen of these are used in the
preferred design, all of which employ standardized internal packag-
ing. Thermal control of these assemblies is by space-facing plates
radiating through Mariner C type bi-metallic-actuated louvers.
I-7
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The Flight Spacecraft is 28 feet i0 inches wide_ solar panel tip to
solar panel tip. The height is 158" compared to a maximum allowable
of 208 inches. The estimated weight is 1920 pounds for the Spacecraft
Bus. A contingency of 180 pounds is therefore available for selective
use during the aetail design phase. The estimated weight of the propul-
sion module is 149840 pounds with a contingency of 160 pounds (approxi-
mately I0 percent of the inert weights) available for use during the
design phase.
Analyses and tradeoffs of the four specified Flight Spacecraft propul-
sion systems indicated that they were nearly equivalent in meeting the
3PL specified requirements. The propulsion system selected is the modi-
fied Minuteman Wing Vl second stage motor for orbit insertion and a
hydrazine subsystem using four 200-pound thrust engines for trajectory
corrections, and for orbit trim and vernier. The choice of this selected
system was based primarily on the lower technical risk in the development
of this system and the larger weight available for reallocation. In
addition_ it makes maximum use of available proven hardware.
A trade study was conducted between propulsion systems sized for 1971_
1973, and 1975_ 1977. The study showed that there were only minor differ-
ences and that a single design can be developed, tested_ and used without
change for all missions_ 1971 through 1977.
Wide variations in mission requirements are acco_nodated by the combined
use of the solid motor augmented by the hydrazine system for orbit
vernier. Yhe performance of the selected propulsion unit exceeds all
1971 mission specification requirements. It provides an orbit insertion
I-8
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velocity increment in 1971 of 2.39 km/sec (2.2 km/sec design goal) with
the 2000-pound capsule.
The hydrazine engines selected for trajectory and orbit correction
maneuvers utilize a Shell 405 spontaneous catalyst. The engines are of
the same type as those selected during the Task A preliminary design.
They provide a total velocity change capability of 637 meters per second
for the 1971 mission. The hydrazine subsystem has an engine-out capa-
bility without malfunction detection and switching. This is accomplished
by canting the engines and using jet vane thrust vector controls to main-
tain the thrust vectors through the vehicle center of gravity. This,
together with the use of proven components, results in a high confidence
in the predicted reliability of 0.9960 for the preferred propulsion
module.
The telecommunications subsystem is sized to meet the mission design
requirements. It can accommodate higher data rates, and allow addi-
tional modes if such needs develop. The system selected uses a 50-watt
traveling wave tube amplifier and a 6-1/2 foot diameter paraboloidal
high-gain antenna with two axes of rotation. Complete coverage of Earth
is provided during Earth-to-Mars transit, orbit insertion, and orbiting
flight. Space is available for growth to an 8 x 12 foot paraboloid.
A maximum data rate of 7500 bps is provided with the 6½ foot diameter antenna.
The system has the potential for a data rate of 15,000 bps for a period
of 20 days after encounter under worst case conditions_ A 1260 bps
backup mode is available during the first i00 days of Mars orbit.
This is accomplished with a fixed Mariner C paraboloidal antenna
oriented to provide coverage of Earth during that period.
I-9
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Five telemetry modes have been provided with data rates of 7500 bps for
orbital use, 1260 bps for backup and late mission use, 80 bps for launch
and interplanetary cruise, 1.64 bps for emergency use with the low-gain
antenna, and an acquisition mode without data transmittal.
Data storage capacity is 3.8 x 108 bits in seven tape recorders. Record-
ing and playback rates can be controlled redundantly through the Data
Automation Equipment, Earth Command and the Computing and Sequencing
Subsystem.
The Command Subsystem provides for two hundred (27-bit) stored and direct
commands with growth provided for by expansion of the output combiner.
Two complete, parallel command detectors and decoders with selection logic
permits either detector to operate with either decoder to provide high
reliability. The probability of executing a false command is several orders
of magnitude less than the JPL requirement of 10 -8 •
The Computing and Sequencing Subsystem controls the sequencing of time-
dependent events during the Voyager mission. All functions for a nominal
mission can be sequenced from launch through the end of orbital opera-
tions without command from mission control unless required by trajectory
dispersions or biasing. The selected subsystem is a special-purpose
programmable digital computer with an overall reliability of 0.986. It
has a capacity for storage of 1024 (27-bit) words and a capability to
execute 140 difference commands. Seven-hundred words of storage are
required to perform mission functions leaving a 30-percent reserve
capacity in a standard size core memory assembly.
1-10
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The Guidance and Control Subsystem is similar to that selected in Task A
and draws heavily on Mariner and Ranger concepts. The Canopus and Sun
sensors, the analog type autopilot, and the cold nitrogen reaction
control system maintain cruise attitude within ±0.3 degree. A planet
sensor, limb detector, and terminator detector have been added to the
Task A system. Single-axis ball and air bearing gyros and free rotor
gas bearing gyros were re-examined. The free-rotor, gas-bearing Minute-
man G6B gyro9 modified to a higher torquing capability, was selected
because of (i) demonstrated performance in the Minuteman application,
and (2) a minimum number of units required for operational redundancy.
Reaction Control is by expulsion of cold nitrogen gas through coupled
0.125 pound pitch and yaw thrusters and coupled .035 pound roll thrusters.
Sixteen separate thrusters are provided in a redundant configuration.
Four titanium tanks contain 44 pounds of nitrogen. Under nominal
conditions the nitrogen will last four years.
The Electrical Power Subsystem has been revised from the Task A design
to satisfy new mission and physical constraints. Fixed and deployable
panels were evaluated extensively. The selected solar panel array
consists of 8 fixed trapezoidal panels (178 square feet), and 4 deploy-
able rectangular panels (138 square feet) for a total of 316 square feet.
This configuration meets power requirements for all mission periods and
orbit selections, and in addition will meet major mission objectives if
one panel fails to deploy. The solar electrical system provides 908
watts of gross power for spacecraft, capsule, and battery charging
loads at the end of six months of orbital operation. The configuration
can be tested in the Boeing Space Chamber with panels deployed.
I-ii
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Three silver cadmium batteries rated at a total of 2720 watt hours pro-
vide power for off-Sun periods up to 3.7 hours. Battery size and cir-
cuit design allow the mission to be completed if any one battery section
fails. Prime power is distributed at 2400 cycles per second, single
phase, 50 volts. Three sets of regulators, inverters, and switching
equipment are provided in a redundant configuration. This provides
capability to operate all vehicle subsystems in event of a failure of
any one power channel. Redundant 400 cycle per second inverters are
provided for scan platform controls. Redundant precision oscillators
are also provided.
The spacecraft structural arrangement is extensively revised from the
Task A preferred configuration because of the larger and heavier pro-
pulsion module and increased capsule attachment diameter. Structural
weight is 385 pounds and consists of (i) the primary structure assembly;
(2) the external supports for appendages; (3) the capsule support and
emergency separation assembly; and (4) an eight point Planetary Vehicle
separation assembly. The primary structure is a 120-inch diameter
magnesium shell, 85 inches long, of conventional semi-monocoque design.
This shell provides direct support for attachment of 16 equipment
modules (14 used) and for distribution of thermal loads between the
assemblies. The Planetary Vehicle adapter is designed to support the
spacecraft at eight points and provides uniform loading at the nose
fairing interface.
The mechanisms employed for release, deployment, and latching of deployed
booms or linkages are the same as those proposed during Task A. Dual
bridge-wire, pyrotechnic pin-pullers are used to release the pins
1-12
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holding the various components in their boost positions. Vinson-type
actuators were selected for the deployment function_ and spring-actuated,
taper-pins are used to lock the components in their deployed positions.
Self-aligning, spherical bearings are used for all hinge joints to
counter any binding effects caused by thermal distortion_ and sleeve
bearings within the spherical bearings provide a second path of rota-
tion, thus increasing the reliability of the system.
Four-segment_ V-block separation bands are used to release the Planetary
Vehicle from its adapter and also to effect emergency release of the
Flight Capsule. Four pyrotechnic separation devices in each band
assure a release reliability of .99992. Hight helical compression springs
impart a total separation velocity of 1 foot per second.
The selected pyrotechnic subsystem follows the basic concept of the
Mariner series in using capacitors and solid state switches. The pyro-
technic subsystem provides for a set of 21 command signals and 59 electro-
explosive devices.
The Temperature Control Subsystem maintains the Spacecraft Bus, propul-
sion module and science instruments within specified operating tempera-
tures throughout all the mission phases. The design approach, parts, and
materials are similar to those used on Mariner C. The equipment modules
are coupled thermally and temperature control is accomplished by 52 square
feet of hi-metal actuated louvers and high emittance radiator surfaces.
The thermal dissipation capacity of the system is approximately i200
watts, providing nearly 50 percent more capability than required to
maintain gross thermal balance.
1-13
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A science scan platform (GFE) is postulated to support the following
science equipment: Infrared Spectrometer, Infrared Scanner, and two
television cameras. This platform, with two-axis gimbal drive, pro-
vides the science instruments with clear views of Mars. An Ultraviolet
Spectrometer is mounted on the spacecraft body with adequate scanning
capability.
Substantial additional study and analysis has been made of ways to meet
the planetary quarantine requirements and of the resulting Flight Space-
craft design constraints. New data made available or developed since
the Task A report are:
I) The new Martian atmosphere which affects both probability of capture
and heating rate of contaminated ejecta.
2) Micro-organism IR emissivity which has been determined by Boeing to
be approximately 0.2 instead of the previously estimated value of
0.5 to 1.0.
3) Increased microbial kill due to low ultraviolet attenuation in the
Martian atmosphere.
Reduction by a factor of 104 in the meteoroid environment at Mars
and associated reduction in the amount of contaminated material
spalled off the orbiting spacecraft.
5) Tests run by Boeing which demonstrate with a high confidence that
hydrazine is self-sterilizing.
6) Firings of solid engines by Boeing which indicate that the micro-
organisms do not survive the hot firing.
4)
Based upon the above, the approaches taken in each hardware area for the
selected design are:
1-14
BOEING--SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
i) Micrometeoroid Ejecta--No surface sterilization is provided for the
spacecraft, but study and analysis should be continued. The higher
ultraviolet kill and the lower micrometeoroid environment reduces
the probability of contaminating the planet to 2.8 x 10 -5 .
2) Reaction Control and Thrust Vector Control Ejecta_ Midcourse and
Orbit Trim Pressurant--Sterilize or decontaminate the nitrogen_
Freon_ and hardware internal surfaces. Study further to assess
ultraviolet kill.
3) Midcourse and Orbit Trim Engine--No sterilization of the propellant
or propellant hardware in this system is provided because of hydra-
zine's self-sterilizing characteristics. Tests in Phase IB are
required to verify that micro-organisms are not ejected from
down stream hardware in Mars orbit.
4) Orbit Insertion Engine--Based upon UV kill and hot firing indica-
tions_ this engine is not sterilized. Further analysis and hot
test firings in Phase IB are required to confirm data prior to
initiation of engine procurement.
The OSE selected is a modest extension of Mariner concepts. Subsystem
............................. Sy_ _ are u_u _ tile ua_lu uu±±ulng blocks for the stem Test
Complex. The System Test Complex employs a Scientific Data Systems
general purpose digital computer in a Central Data and Control System
for automatic control of the subsystem test sets and central data
analysis and display. The total design emphasizes minimum new develop-
ment to enhance mission success and cost effectiveness.
D
Several existing test systems were considered for use in System Test
Complex design and traded off against the preferred concept which is
1-15
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an updated version of that proposed by Boeing in the Phase IA Task A
submittal. Systems considered include the Apollo Acceptance Checkout
Equipment (ACH) and the Mariner C test equipment. The trade studies
indicate that use of ACE would be either non-responsive to specifica-
tion requirements or_ if subsystem OSE were incorporated into the
system_ would be unnecessarily complex. Mariner C equipment does not
include the required degree of central control and automaticity.
All requirements can be met with the preferred design which is well
within current technology. It is planned that existing hardware be
employed to a maximum degree in defining the Spacecraft System OSE
and common components be employed wherever feasible.
The building block approach to design has also been applied to computer
program development. Mission operations and test programs are assembled
from sub-routines prepared in standard format in accordance with stand-
ardized software requirements. This minimizes software development
time and costs and allows computer program preparation in parallel
with equipment design.
Subsystem Test Sets are typically 1 to 9 standard racks containing
equipment similar to that used in the Mariner Subsystem OSE. When
elements of these are integrated with the SDS 920 (or 930) computer
and appropriate interface adapters_ they form a System Test Complex
(STC) of approximately 55 cabinets (racks, output data units_ and
control consoles). Addition of the Mars surface lander capsule and
Science Subsystem OSH brings the total Planetary Vehicle System
Complex (STC) to about 76 cabinets. Figure I-3 shows a model of the
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VIEW LOOKING DOWN 
VIEW FROM TEST AREA 
F igu re  1-3: System Test Complex And Equipment 
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STC, typical test facilities, and equipment. Elements of the STC are
employed as an integral part of Launch Complex Equipment (LCE).
A test team concept is planned wherein technical personnel experienced
in spacecraft and OSE design, systems test operations, launch and mission
operations, and spacecraft assembly and quality control will be formed
into test groups. One of these teams will be assigned to each flight
spacecraft and spare and will follow that vehicle from assembly through
launch. Selected elements of the test team will continue to support
mission operations for their spacecraft.
The Task B review and revision of the preliminary design for the Voyager
Spacecraft System has emphasized conservative design, particularly in the
use of proven equipment and techniques to the greatest extent consistent
with system requirements. High reliability has been achieved through
selection of space-proven components and through design of redundant
capabilities into subsystems and equipment. The propulsion subsystem has
been sized to achieve a range of flight trajectories and Mars orbits for mis-
sions in the years 1971 through 1977. The preferred Flight Spacecraft design
provides mission versatility and capability for growth. As a result of the
Task B activities, The Boeing Company has developed a design believed to
be optimum for achieving objectives of the Voyager 1971 mission.
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VOYAGER 1971 MISSION OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN CRITERIA
This section discusses mission objectives and design criteria and their
influence on the selected design. JPL's "Voyager 1971 Preliminary Mis-
sion Description" was used as the baseline for the mission objectives
and design criteria summarized in this document. Although data were
verified and expanded, no exceptions were taken to the "Voyager 1971
Preliminary Mission Description."
i.i PROGRAM OBJECTIVHS
Voyager Program Objectives--The primary objective of the Voyager program
is scientific investigation of the solar system by means of instrumented,
unmanned spacecraft that will fly by, orbit, and land on the planets.
Scientific information about the origin, evolution, and nature of life
will be acquired and applied toward an understanding of terrestrial life.
Voyager Mars Objectives--The primary objective of the Voyager missions
to Mars beginning in 1971 is to obtain, through unmanned experiments on
the surface of and in orbit about the planet, information of the planet's
terrestrial life_ atmospheric, surface, and body characteristics_ and
environment. A secondary objective is to increase the knowledge of the
interplanetary medium between the orbits of Earth and Mars around the
Sun by obtaining scientific and engineering measurements while the
Planetary Vehicle is in transit.
Meeting both objectives necessitates an orderly program of continually
improving knowledge in science and technology_ therefore, each mission
will be postured with objectives to expand that knowledge and a space-
craft system to achieve those objectives, all sequenced to take best
advantage of preceding mission results.
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1.2 1971 MISSION OBJECTIVES
The 1971 mission is first in the logical development of the sequenced
missions for achieving Voyager Mars objectives. The 1971 mission objec-
tives, postured to expand knowledge gained in the Ranger and Mariner
programs_ are:
l) Acquisition of scientific data from measurements of solar system
phenomena, particularly those of the nature of the Mars planetary
surface, planetary atmosphere, body characteristics, and extra-
terrestrial lifel
2) Verification of technological capability of placing scientific pay-
loads in orbit about the planet Mars, supporting them for extended
periods of operation, and communicating reliably the data obtained
from scientific and engineering measurements.
Although the scientific experiments for 1971 are not defined, science
observations have been postulated to provide spacecraft accommodation for
potential experiments. Therefore, two categories of science instruments
are assumed to be best suited for the expected science experiments:
I) Spacecraft Body-Mounted Instruments--plasma probe, cosmic-ray tele-
scope, cosmic-dust detector, trapped-radiation detector, ion chamber,
magnetometer, RF noise detector, ionosphere counter, bistatic radar,
gamma-ray detector, gravimeter, and ultraviolet spectrometer (scan
mounted)_
2) Scan Platform-Mounted Instruments--infrared spectrometer, infrared
scanner, and photoimaging devices (two television cameras).
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The primary technological objectives of the 1971 mission are to place a
science payload in orbit about Mars_ conduct observations of Martian
phenomena wlth this payload over extended periods of time_ and transmit
the data to Earth. Additional technological objectives are to enter the
Martian atmosphere and land on the Martian surface, and conduct observa-
tions relating to critical Mars landing design parameters in orbit and
in the atmosphere as required.
1.3 MISSION CONSTRAINTS
Mission constraints imposed on the Spacecraft System by the 1971 mission
are schedule, planetary quarantine requirements, number of launches, and
existing mission support facilities. These constraints are considered
firm and not subject to trade studies.
Mission Schedule Constraints--The Mars opportunity places an absolute
constraint on the mission schedule_ consequently_ all design, develop-
ment, fabrication_ testing 9 and deliveries will conform to the establish-
ed mission schedule milestones. The launch period for the Voyager 1971
mission will not be less than 45 days. The minimum daily firing window
will not be less than 2 hours.
Mission Planetary Quarantine Constraints--The probability that Mars is
contaminated prior %o calendar year 2021 as a result of any single launch
will be less than 10 -4 . Consideration will be given %o the implications
of this restraint on the S-IVB stage, the spacecraft_ the capsule, and
all emissions and ejecta.
Number of Launches Constraints--One space vehicle will be launched during
the 1971 Mars opportunity.
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Mission-Support Facilities Constraints--The Spacecraft System will be
compatible with the launch facilities and Deep Space Network. Complex
39 at Kennedy Space Center will be used for launching the space vehicle
during the 1971 Mars opportunity. Launch azimuths will not be less than
60 degrees east of north nor greater than 115 degrees east of north.
1.4 DESIGN CRITERIA
To develop a Spacecraft System with the highest probability of mission
success, Boeing's design approach is to utilize space-proven concepts
such as those developed in the Pioneer, Ranger, and Mariner programs.
If space-proven or space-approved hardware exists and fulfills the func-
tional requirements of the Spacecraft System concept, that hardware will
be given precedence in design consideration. If new hardware must be
developed, proven design concepts will be used that emphasize simpli-
city to ensure reliability and mission success.
Performance reliability should be included as an inherent feature of the
system concept through conservative design, hardware environment control,
strict adherence to procedural development, rigorous qualification testing
at all levels, redundancy, and emphasis on human engineering.
1.5 SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND WEIGHT ALLOCATION
The principal elements for the 1971 mission are shown in Figure i-i.
Each system includes operational hardware, spares, software, and support
equipment; management_ personnel, and facilities for development and test
of hardware and software; and support personnel and equipment for the
prelaunch, launch_ and flight phases of the mission.
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The gross payload capability of %he Saturn V including the portion of
the nose fairing injected into trans-Mars trajectory is 63_000 pounds
for a launch azimuth of 115 degrees. Ample capability exists to launch
the 1975 or 1977 mission with Flight Capsules weighing i0,000 pounds.
Weights of the various elements of the 1971 mission are allocated as
follows:
Space Vehicle (minus launch vehicle)
Planetary Vehicle Adapter
Planetary Vehicle
Flight Capsule
Flight Spacecraft
Propulsion Module
Spacecraft Bus _
44,000 Lbs.
1,500 ea
20,500 ea
3,000 ea _-_
17,500 ea
15,000 ea
2,500 ea
* A maximum of 250 pounds can remain with the Flight Spacecraft.
_-_ Includes science payload weight of 400 pounds.
_-_* Per JPL, 2000 pounds are used for spacecraft design.
1.6 COMPETING CHARACTERISTICS
Boeing recognizes that the selection of a preferred Spacecraft System,
which will provide the best assurance of successful operation_ is maxi-
mized when all system trade studies are evaluated against a standard of
competing characteristics. The standard provided by JPL is shown hori-
zontally at the top of Table l-1 with primary emphasis on "Probability
of Success." Mission characteristics are arranged vertically with emph-
asis on "Overall System" performance. Each block of the matrix iden-
tifies the next level of competing characteristics for evaluating
specific system trades as discussed in Section 3.11.
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1.7 MISSION TRADE STUDY SUMMARIES
The primary objectives of the Task B mission trade studies were to develop
data for program direction and to determine that all important factors
pertinent to the development of mission objectives and design criteria
were identified, evaluated, collated_ and correlated. These objectives
and criteria were established during Task B with the realization that Jet
Propulsion Laboratory will ultimately determine or approve basic mission
decisions. However, a valid comparison of alternate Spacecraft System
designs required that a common_ though preliminary, mission basis be
established.
Trade study subjects have been established by examining the JPL-defined
mission operational phases_ derived functional flow diagrams, and major
system elements for problem areas that require trade study evaluation.
Each trade study has been made by taking the known, significant alternate
solutions and evaluating them in terms of the competing characteristics
established by JPL. The selected solution best satisfies the priority
order of the competing characteristics. The mission trade studies con-
ducted during Task B_ including the candidate solutions_ their evaluation,
and the selected approach, are shown i_ Table 1-2. A further discussion
of the factors influencing the selections is found in Sections 3.1 and
3.2. Table 1-3 is an example of a trade study summary sheet showing data
for one of the mission trades. Additional trade studies will be con-
ducted in later program phases as the mission definition and functional
analyses are further refined.
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Table
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Trade Study Title
Mars orbit for second Plane-
tary Vehicle after successful
first vehicle
Planetary Vehicle, Mars
differential arrival
Trade Study Alternate Solut
Orbit identical to that
of first planetary
vehicle
Bias maneuver early in
mission
2
Similar orbit with
minor variations
Bias maneuver late in
mission
Planetary Vehicle, Mars
arrival date biasing
Modes and sequences for
separation of Planetary
Vehicles
Flight Capsule deorbit
location
Plight Capsule canister
separation mode
Periapsis trim
One-vehicle biasing
maneuver
Separate in rapid
sequence, activate
simultaneously
Deorbit at periapsis
Separate at least i0
days prior to Mars
orbit injection
Thrust at apoapsis
Two-vehicle biasing
maneuver
Separate and activate
forward vehicle, then
second vehicle
Deorbit at apoapsis
Separate 1 day prior t,
injection into Mars
orbit
Nonapoapsis
!
Mission Trade Study Summary
3
Major variations to
alter surface coverage
Separate forward
vehicle and start
activation before
separating aft vehicle
Deorbit within 90 °
after apospsis passage
Separate after
injection into orbit
around Mars
Selected
Approach
2
3
Injection into similar orbits p
data accuracy through redundanc
AV, and less trajectory error;
of mission objectives.
When biasing maneuver is done e
accomplished with smallerAV an
can be integrated with midcours
antenna.
ItisaSolution requirement that
Procedure i was selected on a p
success of only one of the two
arrives in Mars orbit with smal
orbit maneuver usage. Together
flexibility and performance co_
This sequence allows sufficient
for malfunction decision. Yet
vehicle battery capability.
Deorbit at this point permits i
nominal terminal descent rate i
which are favorable both to da_
achieved without severe AV rec
Separation of the canister in t
Early separation exposes capsul
this probability is slight. Ha
craft position fix before encou
event is unsuccessful.
Very small altitude change requ
adjustment preferable9 for larg
apoapsis leads to smaller net e
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ction Rationale
•ovides the greatest probability of experiment success and
r and assessment of first vehicle results, lower injection
_hereby maximizing the probability of successful completion
_rly, orbit determination and midcourse correction can be
i a higher probability of mission success. Biasing maneuvers
maneuvers and monitoring data may be obtainable on low-gain
both vehicles have the capability of bias maneuvering.
_rformance basis and affects the probability of mission
_lanetary Vehicles. The vehicle with the unbiased trajectory
[er residual errors to correct and greater propellant for
the two vehicles have the potential of greater mission
_rage.
separation distance to avoid collision and monitoring time
]ts sequential time requirements are compatible with the
_duction in deorbit trajectory maneuver sensitivities and a
sunlight, needed for the visual sensors. Trajectories
acquisition and communication with the orbiter are readily
lirements.
_e Mars orbit increases the probability of Mars contamination.
to indirect contamination and meteoroid damage; however_
?ly separation allows more time to obtain an accurate space-
iter_ also it will permit corrective action if the separation
rements make the AV resolution errors by off-apoapsis
_r periapsis altitude changes, the lower_V required at
_rors and more propellant left for subsequent maneuvers.
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TABLEi-3:
TRADE STUDY
SUMMARY SHEET SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT
FUNCTIONAL AND TECHNICAL
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
& COMPETING CHARACTERISTICS
The second Planetary
Vehicle must be able to
achieve essentially the
same orbit as planned
for the first Planetary
Vehicle, although it
TRADE STUDY NUMBER & TITLE
MISSION TRAi
I
ALTERNATE i
ORBIT IDENTICAL TO THAT OF FIRST
PLANETARY VEHICLE.
,i
To what extent should the
orbit of the second
Planetary Vehicle differ
from that of the highly
successful first Planetary
Vehicle?
Establish second Planetary Vehicl
in orbit identical to that of fiz
vehicle except for different epoc
must arrive no less than
i0 days later than first
vehicle.
FIRST PLANETARY VEHICLE
ORBIT REQUIREMENTS
50-year orbit lifetime
30 ° to 60 ° orbit incli-
nation.
Periapsis location:
o Southern hemisphere
o i00 -300 from ter-
minator in light-
ed hemisphere.
No occultation of Earth,
Sun, or Canopus prior to
insertion and only minimum
occultation of Sun and
Canopus during orbit.
Adequate time for
communication with
Earth
Motion (posigrade or
retrograde) such that
capsule will make de-
scent in sunlight when
impact is near sub-
periapsis point.
2.2 kilometers per
second_V available
on Planetary Vehicle
for insertion into
orbit around Mars.
Second Planetary Ve-
hicle enhances probability
of mission success through
redundancy. After a success-
ful first vehicle, second
vehicle may be inserted into
a nearly identical orbit for
acquisition of multiple data
for statistical analysis,
resolution of additional
parameters, etc, or into a
differing orbit for broader
soverage.
Selection parameters (derived
from the competing character-
istics)[ are:
o Reliability
o Performance
DISCUSSION
Pro
High probability of indivi
dual experiment success ant
data accuracy through redur
ancy.
2esolution of short-period
variations in observed
phenomena.
Con
May impose awkward constrair
on orbit injection in light
variation in approach geomeJ
and velocity.
n No hrnad_n]na n£ canah414_v
over primary objectives.
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E STUDY SUMMARY (EXAMPLE)
3 ORBIT FOR SECOND PLANETARY VEHICLE UPON SUCCESS OF FIRST PLANETARY VEHICLE
MATRIX OF DESIGN APPROACH
ALTERNATE 2
SIMILAR ORBIT - MINOR VARIATIONS
IN ORBIT ELEMENTS
Inject into orbit that achieves
essentially the same surface cover-
age but differs from first orbit
due to: variations in approach
geometry and velocity; and minor
variation in some orbital elements
as indicated by success or failures
of individual experiments aboard
first vehicle.
DISCUSSION
Pro
Maximum probability of indi-
vidual experiment success and
data accuracy through redundan-
cy and assessment of prelimi-
nary first flight results.
Lower injection_V with in-
herently smaller trajectory
errors.
Con
o 0nly limited broadening of
coverage.
ALTERNATE 3
MAJOR VARIATIONS TO ALTER SURFACE
COVERAGE
Change orbit sufficiently to change
initial coverage to other hemi-
sphere and other limb (major
change in periapsis location) and
major change in inclination,
nodal point direction of orbital
motion (retrograde, posigrade),
etc.
DISCUSSION
Pro
o
o
Con
Broaden capabilities
Contribute to subsequent
missions
Limited reliability of indi-
vidual experiments through
redundancy.
Usually larger injection_V
requirements with inherently
larger trajectory errors.
SELECTION
Reliability
2, i, 3
Performance
2, i, 3
SELECTED
APPROACH
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2.0 DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS AND RESTRAINTS
This section describes the design characteristics of the Flight Spacecraft
as well as the applicable system requirements and restraints. The guid-
ance and navigation requirements and restraints imposed on aiming-point
selection are also discussed along with the planetary quarantine re-
quirements.
2.1 DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
The Voyager design is based on an extension of the Mariner IV design
modified to permit insertion of each Planetary Vehicle into Mars orbit,
subsequent orbital operations of each Flight Spacecraft_ and entry_
descent, and landing of each Flight Capsule.
The Spacecraft System includes the Flight Spacecraft, adapters, Spacecraft
System test complex9 special test facilities required for spacecraft and
Planetary Vehicle testing, facilities at Kennedy Space Center used to
assemble and prepare the Flight Spacecraft and Planetary Vehicle for
launch_ Flight Spacecraft 0SE (including launch checkout equipment)_
developmental models_ the Flight Spacecraft software and spares_ and
personnel required to support the Flight Spacecraft functions.
The Flight Spacecraft will be an attitude stabilized vehicle that uses
the Sun and the star Canopus as celestial references. It will derive
power from photovoltaic cells during solar-oriented periods and from
batteries during boost and other periods during which the spacecraft is
not oriented toward the Sun. The Flight Spacecraft will include a two-
way communication system that will transmit data to and receive commands
from Earth.
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The Flight Spacecraft will carry a science payload capable of accomplish-
ing the science mission postulated in Section 2.1.2, and will either
transport a Flight Capsule to Mars or will perform the designated
mission if it is launched without a Flight Capsule. The spacecraft will
supply power, telemetry, data handling, and command transmission to the
Flight Capsule. Upon ground command, the Flight Spacecraft will orient
the Planetary Vehicle in any direction and initiate the separation
sequence.
The Flight Spacecraft will include a modular propulsion unit that will
perform trajectory corrections, orbit insertion, and orbit trim maneuvers.
Interplanetary Trajectory Corrections--To meet the lO-day arrival date
separation requirement between the two Planetary Vehicles, and to perform
all necessary interplanetary trajectory corrections and trajectory
biasing, a total velocity increment capability of 200 meters per second
will be provided for each Planetary Vehicle.
Mars Orbit Insertion--The minimum velocity increment for Planetary Vehicle
Mars-orbit insertion will not be less than 2.0 kilometers per second,
with a design goal of 2.2 kilometers per second.
Mars Orbit Trim--A total velocity increment of i00 meters per second
will be provided to the total mass in Mars orbit prior to Flight Capsule
separation.
The trajectory for the 1971 mission will be established based on the
following constraints:
l) Type I transfer trajectories that have a maximum C 3 of 25 km2/sec 2
will be used.
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2)
3)
4)
Hyperbolic excess velocity at Mars will not exceed 4.5 kilometers
per second_
The absolute value of DLA will not be less than 5 degrees, and the
inclination of the heliocentric transfer plane to the ecliptic plane
will not be less than 0.i degree_
Flight Spacecraft orbit insertion and the Flight Capsule deorbit
maneuver will occur within view of the Deep Space Instrumentation
Facility (DSIF) at Goldstone, California$
The separation between Planetary Vehicle arrival dates at Mars will
not be less than i0 days.
2.1.1 Mission Profile
The Voyager 1971 nominal mission consists of four major phases: launch
and transit, Planetary Vehicle orbit achievement, Mars entry, and Flight
Spacecraft orbital operations. Each phase with its respective events,
is illustrated in Figure 2-i (see Section 3.9 for functional sequence
details).
The following phase events are grouped into distinctive modes of opera-
............ ......... w...... lity ul success goals
Launch and Transit Phase--Launch to an Earth-orbit altitude of 100
nautical miles is performed using the Saturn V launch system. Following
S-II burnout, the forward nose fairing is jettisoned at approximately
350,000 feet. After Earth-orbit coast, a 2 to 90 minute variable, the
S-IVB stage is restarted and both Planetary Vehicles are injected into a
heliocentric trajectory. The probability of a successful launch and in-
jection is 0.85, as a goal.
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Following S-IVB shutdown, the forward Planetary Vehicle is separated and
the aft nose fairing is folded back for subsequent separation of the aft
vehicle. Upon separation, the external equipment on each vehicle is de-
ployed and maneuvers are initiated to acquire celestial reference. There
is a 0.84 cumulative probability of success associated with separating
at least one vehicle, attitude reference acquisition, and subsequent
positioning on the specified heliocentric transfer trajectory. This
probability value includes the trajectory correction maneuvers described
below.
Subsequent to Planetary Vehicle separation, the S-IVB with attached aft
nose fairing performs a retromaneuver if necessary to satisfy planetary
quarantine constraints and separation requirements established by the
Spacecraft System.
Approximately 4 days after launch, the two Planetary Vehicles perform
midcourse maneuvers to correct velocity or pointing errors imparted by
the launch vehicle and to bias the vehicles so that they arrive at Mars
at least i0 days apart. If additional mid-course maneuvers are neces-
sary, they will be performed not later than 30 days before Mars encounter.
The Flight Capsule sterilization canisters are jettisoned into a non-
impact trajectory ten days prior to Mars encounter.
Depending on the specific launch date, the transit time to Mars can
range between 120 and 235 days. Measurements of the interplanetary
medium and engineering data from the vehicles are transmitted to Earth
during this phase.
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Planetary Vehicle Orbit Achievement Phase--At Mars encounter, the orbit-
insertion engine is fired to insert the vehicle into a nominal orbit
having a lO00-kilometer periapsis altitude) a 20,O00-kilometer apoapsis
altitude, and a 13.8-hour orbital period. One or more orbit-trim maneu-
vers may be performed to achieve the final specified orbit. The cumula-
tive probability of success is 0.78 as a goal for acceptable orbit
placement of at least one Planetary Vehicle.
Mars Entry Phase--Between 3 and i0 days after orbit achievement, the
Flight Capsule is separated and deorbited so that it will impact the
Martian surface. Throughout descent) data is transmitted from the
capsule to the orbiter and stored for later transmission to Earth. Cumu-
lative success values for one Flight Capsule are apportioned as follows:
separation of FlightlSpacecraft and capsule--0.76; capsule injection in-
to impact trajectory--0.72; capsule performance--0.63.
Orbital Phase--Durlng orbit around Mars, the scientific instruments and
cameras on the spacecraft sense the Martian environment. Spacecraft
operation is required for one month and as long thereafter as possible.
There is a 0.65 cumulative probability of success that at least one
Flight Spacecraft will perform the completed mission sequence defined in
the preceding paragraphs.
2.1.2 Science Subsystem Characteristics and Requirements
The Science Subsystem, which is government-furnished equipment provided
by JPL) will be mounted on the Spacecraft Bus. It consists of science
instruments and associated electronics, data automation equipment,
planetary scan platforms, instrument booms, power control, electronic
switching, and science command decoding equipment.
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The Science Subsystem, as identified by JPL, obtains information concern_
ing the atmosphere, surface, body characteristics, and environment of
Mars by performing unmanned experiments in orbit about the planet. It
also provides the secondary capability to expand knowledge of the inter-
planetary medium between the orbits of the Earth and Mars by obtaining
scientific and engineering measurements while the Planetary Vehicle is in
transit.
The Science Subsystem, as described by JPL, is summarized in the follow-
ing paragraph.
_--A preliminary weight allocation for the Science Subsystem is
given below.
Components (Pounds)
Instruments on Scan Platform .............. i00
Instruments on Spacecraft Bus ............. 140
Data Automation Equipment, Booms, Platforms,
Cabling, etc .................... 160
Total Weight ...................... 400
Electrical Power--Primary power allocation is a minimum of 70 watts to
science instruments on the scan platform and 40 watts to instruments in
the Spacecraft Bus. Secondary power to operate e!ectromechanica! devices_
such as the platform control motor, will be provided as necessary.
Data Automation Equipment <DAE)--D.C. signals will not be carried across
the interface of the Spacecraft Bus and data automation equipment. The
DAE will furnish a separate data line that includes real-time science
data as well as a separate data line including non-real-time science data.
The DAE will perform all required input buffering and data formating for
the science data recorders and will control their operational sequences.
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Platform Pointinq--The random angular motion of the scan platform will be
limited so that the maximum random angular velocity of the optical point-
ing axis relative to the planet local vertical is less than 1.3 x 10-4
radian per second. The scan-platform control subsystem will align the
boresight axis of the platform to within 1.0 degree of the center of the
planet. (This applies only during planetary orbit and when Sun-Spacecraft-
planet angle is equal to or less than 80 degrees.) The design of the
scan platform and mount will keep the vibration environment of the
instruments to within Voyager specification limits.
Thermal Control--The spacecraft and the thermal control system will be
designed to maintain all scientific instruments and electronics to within
specified temperature limits throughout the entire spacecraft mission.
Science Instruments--The body-fixed science instruments are mounted on the
Spacecraft Bus in locations that satisfy look angles and positions. Instru-
ment booms will be necessary to meet requirements of the magnetometer and
some particle and photon sensors. Special antennas will also be required
for radio-frequency experiments. Sequential deployment of booms and antennas
may be required to satisfy instrument functional requirements.
Science Data Manaqement--The Science Subsystem does not store data within
its own system; therefore_ the Elight Spacecraft will store at least
5 x 107 bits of data 9 with a design goal of 5 x 10 8 bits. Individual
Science Subsystem tape recorder requirements are for: two television
cameras_ the IR and UV spectrometer_ the IR scanner_ science data gener-
ated during maneuvers_ and fields and particle measurements during a
solar flare.
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Functional Restraints on Spacecraft Bus--The Science Subsystem imposes
functional restraints on the following spacecraft subsystems: power,
computing and sequencing, telemetry, command, data storage, structural
and mechanical, pyrotechnic, temperature control_ guidance and control
and cabling.
2.1.3 Flight Spacecraft Subsystems
The requirements of a given subsystem that affect the requirements
of other subsystems are listed in this section under the appropriate
subsystem headings. Requirements that specifically apply to one
subsystem will be listed in Section 4.0 (Volume A).
General requirements that apply to more than one subsystem are:
i) No gas or solid ejecta from any subsystem will contaminate Mars.
2) No single failure mode of an electrical or electronic part or com-
ponent will cause a catastrophic effect (defined in Table 3.17-1)
on the mission.
3) Slip rings will not be used in any subsystem.
4) All subsystems and the bus structure will be capable of with-
standing the shock, linear acceleration_ and vibration loads
resulting from transportation, launch and injection9 separation
and maneuvers, and orbit insertion.
5) The Flight Spacecraft will be contained within a dynamic envelope
having a maximum diameter of 240 inches and a maximum length of 208
inches.
6) Signals from the computing and sequencing subsystem will initiate
Flight Capsule separation and emergency separation of the capsule:
a) Separation of the Flight Spacecraft and Flight Capsule normally
will be effected above the structural field joint_
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b) An emergency separation system will be designed for a possible
malfunction within the Flight Capsule.
Separation of the Planetary Vehicle and launch vehicle will be con-
trolled by the launch vehicle.
Materials allowable strength information will be taken from MIL-
Handbook 5_ JPL-approved contractor test data, or other JPL-approved
sources,
All subsystems will be designed with proven techniques that allow
for uncertainties, off-design conditions, and partial failures.
All subsystem designs will incorporate as many space-proven materials,
connectors, wire insulation_ and wire types as possible to improve
reliability.
The flexibility to revise interconnecting wiring or to add wires as
the program progresses will be considered.
To suppress corona, rapid venting of entrapped gas and the use of
selected materials and techniques will be considered.
Engineering measurements of all subsystems will be made to evaluate
subsystem operation.
The grounding concept of the Flight Spacecraft and its subsystems
will be as defined in the September 17, 1965_ JPL-released general
specification9 "Performance and Design Requirements for the Voyager
1971 Spacecraft System9 General Specification For, Preliminary."
Boeing interprets the ground concept to be such that the subsystem
power buses are referenced to a single ground point. Only one of
the buses is tied to the spacecraft structure. All signal and
rf circuits are referenced to a separate, single point ground.
Pyrotechnic circuits are referenced to a third, single point
ground.
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15) Regulated d.c. power will not be distributed to spacecraft loads.
16) Ground-command override of critical automatic switching will be pro-
vided.
17) Flight Spacecraft operations will be automatic and capable of a
complete nominal mission without ground command; however, ground
command will be provided as a backup.
18) The mass properties of the Flight Capsule will be:
a) 1971 and 1973 (2000 pounds)--Ix=Iy=Iz= 1500 slug ft2;
b) 1975 and 1977 (8000 pounds)--IX=Iy=IZ= 8000 slug ft 2.
19) The spacecraft will be transportable by air and/or soft-ride van.
20) Materials will be selected for a 2-year lifetime, on the basis of
corrosion resistance, fungus resistance, nonmagnetic properties,
structural efficiency_ compatibility with thermal control coatings,
and vacuumstability.
21) Design will prevent vacuum welding of surfaces requiring relative
motion.
2.1.3.1 Power Subsystem
The Flight Spacecraft electrical-power subsystem will contain two power
sources. Solar panels will provide power to the Flight Spacecraft as
soon as the Sun is acquired after interplanetary trajectory injection.
This power will be continuous during solar acquisition until the end of
Flight Spacecraft operation. The second source, batteries, will be used
during all off-Sun periods.
The power subsystem will provide a precision clock, clock oscillator_ and
countdown register. The power subsystem will continuously distribute
conditioned power to the Flight Spacecraft.
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2.1.3.2 Computing and Sequencing Subsystem
The computing and sequencing subsystem will provide all timed, sequenced,
or ground-directed commands to all other Flight Spacecraft subsystems.
All timed or sequenced commands will be preset into the subsystem before
launch, thus allowing the subsystem to execute all functions from launch
The specific sub-to mission completion without further ground command.
system requirements are:
l)
2)
The subsystem will be capable of:
a) Restoring total state of C&S and its outputs after a power failure;
b) A timing accuracy of 1 part in 106;
c) Executing 140 different commands;
The subsystem will provide timed outputs for cumulative, periodic,
and/or reference times from:
a)
b)
c)
Launch--both independent of and dependent on launch date;
Arrival at the planet--both independent and dependent on launch
date and/or date of arrival;
The receipt of a radio-initiated command.
2.1.3.3 Guidance and Control Subsystem
The guidance and control subsystem will acquire and maintain external
attitude reference, which is necessary to stabilize the Planetary Vehicle
attitude. It will orient the vehicle for orbit insertion, midcourse
maneuvers, and orbit trim maneuvers, and will control sensor and
antenna pointing. This subsystem consists of an attitude reference unit,
autopilot, reaction-control assembly, planet-sensor assembly, and antenna-
pointing mechanism and controller. Specific requirements of this subsystem
are:
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l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
A passive control stabilization, such as derived rate, will be used
during cruise phase;
The star sensor in the attitude reference unit will not have moving
parts that are subject to wear or cold vacuum welding;
The subsystem will make measurements of the planetary approach
geometry, which will be used for Mars orbit determination;
The reaction control unit will maintain or change the attitude of
the Planetary Vehicle during cruise and the attitude of the Planetary
Vehicle and Flight Spacecraft during Mars orbit;
The reaction control unit will orient vehicle attitude for trajectory
corrections, orbit insertion, orbit trim, and capsule-separation
maneuvers.
2.1.3.4 Radio Subsystems
The radio subsystem will provide communication between the Flight Space-
craft and the DSN. It provides the means for the Flight Spacecraft to
send telemetry data to the DSN and for the DSN to send operation directions
to the Flight Spacecraft command system. It will also receive Flight
Capsule data signals. The design of the radio subsystem will be compati-
ble with the use of 85-foot and 210-foot DSIF S-band antennas. The
following requirements also apply to the radio subsystem:
i) The subsystem will be capable of receiving data at the rate of
5 x 104 bps from the Flight Capsule during the capsule's flight
from Mars orbit to the surface of Mars;
2) The subsystem will be capable of simultaneously receiving commands
and transmitting both telemetry and tracking signals.
2-15
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
3)
4)
The nominal rf power level transmitted from the Flight Spacecraft
_ill be 50 watts--minimum power level, 36 watts_
Data rate will be at least 600 bps at the end of 6 months of orbital
operations for a 13.8 hour orbit period.
2.1.3.5 Telemetry Subsystem
The telemetry subsystem will accept data outputs from other Flight
Spacecraft subsystems and transducers and process this data for input
to the radio subsystem as a serial pulse-code-modulated digital signal.
The telemetry subsystem will provide an adequate number of different
bit rates so that all phases of the flight mission profile are properly
covered.
Specific requirements for the telemetry subsystem are:
i) For a single launch_ the telemetry data rate will not exceed
15,000 bps;
2) The Flight Spacecraft will be capable of transmitting a minimum of
2.5 x 106 bits per day of cruise science data to £arth;
3) The Flight Spacecraft will be capable of transmitting a minimum of
5 x 107 bits per day of science payload data to Earth at the end of
the 6-month orbit operation about Mars_
4) The information bit error rate will not exceed 5 in i03;
5) Reduced (degraded) modes of operation will be provided if the
primary mode fails_
6) The Flight Capsule will have a one-way communication link with the
Flight Spacecraft.
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2.1.3.6 Command Subsystem
The command subsystem, in conjunction with the radio subsystem and the
DSIF ground equipment, provides a means of controlling Flight Spacecraft
functions from Earth by radio command. The command subsystem also sends
quantitative commands to the computing and sequencing subsystem to deter-
mine maneuver parameters. Specifically, the command subsystem will:
z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Update initiate-times of all commands_
Provide commands to C&S and DAE for execution and ground verification_
Select modes of operation;
Select an emergency or low data rate_
Provide capability for ground-command override,
2.1.3.7 Data Storage Subsystem
The data storage subsystem will record digital data from the Spacecraft
Science Payload subsystem and will record engineering and cruise science
data from the Flight Spacecraft telemetry subsystem. The subsystem will
buffer information received from the Flight Capsule relay link and the
capsule relay link recorder at rates compatible with the telemetry sub-
system. The minimum requirements compatible with telemetry transmission
rates and orbital period are:
capsule relay link recorder;
2) Total data storage capacity of 3.82 x 108 bits, and a reproduce
capability of 7500 bps_
3) Data storage and reproduce requirements for the individual
recorders are listed in Table 4.1.4-1.
2.1.3.8 Structures and Mechanical Subsystem
The structures portion of the structures and mechanical subsystem supports
all major elements of the Planetary Vehicle including the Flight Capsule,
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the propulsion module, and the Science Subsystem. The primary structure
also serves as a thermal load path between many of the electronic
assemblies and provides meteoroid protection for internal components.
The mechanisms portion of the subsystem provides for attachment and de-
ployment of the low- and high-gain antennas, solar panels, guidance scan
platform, Flight Capsule emergency separation, and Planetary Vehicle
separation.
2.1.3.9 Pyrotechnic Subsystem
The pyrotechnic subsystem deploys solar panels, magnetometer, and
antennas, and initiates protective-cover release, emergency Flight Capsule
separation, Planetary Vehicle separation, solid motor ignition, and pro-
pulsion subsystem valve actuations. Pyrotechnic initiation is commanded
by the computing and sequencing subsystem (with backup command from the
command subsystem), with the exception of solar-panel deployment, which
receives initial command from the separation-initiated timer (SIT) with
backup from the computing and sequencing subsystem and command subsystem.
The following specific requirements apply to the pyrotechnic subsystem:
l) Power to the pyrotechnic subsystem will be enabled by the normally
open contacts of a safe-and-arm device;
2) No single or common failure mode (including procedural deviation)
will both arm and command the pyrotechnic subsystem;
3) Power for actuation of electro-explosive devices will be drawn only
from electrical energy storage within the pyrotechnic firing equipment.
2.1.8.10 Temperature Control Subsystem
The temperature control subsystem will maintain the Flight Spacecraft
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within the specified operating temperature range throughout a normal
mission, and will provide a reasonable margin for uncertainties and off-
design conditions.
The Flight Spacecraft temperature is controlled by radiation-type vacuum
insulation blankets, individual temperature-actuated louvers, radiation-
shield liners_ thermal coatings, low-thermal-conductance joints, and
backup electrical heaters.
The temperature control subsystem will be designed to:
l)
2)
3)
4)
Depend on radiation as the primary mode of heat dissipation;
Operate satisfactorily during Planetary Vehicle maneuvering;
Operate satisfactorily throughout variations of electrical heat
dissipation in the Flight Spacecraft;
Be compatible with meteroid protection requirements.
2.1.3.11 Cabling Subsystem
The Flight Spacecraft cabling will provide electrical interconnection
between equipment items in all parts of the Flight Spacecraft as well as
the separable items.
The following requirements apply:
i) The cabling subsystem will be designed to supress electromagnetic
interference_ magnetic interference, corona, and capacitance coupling;
2) The cable assemblies will be separated according to function:
a)
b)
Power circuitry will be routed separately from all other systems,
Pyrotechnic circuit cables will be routed separately from all
other circuits and from each other,
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Signal circuits (including the data system) will be routed
separate from a) and b),
RF cables will be routed separately where necessary,
Separate cable assemblies will be required within the nose
fairing for fairing separation circuits.
2.1.3.12 Propulsion Subsystem
The propulsion subsystem will provide the thrust required to: correct
the interplanetary trajectory of the Planetary Vehicle to ensure proper
Mars encounter, place the Planetary Vehicle into orbit around Mars, and
ensure proper Mars-orbit trim.
Because of these functions, the propulsion subsystem will provide a
high thrust capability and a restartable low thrust capability.
The propulsion subsystem will be modularized. To the maximum degree
possible, consistent with good design, it will be installed as a complete
package.
The following are subsystem requirements.
i) The propulsion subsystem will weight no more than 15,000 pounds; the
structural system must support this weight.
2) The subsystem must be capable of performing after space vacuum
environment storage up to 400 days.
3) Internal components that come in contact with freon and nitrogen will
be compatible with sterilization processes defined in JPL Specifica-
tions XSO-30275-TST-A and C_40-50198-ETS.
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2.1.3.13 Planetary Vehicle Adapter
Each Planetary Vehicle Adapter will secure one Planetary Vehicle to the
launch vehicle nose fairing. Yhe adapter will be a simple mechanical
system that provides structural support to the Planetary Vehicle during
the boost phase, and will be one that is easily removed following
injection into a heliocentric trajectory. The adapter will retain the
separation system components after separation from the Planetary Vehicle.
It will support a Planetary Vehicle weight of 19,500 pounds.
2.2 DESIGN RESYRAINYS
Section 2.2 describes the design restraints applicable to the Flight
Spacecraft,with particular emphasis on natural and induced environments.
Also included are the restraints imposed by planetary quarantine9 vehicle
attitude, perturbation and separation requirements_ and reliability and
safety.
All design concepts, materials9 and components considered for the Voyager
1971 mission will have a development freeze date 5 months from Phase IB
go-ahead. Only the design concepts that have been developed and have
demonstrated feasibility by that date will be considered for inclusion in
the Voyager 1971 mission.
2.2.1 Radiation Sources
Yhe flux produced by artificial or natural radioactive material on-board
the Flight Spacecraft must not produce an increase in the counting rate
of the interplanetary radiation instruments in excess of 1.0 percent of
the interplanetary background rate.
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2.2.2 Magnetic Interference
Maximum Maqnetic Field--The maximum magnetic field caused by the Flight
Spacecraft, at the science magnetometer sensor9 will be:
i) Less than 1 gamma for a demagnetized Flight Spacecraft under all
normal operating conditions;
2) Less than i0 gamma for a Flight Spacecraft exposed to a magnetic
field of at least 25 oersteds.
No single assembly will contribute more than 20 percent of the total
allowable field at the magnetometer sensor.
Materials--All materials, processes, and parts used in the Flight Space-
craft should be nonmagnetic or, if ferromagnetic, they should be restricted
to usage where magnetic field constraints are not violated.
Maqnetic Field Stability--Magnetlc fields will be stable to the extent
that the field at the magnetometer sensor does not change by more than
0.i gamma from that obtained in the normal cruise condition due %o:
i) A change between any two operational modes after initial transients
have died out (less than a few minutes)_
2) Voltage or current changes over the full design range of the sub-
system for any individual operating mode.
The £1ight Spacecraft will be magnetically evaluated after being
subjected to:
l)
2)
3)
Magnetization in a magnetic field of not less than 50 oersteds_
Demagnetization by a decreasing alternating field of initial peak
value less than i00 oersteds_
Operational modes of the energized spacecraft.
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In designing Flight Spacecraft circuitry, the requirements for subsequent
deperming, Item 2 in preceding paragraph, will be given consideration, and
the enclosed area of circuit loops will be held to a minimum.
2.2.3 Environment
This section describes the environment encountered for all parts, compon-
ents, and the Flight Spacecraft. JPL's "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document is identified as the primary source of the following data. Sub-
paragraphs of this section contain a matrix of environmental parameters
considered versus location, event, or operation. The matrix symbols are
defined as follows. NA: Not applicable (not a controlling spacecraft
design factor): X: indicates that either a partial or complete estimate of
the environment is discussed or the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document description is referenced; a blank indicates that no estimate is
currently available.
2.2.3.1 Manufacturing and Shipment Environment
Table 2-1 shows environmental considerations for manufacturing, shipping,
and storage.
g
z
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Table 2-1:
IN MANUFACTURE, SHIPMENT, AND STORAGE
Parameter
Temperature
Humidity
Shock
Vibration
Contaminants
Solvents and Chemicals
Ma@netics
Symbols:
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
4-* '+' +_ _ 0."0 tm _ C'_ k+_ "0 IZ _ t_ -,-I C: -,_ -,4 cn 0
o c o o o .c: _ _z o _z >.
_. _tO 0 _x: co :_: coL3 u) u) 09
X X X X
X X X
C: 0 C: _n
_ _ • •
X X
NA
X X
X X
X
NA
X X
X X
X X
NA - Not Applicable
X - Environment Specified
Blank - Environment Not Defined
NA
X
NA
X
NA
X
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Temperature--The temperature of components or assemblies after manu-
facturing will not exceed flight acceptance testing limits. Temper-
ature of the Flight Spacecraft during shipment and storage will be
maintained between 35 and lO0°F. Silver-cadmium batteries will be
stored between 20 and 50°F at ETR before installation in the Flight
Spacecraft.
Humidity--The Flight Spacecraft will not be exposed to relative
humidity in excess of 50 percent.
Shock--Shock caused by accidental drop of unpackaged parts or com-
ponents during handling for inspection, assembly, tests, or trans-
portation is not expected to exceed:
a) Two-inch vertical drop onto a wood (fir) bench flat on the face
of the component;
b) Tilt drop--a component edge will be used as a pivot and the
opposite edge will be raised 4 inches from the bench, or as
high as practical.
Vibration--Vibration environment during manufacturing, bench test-
ing, and repair will be controlled. The maximum vibration environ-
ment will be defined.
Contaminants--Exposure to contaminants will be controlled as speci-
fied in Section 3.13.
Solvents and Chemicals--During shipment and storage, the Flight Space-
craft will be protected to preclude exposure to chemicals and solvents.
Magnetics--In the manufacturing process, the Flight Spacecraft and
its components can be exposed to magnetizing fields in addition to
that of the normal Earth's field. The effect of such fields will de
depend on the amount and type of magnetic material in the Flight
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Spacecraft components, the magnitude and proximity of such fields,
and mechanical forces exerted on the component. A reduction in any
of these reduces the effects. The maximum magnetic field to which
Flight Spacecraft components will be exposed during manufacture is
i00 oersteds. The magnetic stability of the Flight Spacecraft or
Flight Capsule will be affected by shock and vibration during
shipping. The exact amount of this effect will be determined.
2.2.3.2 Test and Prelaunch Environment
Table 2-2 shows environmental considerations during test and prelaunch.
Table 2-2: ENVIRONN_NYAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING
TEST AND PRELAUNCH
Par.
No. Parameter
i. Temperature
2. Humidity
3. Vibration
o
o
Pressure
Shock
Electrical
Transients
Corrosive
Atmo sphere
_ubsystem SAY (S/C Assy ESA (Explosive- On
Labs Facility) Safe Area) Pad
x A
X
NA NA NA
NA X X
NA NA
Contamination
NA
NA
X
EYO
-6. EMI X X X X
7. Magnetics X X X
o
9.
Heat Steriliza-
tion
Deperming and Mapping
Explosive
Atmosphere
Solar Radiation
Acceleration
Symbo is : NA - Not Applicable
X - Environment Specified
Blank - Environment Not Determined
X
X
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Temperature--The temperature of the Flight Spacecraft will be main-
tained between 35 and lO0°F before battery installation and between
35 and 75°F after installation. During prelaunch operations,
Flight Spacecraft subsystems will be designed to tolerate local
temperatures corresponding to a bulk gas temperature within the
nose fairing of between 45 and 65°F in the steady state.
Humidity--The Flight Spacecraft will not be exposed to relative
humidity in excess of 50 percent.
Vibration--The vibration environment of the subsystems through the
explosive-safe area (ESA) will be limited by a control program.
The limits for vibration exposure will be estimated; however, these
limited will not influence the Flight Spacecraft design and, there-
fore, are indicated in Table 2-2 as not applicable.
Electrical Transients--Induced voltage levels up to a 50-volt peak
are expected to be coupled into Voyager system cabling due to power
transients. A representative transient is shown in Figure 1 of the
JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions" document.
Corrosive Atmosphere--The Flight Spacecraft will be protected from
exposure to corrosive atmosphere at the subsystem laboratories and
spacecraft assembly facility (SAF)_ therefore, this environment is
indicated as not applicable in Table 2-2.
Electromagnetic Radiation--At the launch pad, launch vehicle trans-
mitters and Cape Kennedy rf sources, such as radar, will provide an
electromagnetic environment to the Flight Spacecraft. No information
exists on the shielding properties of the launch vehicle nose fairing,
but, if a transparent nose fairing will be the worst case9 rf power
densities in Table 2-3 will be used.
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Table 2-3:
Prequency ESA
0.150-100
100-150
225-260
400-550
1200-1400
12200-2900
5400-5900
8500-i0_000
2
4
i0
20
18
20
POWER DENSITY LEVELS (DB_VMETER)
Enroute
2
4
10
30
0
28
30
Pad
2
4
36
i0
30
28
3O
Ascent
2
4
36
10
30
28
3O
Parkinq
36
23
23
I
In addition to frequency ranges listed in Table 2-3, very-low-
frequency radiation spectra of lightning discharge occur from about
1 to 40 kc.
7) Magnetics--During magnetic stability evaluation and testing, d.c.
magnetizing and a.c. demagnetizing fields as high as i00 oersteds
will be used on subassemblies9 assemblies9 and the assembled Flight
Spacecraft. The frequency of these demagnetizing fields, which will
have an effect in circuit loops9 will be 60 cps for assemblies and
smaller components but will be restricted to less than 1 cps for
system tests. It is assumed that small components and nonelectrical
hardware will be exposed to concentrated 60-cps demagnetizing fields
as high as i000 oersteds.
8) Explosive Atmosphere--It is assumed that the Flight Spacecraft will be
exposed to an explosive atmosphere when on the launch vehicle. This
atmosphere might consist of oxygen, hydrogen, RP-19 and hydrazine.
9) Acceleration--It is assumed that the Flight Spacecraft will be
exposed to accelerations in the upward direction of 1.5 g's maximum
during hoisting. Maximum incremental accelerations during onsite
transportation should not exceed 0.5 g in any direction. While on
the launch vehicle before launch_ the Flight Spacecraft should not
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experience accelerations greater than 0.15 g due to ground-wind
excitation of the launch vehicle.
2.2.3.3 Launch Environment
Table 2-4 shows environmental considerations during launch.
Table 2-4: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING LAUNCH
g
z
o.
On
1.
2.
2.
3.
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Parameter
Shock
Acceleration 9
Low Frequency
Vibration
Random
Acoustic
Static
Acceleration
Temp. and Thermal
Transients
Pressure
Reduction
Electromagnetic
Radiation
Electrical
Transients
Electrically
Conductive Gas
Electrostatic
Ch 9 and Discharge
Cleanliness
Solar Radiation
Albedo
Magnetics
0
+J D
J
C
O (n n
+_ c" 0 0
•H 0 D 4_ _D -_
H _0 9 .,4 -_ .4 0%
OO ) O O O-_ CL
C ,--I ._ u) u) u) CO 0
NA NA
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X NA
X X X X X
X X X X X
(D
0
c >
•_ c c
k o c c >_o
•_ -_ 0 0 _ -_
_ ._ On ._ _ 4_
X X NA X X
NA X NA X NA
NA X NA X NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA X NA X NA
Symbo i s :
X X X X X
NA X X X X X NA NA NA N_
X X X X X
X X X
X X X X X
X
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA
X X X X X
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
X X X X X
NA - Not Applicable
X - Environment Specified
Blank - Environment Not Defined
NA NA NA NA
X
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X
2-28
DBOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
l)
2)
Shock--Local shocks will be experienced by the Flight Spacecraft
due to pyrotechnic firings. Shock response from these environments
is approximated by an input consisting of 200-g terminal peak saw-
tooth with a rise time of 0.7 to 1.0 millisecond. There are tran-
sient events to be expected during various portions of the flight.
The transient events are insignificant compared to nose fairing and
Planetary Vehicle separation shocks.
Random Vibration, Low-Frequency Acceleration and Static Acceleration--
The response to the random vibration environment used in the design
of components shall be based on the environment specified in the
JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions" document. Limit accelera-
tion factors used for preliminary structural design are shown in the
following table for both launch and orbit insertion conditions. As
indicated by the footnotes, some of the entries have been adjusted
to include conservative dynamic response increments.
Limit Acceleration
Condition
Launch
Orbit Insertion
Z Axis
+5.69
- 2.8 g*
0
t 5 g*
- 3.5 g**
X or Y Axis
_+2 g*
±2 g*
0
0
0
Torsion About Z
0
0
i0 rad/sec 2
0
0
* Dynamic response factors included.
*_ Applicable only to deployed appendages due to their dynamic response
at thrust termination.
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4)
6)
7)
8)
9)
lO)
3) Acoustic--The external acoustic environment shall be the same as
that described in the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document.
Temperature and Thermal Transients:
a) Maximum heat rate from the nose fairing to the Flight Space-
craft will be assumed to be 65 watts/sq, ft.9 totally enveloping
IR heat flux during Earth orbit and early cruise;
b) Maximum heat rate from the nose fairing to the Flight Spacecraft
will be assumed to be 40 watts/sq, ft. during Earth orbit and
early cruise_
c) Maximum aerodynamic (nose-fairing-off) heat rate will be assumed
to be 24.2 watts/sq, ft. during Earth orbit and early cruise.
Pressure Reduction During Ascent--The ambient pressure versus time is
shown in the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions" document.
Electromagnetic Radiation Envlronment--See Table 2-3.
Electrical Transients--The electrical transients on the umbilical
cable wires during launch are assumed to be those of Figure 1 of the
JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions" document. Possible transients
due to separation of launch vehicles are to be determined.
Electrically Conductive Gas--An electrically conductive gas from the
launch vehicle might envelop the Flight Spacecraft and provide a con-
ductive environment. The actual conductive value will be determined.
Electrostatic Charge and Discharge--The space vehicle will generate an
electrostatic discharge during launch, the magnitude of which will be
determined.
Cleanliness--Contamination of the Flight Spacecraft after launch can
occur from any one of several possible sources: smoking or outgassing
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ll)
12)
13)
of materials, loosening of particles and debris from the nose fair-
ing and adapter systems by acoustic or mechanical vibrations, V-
5and separation pyrotechnics9 or a retropropulsion maneuver. If
pyrotechnic devices are used to separate the nose fairing, special
particulate contamination problems will arise.
Solar Electromagnetic Radiation--The Solar spectrum outside the
Earth's atmosphere will be assumed to have the shape of the
"Johnson Curve" with integrated intensity of 127 watts/sq, ft.
Albedo Radiation--With an average terrestial albedo of 0.36, the
reflected radiation is 45.2 watts/sq, ft.
Magnetics--The combination of vibration and the ambient magnetic
field associated with launch will affect the magnetic stability of
the Flight Spacecraft. The exact nature of the ambient field at
launch is not established; however, it is believed to be slightly
different from that of the normal Earth's magnetic field because
of the umbilical tower and launch vehicle. Vibration and shock
will also affect the magnetic stability of the Planetary Vehicle.
The extent of these effects will be determined.
2.2.3.4 Postlaunch Environment
Table 2-5 shows environmental considerations relative to postlaunch.
l)
2)
Planetary Upper Atmostheres and Interplanetary Space--The atmosphere
and matter density for near-Earth, cruise, flyby, and Mars orbit are
the same as shown in the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document.
Solar Thermal Radiation--The solar thermal radiation for near-Earth,
cruise, Mars encounter, and Mars orbit is the same as shown in the
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Table 2-5: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE TO POSTLAUNCH
Par.
No.
le
o
o
o
5.
o
Q
8.
Near Mars
Parameter Earth Cruise Flyby Orbit
Planetary Upper X X X X
Atmosphere
Solar Thermal X X X X
Radiation
Corpuscular
Radiation
Geomagnetically
Trapped Particle
Radiation
Galactic Cosmic
Radiation
Radioisotope
Thermoelectric
Generator Rad.
Solar Cosmic
Radiation
X NA X X
X X X X
X X
Solar Flares X X X X
Solar Wind X X X X
Auroral Radiation
Meteoroid Env.
Electromagnetic
Environment
Electromagnetic
Radiation
External
Internal
Temperature
Albedo & Planetary
Thermal Radiation
X NA NA NA
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
NA NA
SYMBOLS NA Not Applicable
X Environment Defined
Blank Environment Not Defined
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3)
4)
5)
6)
JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions" document.
Corpuscular Radiation--The geomagnetically trapped radiation, galac-
tic cosmic radiation, radioisotope thermoelectric generator radiation,
solar cosmic radiation, and auroral radiation environments are the
same as described in the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document, and the November 12, 1965, "Errata."
Meteoroid Environment-- _he meteoroid environment to which the Flight
Spacecraft will be exposed is the same as that shown in the JPL
"Voyager Environmental Predictions" document, and the November 12,
1965, "Errata."
Magnetic Environment--The magnetic environment for near-Earth magnetic
field and cruise magnetic field is the same as shown in the JPL
"Voyager Environmental Predictions" document.
Electromagnetic Radiation:
a) Internal Electromagnetic Radiation--The harmonics from any power
subsystem square-wave power supply can be expected to be present
on the wiring and to be radiated throughout the Flight Spacecraft_
b) Transients with a general waveform as shown in Figure i of the JPL
"Voyager Environmental Predictions" document can be expected to
occur on some of the Flight Spacecraft cabling wires. The
degree of coupling to adjacent lines can be estimated to be unity
as a worst case.
2.2.3.5 Postlaunch Pyrotechnic and Propulsion Events
Table 2-6 shows environmental considerations during postlaunch pyrotech-
nic and propulsion events.
i) Acceleration--Maximum sustained acceleration in the thrust direction
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2)
direction during Planetary Vehicle retropropulsion firing is 3.5 g's
(2000-pound capsule).
Shock--Ignition of the Flight Spacecraft retroprepulsion will gener-
ate shock loads within the Flight Spacecraft. Because the ignition
transient is unknown at this time, the shock effect on the Flight
Spacecraft will be taken as that which would be generated by a step
application of thrust.
Table 2-6: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING POSTLAUNCH
PYROTECHNIC AND PROPULSION EVENTS
Par
No.
lo
2.
3.
4.
.
lidcourse Orbit
laneuvers
Parameter
Vibration
Acceleratlon
Orbit Flight
Insertion Trim Spacecraft tion
Trajectory Canister
Deflection Opening
X X
Steriliza- Capsule
Spacecraft
Separation
Shock
Thermal
Transients
Charge
Buildup
(From Com-,
bustion)
Exhaust
Gases
Contamination
Microbial I
Particulat_
SYMBOLS: NA
X
Blank
X X
X X X X
X X X X NA NA
X X X X NA NA
NA NA NA
Not Applicable
Environment Specified
Environment Not Determined
3) Thermal Transients--Thermal transients during maneuvers as severe as
going full-Sun to full-shade, and vice versa, can be anticipated.
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Charge Buildup from Combustion and Exhaust Gases--These environments
are the same as shown in the JPL "Voyager Environmental Predictions"
document.
2.2.3.6 Planetary Environments
An orbiting Flight Spacecraft will be affected by the albedo, infrared
radiation, and surface temperature of Mars.
The albedo of Mars is 0.15. The color index of Mars (1.3 to 1.0) is
relatively high compared with the 0.5 index of the Sun.
The yearly mean blackbody effective temperature is assumed to be -13°C
(9°F) for the sunlit side and -73oc (-100°F) for the dark side. Varia-
tions caused by the eccentricity of the Martian orbit are accounted for
by multiplying the yearly mean absolute temperature by the square roo_ of
1.0087 + 0.09405 cos @, where @ is the heliocentric longitude of Mars
from its perihelion.
The surface temperature will range from -98°C (-145°F) for nighttime winter
temperatures in the polar regions to +37°C (+98°F) for the maximum daytime
ground temperatures for a dark area near the equator during perihelion
_-.sage.
2.2.4 Attitude Control Restraints
The elapsed time from space vehicle launch until solar acquisition by the
aft Planetary Vehicle will not exceed 2.5 hours, which includes a 90-
minute maximum hold time in Earth parking orbit.
The celestial reference will be the Sun and Canopus. The amplitude
of the Flight Spacecraft attitude control limit cycle must be held to
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less than _0.4 degree along each axis to maintain overall pointing
accuracy of the high-gain antenna within 0.9 degree. This restraint
can be relaxed during the cruise portion of the mission to the 0.6-
degree attitude control limit cycle.
The maximum time duration of first midcourse maneuver will not exceed 65
minutes. This time includes changing the attitude of the Planetary
Vehicle to the required maneuver attitude, motor burn, and return of the
vehicle to the cruise attitude. During this maneuver, the solar panels
will not be off-Sun for more than 50 minutes.
Attitude control pointing angle restraints imposed by trajectory cor-
rections, orbit insertion, and orbit trim are defined in Section 2.3.
Flight Spacecraft attitude control will not be impaired when the Sun is
occulted by Mars for up to 3.7 hours or when Canopus is occulted by Mars
for up to 2.0 hours. The pointing angle error between the Flight Capsule
deorbit motor thrust axis and the Flight Spacecraft primary reference
axis before capsule separation will not exceed 20 milliradians (So)
about each axis. The attitude control system must: (i) limit random
angular motion of the platform to less than 1.3 x 10-4 tad/see for the
photoimaging experiment_ and (2) align the boresight axis of the plat-
form to within _ i degree of the center of Mars.
The attitude reference subsystem will not contribute more than a O.l-
degree error to the total allowable pointing error of 0.2 degree when
the planet tracker is in operation.
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2.2.5 Fliqht Perturbation Restraints
The following operations will not exceed the capabilities of the reaction
control subsystem:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Booster separation
Propulsion subsystem shutdown transients
Separation of the sterilization canister
Separation of the capsule
_V applications
2.2.6 Restraints on Separation of Flight Spacecraft and Flight Capsule
The maximum timing error in the Flight Capsule release signal will not
exceed _i minute (3o).
The maximum _V imparted to the Flight Spacecraft by Flight Capsule
release will not exceed 0.5 fps.
The timing error allowances on Flight Capsule deorbit after Flight Cap-
sule release are 0.3 minute for a 2000-km circular orbit, and 0.5 minute
for latus rectum departure from an elliptical orbit of i000 km periapsis
and 20,000 km apoapsis.
2.2.7 Reliability
Flight Spacecraft reliability design restraints in the form of require-
ments, guidelines, and preferences are summarized below. Details and
application of these restraints, methodology for determining design
compliance, and an evaluation of the design response are given in
Sections 3.17 and 4.0.
Sinqle Failure--No single failure mode of an electronic or electrical
part or component will cause a catastrophic effect on the mission. (See
Table 3.17-1 for definition of catastrophic effect.)
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Sensing and Switching--Where malfunction sensing and switching is
required, the following order of selection governs:
i) Automatic, fail-safe, on-board circuitry_
2) Detection via telemetry_ function switch via ground command.
Redundancy Preference--The following order will apply:
i)
=)
3)
Cooperative multichannel_
Alternate path or functional_
Block or standby.
2.2.8 Safety
Safety will receive major consideration in the design of the Voyager
Spacecraft System. All safety requirements in "Performance and Design
Requirements for the Voyager 1971 Spacecraft System, General Specification
for," dated September 17, 1965, will be met. AFHTR M-127-19 "Range Safety
Manual_" will apply9 The requirements of AFSCM 80-7_ "Handbook of Instruc-
tions for Aerospace Vehicle Equipment Design," will be used as guides.
Probability studies will be conducted in Phase IB to establish destruct
criteria. However, for Task B, provisions will be incorporated in the
adapter for inclusion of a destruct system.
Electro-explosive devices associated with the solid-motor ignition system
must be installed in the explosive safe area because encapsulation of the
Planetary Vehicle prevents installation on the launch pad. Accordingly,
the safe-and-arm system will incorporate a mechanical locking pin to pro-
tect against premature ignition of the solid motors prior to launch.
Pressure vessels that will be in proximity to personnel will be designed
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with a hazard factor of 1.76 and an ultimate load of 2.2 times the design
pressure. Pressure vessels and separation components will be capable of
withstanding ultimate loads without failure. Rocket-motor cases will have
a hazard factor of 1.0. Pyrotechnic devices will not be used when equally
reliable mechanical or electromechanical devices are available. When pyro-
technic devices are used, adequate safing devices will be used to prevent
premature or unscheduled activation.
2.3 GUIDANCH AND NAVIGATION--I¢_NHUVHR AOOU_CY _NU PROPULSION H£WUIRH_HNTS
The Flight Spacecraft must perform interplanetary trajectory corrections
to meet the high degree of precision required in placing a Flight Space
craft in a specified Mars orbit. Control accuracies and velocity incre-
ments, and trajectory and orbit accuracy requirements imposed on the
Spacecraft System are presented in this section.
2.3.1 System Velocity Control Accuracy Requirements
To achieve the trajectory and orbit parameter control accuracy specified
in the following paragraphs, the gross control accuracies for maneuvers
must be within the following limits, with a 3a tolerance.
I Maneuver Restraints Pointing Errors Resolution Errors i_ u_ ,,,=,,euvers / i i**e_els/sec i._- 0.i me_er/secFor Maneuvers < 1 meters/sac 3.00 10% of _VFor Orbit Insertion .... 18 meters/sac
In addition, the _V proportional error must be less than or equal to 1.5
percent of AV.
2.3.2 Trans-Mars Trajectory Accuracy Requirements
The contribution to Mars-encounter parameter due to control of maneuvers,
with no aim-point or flight-time biasing, will not exceed the following
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(with a 3a tolerance) after no more than two corrections:
in R T plane < i00 km; flight time <_.1.0 minute.
semimajor axis
Allowing for orbit determination and aim-point biasing and the possibility
of performing three corrections, the encounter accuracies can be controlled
m
to the following 3o tolerance values: semimajor axis in R-T plane <__350
km; flight times_<2.0 minutes.
2.3.3 Trajectory Maneuver AV Requirements
Two or more trajectory correction maneuvers will probably be required.
The corrections will include aim-point biasing, flight-time biasing, and
correction of deviations due <o trans-Mars injection and previous maneu-
vers. The first maneuver will be executed approximately 4 days after
launch, and a second, if necessary, between 25 and 35 days after launch.
A third correction, if required, will be for vernier control of encounter
and will be executed between 30 and 40 days prior to encounter.
The _V required per vehicle to achieve this correctior capability is 200
meters per second. _V allotment to individual requirements will be made
during the actual mission. However, a general premission allotment can
be made as follows.
Requirement
Flight-Time Adjustment
Aim-Point Biasing
Correctinn of Random Errors
AV
( Met er s/Sec )
150
lO
40,4o
To account for nonabortive but off-nominal injection errors.
2.3.4 Orbit-Insertion Accuracy Requirements
The orbit parameters at insertion must be controlled, relative to the
desired orbit parameters, to within the following accuracies--with a
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3_ tolerance: periapsis altitude, 30 percent_ inclination, 5 degrees_
line of apsides, i0 degrees_ period, i0 percent.
2.3.5 0rbit-Insertion _V Requirements
Various maneuver techniques are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.3. The
Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem must be able to perform a variety of orbit
insertions having several approach velocities. The excess hyperbolic
velocity (VHP) requirements depend on the particular combination of launch
and arrival dates selected for the launch period. VHP will vary between
2.82 and 4.5 kilometers per second over the allowable range of transit
trajectories. The requirement of entering various orbits is manifested
by orientations of the line of apsides as much as 90 degrees from the
direction of least _V and by various required orbit sizes.
The periapsis altitude can be selected on the basis of two alternatives:
better observation of the planet surface at low altitudes, and longer
lifetime at high altitudes due to reduced atmospheric drag. The apoapsis
altitude can be selected on the basis of desired ground coverage,
communication to Earth and capsule, solar and Canopus interference by
Mars, and data transmission requirements. Until the mission objectives
have been clearly defined and a priority established for the scientific
experiments, a broad range of orbit altitudes and orientations must be
considered.
2.3.6 0rbit-Trim Accuracy Requirements
It is desired that the periapsis altitude, inclination, line of apsides,
and orbit period be controlled by performing orbit-trim maneuvers. It
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is also desirable that this trim be accomplished, with 3o tolerance, to
the following accuracies relative to the desired orbit: periapsis
altitude, 1.0 percent; inclination, 1.0 degree; line of apsides (ignoring
precessions)_ 1.5 degrees; period, 1.0 percent.
2.3.7 Orbit-Trim AV Requirements
The vehicle must be capable of executing a 100-meter-per-second velocity
increment to the Planetary Vehicle while in the Mars-bound orbit.
2.3.8 Mars-Entry Accuracy Requirements
It is desired that the Flight Capsule entry parameters be controlled at
capsule deorbitto the following accuracy, with a 3a tolerance, relative
to a specified entry; position of landing, 500 km (with a 300 km goal);
entry angle, 6.0 degrees.
2.3.9 Mars-Entry AV Requirements
The capsule propulsion subsystem must provide a velocity impulse to
establish a new orbit (different from the Mars satellite orbit) that will
enter the atmosphere. This trajectory must enter the atmosphere with
moderately low entry angles, increasing the time available for
communication between the end of transmission blackout and impact and
reducing impact velocity. Errors in the landing-site location are
sensitive to the deflection errors for these low entry angles;
consequently, consideration of allowable landing site dispersions is
important in designing the entry trajectory. The AV direction and
magnitude applied to the capsule varies, depending on where in the
orbit the maneuver is performed. The AV requirements for the deflection
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maneuver as a function of the entry velocity, flight path angle at entry,
and location in the orbit are discussed preliminarily in Section 3.1.4.
Fliqht Capsule Entry Trajectory--To meet the simultaneous requirements of
a specific landing site and entry within view of Goldstone, and to allow
the possibility for independent adjustment of landing latitude, it is
recommended that thrust-out of the satellite orbit plane be considered.
JPL supplementary information on the entry capsule indicates that a _V of
approximately 550 meters per second is adequate. The pointing direction
of the _V affects spacecraft design, but the magnitude of the _V does
not. The interactions should be investigated jointly as an interface
between the capsule contractor and Flight Spacecraft contractor.
2.4 AIMING-POINT SELECTION
The aiming point is defined as the point at which the hyperbolic approach
asymptote pierces the RT plane. This aiming point is described in terms
of the conventional RST coordinate system, which has Mars' center as its
origin. The aiming point has polar coordinates (B,8)--where B is the radial
distance of the aiming point from the center of Mars, and 8 is the polar
angle measured positively from the T axis into the _ axis.
To specify a preferable 8, it is necessary to consider the following:
(i) occultation of Sun, Earth, and Canopus during the approach hyperbola
and in the initial orbit, (2) inclination of the desired orbit,
(3) location of the periapsis point for the approach hyperbola and the
initial orbit, and (4) probability of impacting Phobos and Deimos.
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To specify a preferable B, it is necessary to consider the following:
(i) probability of impacting Mars, (2) probability of impacting Phobos
and Deimos during the hyperbolic approach, and (3) the desired orbit
about Mars.
2.4.1 Aiminq-Point Objectives
Trajectory design philosophy is based on maintaining a high probability
of mission success while obtaining the best possible conditions to
satisfy the scientific objectives. Estimates of the requirements from
the scientific objectives are outlined in Section 4.4 of Volume A
(D2-82709-6). The B vector influence mission success because
aiming-point selection for the transit phase of flight is biased to
maintain an overall mission probability of contaminating the planet of
less than 10-4. The probability of impacting and contaminating Mars
increases as B is decreased. The magnitude of the B vector slightly
affects the probability of impacting Phobos and Deimos during the
hyperbolic approach trajectory.
At each midcourse correction except the last, the aiming point is moved
so that B is controlled by the knowledge of expected spacecraft position.
At the last midcourse correction, the B vector is aimed for the minimum
allowable B vector for planetary quarantine, or the minimum desired B
from a scientific mission standpoint, whichever is the higher. The long-
term orbit lifetime and the B-vector dispersions are the main factors
in selecting a minimum allowable aiming point. Low B vectors are
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usually preferred because of the scientific experiment considerations and
because the _V requirements for orbit insertion decrease as the B vector
is decreased. Some of the scientific experiments, as well as operational
requirements such as communications, may lead to a preference for larger
apoapsis altitudes_ this places a secondary constraint on the aiming
point because occultation and communication are influenced.
The aiming angle, @ , influences the scientific experiment objectives because
it is directly responsible for the resulting inclination of the satellite
orbit with respect to the Mars equator. This inclination affects the
latitudes of photographic coverage_ illumination angles, sensor
interference, and interference with lines of sight to the Earth, Sun, and
Canopus. The latter two are generally undesirable. The lower inclinations
also have higher probabilities of impacting Phobos and Deimos. The effects
of orbit inclination are discussed in more detail in Section 3.i.3 and
Section 4.4.
The location of the periapsis point of the approach hyperbola is a function
of both B and _ In turn, the periapsis point of the spacecraft orbit is
also a function of B, 8, and placement of the orbit periapsis with respect
to the hyperbola periapsis.
2.4.2 Selected Aiminq Points for an Example Mission
The aiming points for injection into the trans-Mars trajectory and for
the three midcourse corrections are placed far enough away from Mars so
that the total probability of impacting Mars on the approach hyperbola is
less than 0.2 x 10-5 . Because of the highly elliptic nature of the
encounter position sensitivity to errors at trans-Mars injection, an
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initial aiming point, @, of 116 degrees results in the smallest B-vector
magnitude that satisfies the impact probability constraint. For the mid-
course corrections_ @ = 25 degrees is selected because it ensures freedom
from occultation of Sun_ Harth_ and Canopus along the approach hyperbola.
@ = 25 degrees also results in an orbit inclined 46.6 degrees to the.Mars
equator for a launch of May 1 and an arrival of November i_ 1971.
Assuming a probability of success of 0.9995 for each midcourse maneuver
and a probability of success of 0.9990 for orbit insertion at Mars, the
B-vector magnitudes (B) for the aiming points of injection and the three
midcourse correction maneuvers are_ respectively_ 11,733 km, 21,307 km,
6_775 km, and 6,436 km. These values were computed by integrating a two-
dimensional normal distribution of error over the capture area of Mars in
mm
the RT plane.
For a typical example orbit with a periapsis altitude of i000 km, an
apoapsis altitude of 20,000 km and an inclination of 46.6 degrees with the
Mars' equator_ the probability of impacting Phobos or Deimos on the
approach hyperbola and in the initial Mars orbit is less than 1 x 10 -20 .
The probabilities of impacting either Phobos or Deimos within 50 years
are 2.75 x 10-6 and 1.59 x 10 -6 , respectively.
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2.5 PLANETARY QUARANTINE REQUIREMENTS
2.5.1 Summary
The Boeing Phase IA, Task A, study concluded that compliance with the
planetary-quarantine constraint would require sterilization of the
propulsion and attitude control subsystems to prevent contamination by
exhaust products. It also concluded that the microbiological burden on
the spacecraft surfaces might require reduction by either heat treatment or
ethylene oxide because of the probability of contamination of Mars by
ejecta resulting from meteoroid impacts on the spacecraft. During Phase
IA, Task B, a study was performed to reevaluate and outline the problems
within the concept of a single Saturn V launch vehicle per opportunity
and two Planetary Vehicles per launch.
The approach used in the Phase IA, Task B, study was to develop system
requirements for compliance with the overall mission planetary-quarantine
constraint by an analytical procedure similar to that reported in Boeing
Document D2-82709-2, "Voyager Spacecraft System Final Technical Report,
Volume B."
events, and those most difficult to evaluate for absolute probability of
occurrence, are the events associated with spacecraft propulsion and
attitude control subsystem exhausts and meteoroid ejecta.
The analysis to determine the probability of contamination by spacecraft
ejecta from meteoroid impacts involved a logical process of calculating
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subevent probabilities, taking into account such factors and influences
as distribution of ejecta_ capture by the Martian gravity_ particle size,
mass, and velocity distributions_ effects of atmosphere entry heating_
and solar radiation on microbial particles.
The result of this meteoroid-ejecta analysis is presented in Section
2.5.4. The data indicated that the survival probability of micro-
organisms ejected from the spacecraft are on the order of 1 x 10 -5 •
Therefore9 it would appear that decontamination of the exterior surfaces
may not be required. However, more study is necessary to confirm this
position.
Tests were performed during the Task B study of the sporicidal effects
of the candidate propellants for the Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem.
The results indicate that hydrazine has significant sporicidal proper-
ties.
The solid propellant (aluminized polybutadiene) apparently has little
or no sporicidal properties. Firing tests were performed during Task B
on a small-scale solid-propellant engine using aluminized polybutadiene
to evaluate the survival of micro-organisms in the exhaust. Results
indicated a low probability of survival.
Until further study substantiates preliminary findings of the Task B
study, the planetary-quarantine requirements on the spacecraft are as
follows: (i) sterilization or decontamination of the orbit-insertion
TVC fluids and associated hardware interior, (2) sterilization or
decontamination of the internal surfaces of the reaction control
system, including the propellant, (3) biasing of
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trajectory aim points to preclude accidental impact at encounter,
and (4) the selection of orbit parameters compatible with a prob-
ability of impact within 50 years of i x i0 -5 or less.
2.5.2 Planetary quarantine Allocation of Hvent Probabilities
Contamination of _ars can occur in a number of ways. To demonstrate that
the mission meets the contamination constraint, these eventualities were
identified and then translated into a probability framework. A
planetary-quarantine probability analysis was performed to
develop a contamination-probability framework for the 1971 Voyager mission
so that:
i) Allotments of the total-constraint probability could be intelligently
mad_
2) Studies of specific contaminating events could be properly inte-
grated;
3) A framework would exist to assist in mission optimization under
the contamination constraint.
Probability Allocations--A functional analysis similar to that in Task A
was performed to identify mission events that could result in contamina-
tion of Mars. Hvent allocations are shown in Figure 2-2.
To quantify allotments of the constraint probabilities in Figure 2-2, the
probability of each of the events identified in the functional analysis
must be determined. The probability of each subevent is a function of the
equipment reliability, trajectory parameters, structural characteristics
of the hardware, ejecta of particles, and the environmental characteristics.
In some events the probability is a function of one or more of these.
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For Voyager systems, elements other than the spacecraft were found
to be critical, and must be analyzed after detailed design.
Because available time and system and subsystem data did not permit
rigorous evaluation of an optimum relative apportionment, the values
shown in Figure 2-2 were based on preliminary analysis and engineering
judgment. These values, then, are the requirements necessary to satisfy
the planetary-quarantine mission constraint.
2.5.3 System Impact Probability
2.5.3.1 Spacecraft Impact
Trajectory-aim-point biasing meets the constraint on probability of
spacecraft impact on Mars. During the mission, the spacecraft will be
tracked by cooperative effort between its own equipment and Earth-based
deep-space instrumentation facilities. The trajectory outcome of each
trajectory-control maneuver is determined on Earth with a known cer-
tainty, and prepared parametric data is then used to assist in choosing
a subsequent aim point, if one is needed.
Finally, the orbit-insertion command will not be given unless the result-
ing orbit satisfies the impact-probability allocation of 1 x 10 -5 for
each spacecraft. Discussions of aim-point biasing and orbit parameters
are presented in Sections 2.0 and 3.0.
2.5.3.2 S-IVB Nose Fairing Impact
The nose fairing covering the forward Planetary Vehicle module will be
jettisoned at 350,000 feet, thus precluding Mars contamination.
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The nose fairing covering the rear Planetary Vehicle will remain attached
to the S-IVB. Two factors, direction and time of thrust of the S-IVB,
enter into the probability that the S-IVB/nose fairing may end up on a
trajectory that will impact Mars. Reliability of the subsystems in-
volved in control of these factors is unknown at this time. The capability
to direct the S-IVB/nose fairing on a Mars nonimpact trajectory is
required in order to meet the probability allocation of 0.2 x 10-5 .
2.5.4 Meteoroid Impact Ejecta Considerations
Probability of planetary contamination by meteoroid impacts on the space-
craft, and by subsequent ejecta depositing viable organisms on the planet's
surface was determined in the same manner as in Task A (see D2-82709-2,
Volume B, Section 3.3). The general equation for this function is:
[ ]Pc = P O l-exp (-Y. r j P_ P_ )j=l
where:
P
o
rj =
pJ =
3
Probability of successfully achieving orbit = 0.65.
Expected number of spores on exposed surfaces.
Conditional probability of ejecting an individual live spore
from the surface by meteoroid impacts.
Product of two probabilities: (PN) the conditional prob-
ability of survival of a single ejected spore (alone or on a
particle) during capture_ entry, and landing; (Pc) the prob-
ability that a spore which does survive the ejection, entry_
and landing will grow or propagate in the surface environment.
The rP2P 3 terms in the equation apply to different parts of the orbiting
hardware, where j takes the subscript or superscript assigned to each part.
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For this analysis, the spacecraft surfaces that will be susceptible to
meteoroid impacts were divided into: solar panels (p); antennas (a);
spacecraft structures and appendages (s).
Values of r for the various surfaces (solar panels, antennas, and spacecraft
and appendages) were derived from estimates of contamination from clean-
room fallout, handling during final assembly and test, and from possible
contaminant fallout from the spacecraft nose fairing during launch.
Estimates of reductions were made from exposure to solar radiation and
dislodgment by meteoroid impacts or spacecraft vibrations during the
launch and interplanetary cruise. Calculations of r are exemplified in
Figure 2-3.
CONTAMINATION I
DURING INITIAL I
ASSY & TEST I
_3.1 x 104
+
CONTAMINATION
DURING FINAL
ASSY & TEST
1.3 x 10 5
BACTERIA REDUCTION I
BY VIBRATIONS AND I
METEOROIDS
1.2 x lO4
+
CONTAMINATION
FROM NOSE FAIRING
DURING LAUNCH
1.0 x 104
BACTERIA REDUCTION
BY RADIATION
DURING CRUISE
4.9 x 10 4
= r
S
I T1 A F"PE' F) T A T F'_ A I'_T M( "_
S/C STRUCT. &ON
PROTUB. IN ORBIT
1.1 x 105
_The bacterial loading is given in number of spores. These were assumed
to constitute approximately i0 percent of the total microorganism load.
Figure2-3: DERIVATION OF r (EXPECTEDNUMBER OF SPORES
S
ON EXPOSED SPACECRAFT STRUCTURES AND APPENDAGES)
2-53
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
Numerous investigations have indicated that ultraviolet radiation, princi-
pally that with wavelengths between 2000 _ and 2700 _, is effective in
killing bacteria. In the spectral band most effective (2500 _ to 2600 _)
incident energy of 1 x 104 to 12 x 104 ergs/cm 2 is required to kill 90
percent of a given microbial population. The smaller value (i x lO4
ergs/cmSis effective with a variety of vegetative forms while the higher
value of 12 x 104 ergs/cm 2 is necessary for lethal action on bacterial
spores (B. subtilis). Under laboratory conditions, the probability of
survival would be extremely remote for organisms exposed to the predicted
incident ultraviolet radiation in the 2500 _ to 2600 _ band. However,
laboratory conditions will not prevail on the Voyager spacecraft.
Variations in microbial sensitivity to ultraviolet radiation have been
observed under varying temperatures and under subsequent or coincidental
exposure of the test samples to visible light. This phenomenon, photo-
reactivation, can reduce the lethal efficiency of ultraviolet, by one or
more orders of magnitude for certain types of microorganisms. Most of
these conditions should be evaluated further by laboratory experimentation.
In an experiment performed during Task B, B. subtilis spores were coated
on metal strips and solar panels which were then exposed to UV irradiation
of 0.714 watts/ft 2 for periods of one, two and four hours while the chamber
was maintained at a pressure of 0.5-mm Hg. White light was used during and
immediately following UV exposure. Several panels were subjected to simu-
lated meteoroid impact. The ejecta were collected and exposed to UV radi-
ation for an additional two hours. Bacteriological analyses were then per-
formed on all samples.
2-54
BOEING--SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
A few microorganisms survived UV exposure before impact_ none were obtained
on the ejecta from the simulated meteoroid impacts. Based on these test
results, and because of the uncertainty of the shadowing effects by
multiple layers or clumps of spores, the spore reduction on exposed-spacecraft
surfaces due to solar ultraviolet radiation was assumed to be 97 percent.
The probability of ejecting spore-carrying material from the spacecraft
(P2) is a function of the exposed spacecraft contaminated-surface areas,
materials used in the exposed surfaces, meteoroid flux, exposure time,
and the meteoroid impact phenomena related to the ejection of materials
and spores. First approximations of the P2 probability can be made by
defining the function as:
P2 : Contaminated Surface Area Ejected (A e)
Contaminated Surface Area (A)
With this approximation, P values were calculated, using the meteoroid
2
flux in the vicinity of Mars as contained in the JPL "Preliminary Voyager
Environmental Predictions" document, dated September 17, 1965. The values
of A e are based upon experimental studies and analysis performed during
Task A and reported in Volume A, D2-82709-I, and in D2-82733-i. The
A e values used in the analysis were: solar panels, 112 cm2; antennas,
2 o
i0 cm ; and spacecraft structures and appendages, 34 cm-.
Tests were conducted during Task B using the Boeing light-gas-gun facility
to simulate typical meteoroid impacts on types of spacecraft structure
and other exposed surfaces (see Figure 2-4). These tests indicated that
microorganisms will survive in the ejecta from meteoroid impacts.
A series of 14 tests was performed using 10 -4 gram polycarbonate resin
(Lexan) projectiles at velocities approximating 20,000 feet per second
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striking solar panel and aluminum plate samples. Microorganisms were
recovered from all experimental firings.
Using the predicted quantities of spalled ejecta (enumerated previously
as Ae values), P2 values were calculated. They are summarized in Table
2-7 along with r values for the various contaminated surfaces of the
spacecraft exposed to possible meteoroid impact.
Table 2-7: VALUES OF r AND P2 FOR MARS-
ORBITING SPACECRAFT--50 YEARS IN ORBIT
Exposed Spacecraft Surfaces
External (Solar Cells)
Solar Panels
Internal Laminations
External (Metal Backing)
Antenna
Spacecraft Structures and Protuberances
r. Values
5.0 x i0 3
Spores
9.8 x 10 4
4.0 x 10 3
1.4 x 10 3
1.O x lO 3
J
P2 Values
2.4 x 10 -4
2.6xi0 -5
5.3xi0 -5
l.lxlO -4
1.2xlO -4
In the general equation, P3 is the product of PN and PG" PN is the
product of PI and PII" PI is the fraction of all ejected spores alone
or on particles that will survive aerodynamic entry heating. PI is an
integral over an abstract space consisting of all possible ejecta-particle
initial conditions, sizes_ and materials. The integrand is the number dis-
tribution of spores times the conditional probability PS that an individual
spore on a specific trajectory will survive aerodynamic entry heating.
The distribution function of speed and mass is at present undefined.
Analysis based on recent NASA thermal-death-time data shows PS to be so
sensitive a function of position in the abstract space that it is either
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substantially zero or unity. This is illustrated in Figure 2-5, which
shows the sharp variation of PS with particle diameter (D) and mass-
infrared-emission coefficient (_') for typical periapsis-ejecta-
entry conditions. Analogously, there exists for every particle a critical
speed (VM), relative to Mars, above which sterilization is certain.
Figure 2-6 shows VM as a function of E' and D at i000 km. VM is a
function of altitude as well as particle properties and is zero above a
critical altitude (hm). The variation of hm with _' and D is shown in
Figure 2-7. Based on this analysis a subset of all possible trajectories,
called survival trajectories, can be identified. The fraction of all spores
ejected on survival trajectories is PI"
Preliminary Boeing spectrographic measurements of the emissivity of spore
samples suspended in KBr pellets have produced _' values of about 0.i
cm3/gm-#. Figure 2-6 shows that for such e' values the critical speed
approaches periapsis orbital velocity. Further, as shown by Figure 2-7
all survival trajectories must necessarily originate within an altitude
which is near the periapsis altitude of the presently-assumed highly-
eccentric trajectory. The value PI, the fraction of all spores ejected
within the limiting range of velocities and directions, approximates the
fraction of survival trajectories available while the spacecraft is within
the altitude limits. This fraction is estimated to be less than i0-I.
At present, the basic physical data needed to make the preceding analysis
precise is lacking. A relatively small reduction in the value of the mass-
emission coefficient(£') would imply aerodynamic sterilization of all cold-
propulsion exhaust and most cold-meteoroid ejecta particles. Therefore,
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there is an obvious need to refine the value of _' and to determine the
mass and speed distribution of the ejecta.
The second factor in the PN term is PII' which is the probability that an
ejected spore which survives the aerodynamic environment will also survive
exposure to the solar ultraviolet radiation during entry. Since all sur-
vival trajectories must originate near periapsis, as previously suggested
for the given range of £' values, a significant fraction of those trajec-
tories will be occulted. Current studies of space survival on optically-
thin particles indicate the solar ultraviolet 90 percent kill time near
Mars is about 20 minutes; this is much less than the time for descent from
periapsis of any particle in the i to i0 micron diameter range. However,
the probability that a spore will simply not be exposed, due either to
ejection and entry during occultation, or due to shielding by neighboring
spores or other matter, appears to be relatively great. Therefore the
probability PII of surviving the solar UV during entry becomes essentially
the non-exposure probability. PII is presently estimated as 0.i to 0.3.
Additional analytical and experimental work must be performed before re-
liable estimates of these probabilities can be derived.
The third factor in P3 is PG' which is the probability that a spore which
does survive ejection, entry and landing will propagate in the surface
environment. Estimates by Sagan and Coleman on the probability that a
given microorganism, landing on the surface of the planet would be able
to multiply and contaminate a sizable fraction of the planet were I0-I to
10 -2
. Their estimates were based on evaluation of the expected "average
Martian environmental conditions" considering primarily freeze-thaw cycle
effects. More recent data from Evans of Goddard Spaceflight Center have
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indicated that ultraviolet radiation (2000 to 3000 _) probably does reach
the surface of Mars, thereby offering another hazard to microorganism
survival on the planet's surface. This intense UV at the planet's surface
may reduce the probability of growth by one order of magnitude.
From the inhospitable conditions of the Mars surface, as indicated by the
Mariner IV data, the probability of spore germination and propagation may
be assumed to be decreased by an additional order of magnitude. Therefore,
a PG of 10 -3 appears to be a reasonable estimate at this time.
It is possible that the photo-decomposition of some materials under the
influence of intense radiation as well as diffusion of spores from the
internal structure may, over a long period, release spores into the surface
environment. However, this presently appears highly improbable and was
not considered in this analysis.
From the assumptions that PN' the product of PI and PII' is less than 10 -2
and PG = 10-3' the probability of contaminating Mars during the 50-year
orbital-stay period is less than 2.8 x 10-5 . This approaches the allocated
1.0 x 10-5 allowable probability for planet contamination by meteoroid
ejecta. If PG = I0-i, the probability of contamination is increased to a
value less than 2.8 x 10-3 for the 50-year stay.
Considering the uncertainties in the assumptions used in this analysis,
there is a possibility that the allocated probability could not be met with-
out some spacecraft surface treatment. However, comparing the uncertainties
of the calculations (the emissivity of the particles in particular) with the
uncertainties of the Mars atmosphere and surface, it appears prudent at this
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time not to create "worst case" requirements which might force the system
into a high-risk_ low-reliability design or into a mission with a lower
probability of success. Therefore, a system requirement for surface
decontamination is not imposed at this time. The necessity for further
study and experimentation to conform this position is apparent.
2.5.5 Propulsion and Reaction Control Subsystems
As part of Task A_ analyses were performed to determine the probability
of Mars contamination by ejecta from propulsion and reaction control sub-
systems. During Task B, these analyses have been refined and re-inter-
preted in the light of test results to evaluate planetary-quarantine
requirements for the selected subsystems. The general equation for con-
tamination probability given in Section 2.5.4 applies also in the present
cases. Here9 r represents the number of viable organisms that might appear
in the exhaust (i.e._ those in the propellant_ or exposed interior surface r
or imbedded in material that may spall)_ P2 is the conditional probability
that one of these individual organisms will be ejected alive_ and P3 is
the conditional probability that a live ejected organism will contaminate
Mars.
P3 is again the product PIPIIPG . Pl is the probability that an individual
organism will be captured and survive the entry aerodynamic environment_
PII is the conditional probability that an organism that survives the
aerodynamic environment will survive solar ultraviolet radiation_ and PG
is the probability of survival and propagation after reaching the surface
of Mars.
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The aerodynamic heating analysis leading to Figures 2-5 and 2-6 can
be applied directly, leading to the result that PI is the fraction of or-
ganisms ejected near periapsis and with velocity relative to Mars less
than 1 to 2 kilometers per second in excess of orbital velocity. More-
over, PII must be based on the set of organisms surviving aerodynamic
heating and reduces to the probability that such an organism will be
ejected and enter the atmosphere during occultation, or be shielded from
ultraviolet by other organisms or inert material, or both.
Consideration of PG is similar to that presented in Section 2.5.4. This
is assumed to be in the range of 10 -3 to I0 -I.
2.5.5.1 Reaction Control Subsystem
In the reaction control subsystem, r is substantially the number of or-
ganisms in the cold nitrogen propellant. No heating will occur, and,
as shown in Table 2-8, cold nitrogen is not sporicidal. Therefore,
P2 is substantially unity.
Reaction-control-exhaust velocity relative to the spacecraft will be
about 2000 fps and randomly directed. For the highly elliptic nominal
orbit, the fraction of survival trajectories (Figures 2-5 and 2-6)
reduces to the fraction of time that the spacecraft is sufficiently near
periapsis. This leads to an estimated value of PI of 0.i for the nominal
mission. Because the exhaust velocity is low, relative to the orbiting
spacecraft, ejecta trajectory ranges will be long enough to preclude
significant protection from ultraviolet due to occultation. Also, since
the nitrogen must be filtered to reduce particulate contamination, effec-
tive shielding due to clumping is unlikely. Thus, PII is estimated to be
10-3 . Further investigation of this phenomenon is required.
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If PG = I0-3 is assumed, then P2P3 r = I0-5[ which exceeds the probability
allocation of 0.i x 10-5 for all r Z i0. Arguments similar to those in
Section 2.5.4 may be presented regarding the uncertainties associated with
the assumptions used in the analysis and with knowledge of the Martian
environment. However, because it is relatively certain that viable
organisms will be ejected, it appears prudent to plan for internal decon-
tamination of the subsystem hardware and sterilization of the nitrogen
gas by heat or filtration.
2.5.5.2 Midcourse and Orblt-Trim Engine
Previously published reports indicated that monomethyl and dimethyl hydra-
zine were lethal to Bacillus subtilis. An experimental program was conducted
to extend these test results to other microbiological species and other
propellants.
A series of the test propellants were inoculated with spores of Bacillus
subtills var. ni_q_i._,spores of Asperqillus nlqer, and a soil suspension
containing a representative population of soil microorganisms. Water
controls were used. After inoculation, the propellants were stored at
their respective standard storage temperatures and samp '-_±_uat ....
and 72 hours and at 7 days. The results are presented in Table 2-8
Test results indicate that hydrazine and aerozine are self-sterilizing.
Although hydrazine is sporicidal, an unsterile engine may still contain
organisms that are not exposed to hydrazine. These microorganisms were
not considered of significant contaminating potential to be included in
the analysis. Midcourse firings should remove most of the contamination,
thereby reducing the r value to a low figure. Furthermore, considering
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that these microorganisms will have to be wiped off by the hot exhaust
gas_ the probability of being ejected in a viable condition also appears
to be very low. This remains to be verified by tests to be performed
during Phase IB.
Sample Type
Hydrazine
Aerozine
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Liquid Nitrogen
Aluminized Poly-
butadiene
Water Control
Table 2-8: SPORICIDAL-TEST SUMMARY
Results
No survival after 24 hours; negative results after
20 days
No survival after 24 hours; negative results after
20 days
Anaerobic survival
No apparent reduction in viability after 14 days
No apparent reduction in viability after 20 days
Slight reduction in viability over 20-day period
The probability of contamination by orbit-trim-engine malfunction is equal
to the probability of catastrophic failure (3.4 x i0-9)_ which is well
within the required constraint of 0.2 x lO-5.
It appears that the midcourse and orbit-trim system will not require
sterilization to satisfy the planetary-quarantine probability apportion-
ment.
2.5.5.3 Orbit-Insertion Engine
During Task B, experimental investigations were performed of the spori-
cidal effects of aluminized polybutadiene. Test results showed no apparent
reduction of inoculated microorganisms (B. subtilis spores and soil infusion)
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over a period of 20 days. The test also demonstrated that normally pre-
pared propellant contains a natural flora.
Solid-propellant firing tests also were performed during Task B to deter-
mine whether microorganisms will survive the firing and be present in
exhaust products. A series of 14 solid-propellant firings were conducted
at the Boeing lulallp facility. Seeded propellant was prepared by inocu-
lating 36 grams of powdered aluminum with approximately 2 x 104 spores of
Bacillus subtilis var. _ prior to mixing with polybutadiene. Firing
tests used a 0.5-pound scale rocket motor. Prior to firing, the rocket
motor, collection chamber, and associated pipes were steam-treated
(250°H at 20 to 25 psig) for 30 minutes. The sterility of the 20-cubic
foot collection chamber was checked and verified by microbiological
analysis.
After sterilization, the solid-propellant grain was placed in the rocket
motor and fired. A scrub-water system in the collection chamber was used
to condense the exhaust products. Microbiological analyses of the scrub
water and exhaust products were made. Results of the microbial analyses
The solld-propellant firing tests indicate a low probability that organisms
in the propellant will be a source of contamination--in other words, P2
approaches O. The possibility of live ejecta from contaminated hardware
remains to be established.
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Table 2-9: RESULTS OF SOLID-PROPHLLANT FIRING TEST
_umber
of
Firings
6
Propellant
Seeded Aluminized
Polybutadiene
Seeded Aluminized
Polybutadiene
Naturally Contaminated
Aluminized Polybutadiene
Seeded Aluminized Poly-
butadiene Surface
Decontaminated with
HTO Prior to Firing
Seeded Aluminized
Polybutadiene Surface
Decontaminated with HYO
iPrior to Firing
lqniter
Seeded Aluminized
Polybutadiene
Naturally Contaminated
Polyester Propellant
Naturally Contaminated
Aluminized Polybutadiene
Naturally Contaminated
Polyester Propellant
Naturally Contaminaed
Aluminized Polybutadiene
Results
4 negative
2 positive e
2 negative
4 negative
1 negative
1 negative
The positive results recorded appear to be caused by handling
procedures during transporting of exhaust products from explosive
safe area to the microbiology laboratory. Both samples showing
positive growth were taken on the same day.
The probability of survival of microorganisms from the surfaces of nozzle
internal surfaces appears low because dislodgement will be caused by the
hot exhaust gases. The probability of existence of microorganisms in the
ablative material of the nozzles also is low since the material is cured
at temperatures and times lethal to the microorganisms. Furthermore,
viable organisms ejected from the orbit-insertion engine will be traveling
at high velocities relative to Mars, and the probability of a single spore
surviving the entry heat pulse will be low. Consequently, this source
of contamination is not considered significant in the analysis. The
position remains to be confirmed by tests to be performed during Phase
IB.
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The arguments considering the probability of contamination by reaction-
control exhausts are equally applicable to the thrust-vector-control
exhausts since the excess freon will be dumped cold and the nitrogen is
ejected cold. Therefore, to preclude Mars contamination, the TVC system
should be decontaminated in the same manner as the reaction control system.
2.5.6 Conclusions
The following requirements are recommended to ensure compliance with the
planetary-quarantine constraints: (i) sterilization of the orbit-insertion-
engine TVC propellants and the interior of all associated TVC hardware,
(2) sterilization of the interior surfaces of the reaction control subsystem
and its associated propellant, (3) biasing of the trajectory aim point to
prevent accidental spacecraft impact at encounter, and (4) selection of proper
orbit parameters to ensure a nonorbit decay within 50 years.
During Phase IB, further studies are necessary to verify the conclusions
and requirements resulting from the Task B effort:
i) Improve the determination of the emissivity value of spores and of
organic and inorganic materials;
2) Determine the effects of solar radiation on various microorganisms--
spores after exposure to solar radiation_
3) Study the decomposition of material under Martian conditions and the
sporicidal properties of decomposition products;
4) Examine the possibilities of spore erosion during entry--that is,
conditions under which a spore loses atoms to an extent that would
destroy it;
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Extend studies of microorganism survival on propellants and in
exhaust products;
Study the probable distribution of ejecta from both meteoroid impact
and propulsion and reaction control subsystems by Monte Carlo
techniques.
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3.0 SYSTEM-LEVEL FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
This section contains the system-level functional description of the
preferred spacecraft design and its relationship and interfaces with
other mission elements. A set of trajectories, limited by mission con-
straints, is described. A Spacecraft System is defined in broad enough
terms to allow identification of system interfaces. A top-level flight
sequence is developed from which the preferred spacecraft design is
evolved--a result of many system and subsystem trade studies. Special
system-level requirements and constraints, such as planetary quaran-
tine, cleanliness, magnetics, radiation, and data system, are presented.
A reliability analysis and assessment of the design against the reli-
ability allocations concludes the section.
3.1 STANDARD TRAJECTORIES
This section describes the range of trajectories, considerations
required to select meaningful trajectories, and the most useful
parameters of typical trajectories.
3.1.1 Transit Trajectories
3.1.1.1 Engineering Design Considerations
Constraints on Launch and Arrival Dates--The Type I trajectories avail-
able for use in 1971 are those that have launch and arrival dates within
the boundaries depicted on the base design chart, Figure 3.1-1 (see Ref-
erence I, Figures 90-95). Three of the boundaries are established
Reference i: JPL EPD No. 281, "Trajectory Selection Considerations for
Voyager Missions to Mars during the 1971-1977 Time Period," C.E.
Kohlhase and W. E. Bollman, September 159 1965.
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directly by the specified constraints: maximum vis-viva energy,
C3 = 25 km2/sec2_ minimum absolute value of the declination of the depar-
ture geocentric asymptote, ]DLA_ = 5 degrees_ and maximum hyperbolic ex-
cess speed at Mars, VHP = 4.5 kilometers per second. The DLA boundaries
on early launches result directly from the following requirements:
i) Latitude of the launch site (Complex 39 at Kennedy Space Center) =
2)
3)
28.65 degrees;
Allowable range of launch azimuths= 60 to i15 degrees;
Two-hour minimum daily firing window.
For northeast launches, the boundary is determined by ]DLA]< 39.3 degrees_
for southeast launches, by [DLA] <35.9 degrees. The negative value of DLA
applies in both cases because of the requirements of the Type I transit
trajectories. Because northeast launches produce shorter coast times in
the parking orbit, the corresponding limit (DLA = -39.3 degrees) will be
generally used. The limit applicable to southeast launches, DLA = -35.9
degrees, is shown for reference. (The early launch boundary may be modi-
fied slightly by a limitation on the velocity increment available for
biasing the arrival date. This is discussed briefly in Section 3.1.2.)
A further requirement for the Voyager mission is the minimum launch period
of 45 days. This is easily satisfied because the range of launch dates
shown on Figure 3.1-1 between the limits DLA = -39.3 degrees and
C 3 = 25 km2/sec 2 varies from 61 to 93 days. Therefore, there is consid-
erable flexibility in the choice of launch and arrival dates.
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The region of available trajectories is divided by the exclusion of
inclinations of the heliocentric transfer orbit that lie between 0.i and
0 degrees. Operation in the region of arrival dates later than
January ii, 1972, is considered both unnecessary and undesirable. It
would require generally longer trip times and higher trajectory sensi-
tivities, and the region of earlier arrival dates has a sufficient
range of launch dates.
The overall effects of the changes in the constraints from those of
Task A have been to increase the range of launch dates by about ii days
and to delay earliest arrivals about 6 days.
Launch Window--Launch window considerations for Task A constraints and
requirements were discussed on Page 3-17 of Reference 2. The results
were illustrated in Figure 3.1-6 of Reference 2.
For Task B, increases were made in the allowable ranges of launch
azimuth, DLA and C3, as discussed above. In addition_ a new maximum
parking-orbit coast time of 90 minutes was specified. These changes
produce several effects. The change of the DLA limit from -33 degrees
to -39.3 degrees provides a total DLA range from about -18 degrees to
-39.3 degrees. The launch window available at a given value of DLA
Reference 2: Boeing Document D2-82709-I, Part I, "Voyager Spacecraft
System Final Technical Report," Vol. A, Preferred Desiqn for Fliqht
Spacecraft and Hardware Systems.
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has been increased by widening the allowable launch azimuth sector (this
increase is somewhat more for northerly launches than for southerly
launches). The increase in the available range of C3 values widens the
range of required parking-orbit coast times. On the other hand, the
available parking-orbit coast time essentially removes the coast time
limitation and provides two launch windows in each 24-hour period at
most declinations. With one launch window is associated a long coast
time, with the other a short coast time. Other factors now become impor-
tant. Short coast times provide maximum injection accuracy, maximum
system reliability, and minimum propellant boiloff. The use of both
launch windows would require the use of two widely separated injection
locations with attendant duplication of tracking capability. These con-
siderations favor the use of only the short parking-orbit coast time and
the associated northeast launch azimuths.
Communication Between Planetary Vehicles and Earth--Each Planetary
Vehcile will communicate with the Earth-based DSN via the low-gain
omnidirectional antenna until it reaches a distance of approximately
45 million km from Earth. Then, at as late a time as warranted by the
performance of the telecommunication subsystem, the change will be
made to the high-gain directional antenna. Figure 3.1-2 presents the
envelope of distances and nominal times of operation for the low-gain
and high-gain antennas on available transit trajectories in 1971. In
Figure 3.1-3_ the pointing requirements for the antennas are illustrated
by the envelope of Earth cone and clock angles for points along all
available transit trajectories from i0 days to encounter. The cone-
3-5
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clock angle region for switching from the low-gain antenna to the
high-gain antenna has been mapped from the distance versus time chart.
It is of particular interest that the required operational envelope of
the high-gain antenna comprises a relatively small portion of the total
envelope. The data for Figures 3.1-2 and 3.1-3 were computed from 67
trajectories throughout the constrained region by a special-purpose
conic program. A limited check with values produced by a six-body
integrating trajectory program indicates an agreement generally within
0.5 degree on Figure 3.1-3.
Approach-Aiming Parameters for Transit Trajectory Design--The approach-
aiming coordinates, defined in Figure 3.1-4, describe the position of
Sun and Earth with respect to the approach-aiming-coordinate system.
This system is based upon the direction of the approach asymptote, given
by S, and the axis T, parallel to the ecliptic plane. The Sun angular
coordinates ZAP and ETS are plotted in Figure 3.1-5 for the available
1971 launch and arrival dates. The Earth coordinates ZAH and ETH are
similarly presented in Figure 3.1-6. The data for all these figures
were obtained from Reference 1.
Some of the requirements and objectives of the areocentric phase of
the mission can be transformed into requirements for the transit tra-
jectory by means of the approach-aiming coordinates. From Figure 3.1-4
it is apparent that Sun and Harth maximum occultations occur whenever
m
aiming points are chosen in the R-T plane along the lines determined
by the angles HTS and HTH, respectively. The HTS values of Figure 3.1-5
indicate that no Sun occultation exists on approaches to direct orbits
about Mars. The HTH distribution in Figure 3.1-6, however, shows Earth
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occultations occur on approaches to direct orbits for transit tra-
jectories with early arrival dates launched from late April to early
June. Greater detail for specific approach trajectories must be
obtained from occultation charts like Figure 3.1-21 of Reference 2,
which also shows the Canopus occultation zone. The lack of diffi-
culty with Earth and Sun occultations on the approach trajectories
implies that occultations occurring during the orbital phase will
play a more important part in the trajectory design. These are
discussed in a later section.
Angle ZAP indicates whether the approach to the planet is from the
sunny side (ZAP greater than 90 degrees) or dark side (ZAP less than
90 degrees). It also gives an indication of the position of the
approach-hyperbola periapsis relative to the Mars-Sun line since the
areocentric angle from S-vector to periapsis varies from about 55 to
75 degrees. Together with this angle, ZAP shows the amount of in-
plane rotation necessary to place t_ne orbit periapsis at a desirable
illumination.
The angle ZAE describes the orientation of the approach asymptote rela-
tive to the Mars-Earth line. Since the Planetary Vehicle is Sun-
oriented, differences in the variations of ZAP and ZAE over the launch
period indicate varying Earth-pointing requirements for the antenna.
A comparison of Figures 3.1-5 and 3.1-6 shows that major differences
occur only for trajectories with early arrival dates.
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Scientific experiment requirements and the more detailed consideration
of the approach phase in Section 2.4 and the orbital phase in Section
3.1.3 are of primary importance in the selection of the set of launch
and arrival dates. Also_ when possible, it is desirable to simplify
the mission requirements by achieving the minimum variation in arrival
geometry wlth respect to Earth and Sun. The launch and arrival dates
which best achieve this are shown as shaded areas in Figures 3.1-5
and 3.1-6.
3.1.1.2 Scientific Considerations
The objectives of probable orbiter scientific experiments generate
three main requirements for the areocentric phase of the mission:
i) Latitude of the subperiapsis region in the range of plus i0 to
minus 40 degrees;
2) Relatively low illumination angles in the subperiapsis region;
3) Observation of the wave of darkening phenomenon, if possible.
The approach parameter LVI, the latitude of the vertical impact point
on Mars for the approach trajectory, defines the minimum inclination
available for the approach hyperbola. When near-equatorial orbits are
wanted, the small values of LVI in the upper right region of
Figure 3.1-7 should be used to avoid excessive orbit-trim requirements.
Low illumination angles are obtained with lowest orbit_nsertion AV
requirements by placing the periapsis of the approach hyperbola near
the terminator. When angle ZAP is 90 degrees more than the angle
between the S-vector and the hypobola-periapsis radius, the periapsis
3-10
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D
is in the terminator plane. Since this angle typically will vary
between 55 and 75 degrees, a satisfactory illumination angle of
15 degrees can be obtained with ZAP values between 130 and 150 degrees.
The larger ZAP values correspond to higher VHP values and/or higher
periapsis altitudes. This requirement leads to the use of early
arrival dates in the region toward the bottom of Figure 3.1-5 and
produces a conflict with the trends discussed in the previous para-
graphs. The Planetary Vehicle, however, has the prescribed capability
to rotate the line of apsides of %he elliptical orbit in the orbit
plane ± 90 degrees from the hyperbola periapsis. This reduces the
conflict to a varying increase in orbit insertion _V. In general, the
smaller ZAP angles will require larger expenditures of orbit insertion
_V to produce the desired low illumination angles.
The observation of the wave of darkening phenomenon was discussed in
Task A report, Reference 2, Section 3.1.2. It was shown that early
arrival dates may be necessary to achieve best results.
D
3.1.2 Arrival Date Separation Considerations
The Planetary Vehicle arrival dates at Mars are required to be separated
by at least I0 days. Each vehicle is provided with a total velocity
increment (_V) capability of 200 meters per second to perform all of the
necessary interplanetary corrections and biasing. A _V allotment of
about 50 meters per second each should be adequate for all midcourse
corrections and aiming-point biasing under the adaptive guidance policy.
This leaves about 150 meters per second for each vehicle or a conserva-
tive total of about 300 meters per second for arrival-date biasing.
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The available _V is used most economically by combining the maneuvers
required to perform the first midcourse correction, aiming-point biasing,
and the arrival-date biasing. This procedure also reduces the total
number of maneuvers, involving loss and reacquisition of celestial
references, reorientation, and thrusting. Performing the maneuver
together with the first midcourse correction will permit monitoring of
engineering data via the low-gain antenna in the event of a malfunction.
Figures 3.1-8 and 3.1-9 present a few representative curves that illus-
trate the _V requirements for the arrival-date biasing maneuver, per-
formed 5 days after launch. Figure 3.1-8 illustrates the _V required
for one Planetary Vehicle to achieve the entire 10-day bias. Figure
3.1-9 illustrates the _V requirements for each of the two vehicles to
perform a 5-day bias. A dual symmetry exhibited by the biasing _V
requirements is illustrated schematically in the sketch on Figure 3.1-9.
The data of the figures were calculated separately for each bias by a
newly developed special-purpose conic program. The _V values for the
symmetric cases agreed, in general, within 3 meters per second. A
check of the conic data with two widely separated cases computed with
a six-body integrating-trajectory program gave good agreement.
The approximate maximum _V capability indicated in Figure 3.1-8 shows
that one vehicle is capable of performing the entire biasing maneuver
for many trajectories. This suggests that a single-vehicle mode should
be used in some instances. Such a procedure would have the advantage of
3-12
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requiring only one vehicle to make the relatively large trajectory
adjustment. Thus, the probability of subsequent midcourse corrections
would be increased for only that vehicle.
The capability of a single Planetary Vehicle to perform a lO-day biasing
maneuver has been mapped into _V contours on the constrained-trajectory
design chart in Figure 3.1-10. For all trajectories with launch and
arrival dates within these contours, the indicated _V capability is
sufficient to achieve the lO-day arrival date bias. Figure 3.1-10
shows thai one Planetary Vehicle can adequately bias the arrival dates
of approximately 35 percent of the trajectories considered. The
lO-day biasing maneuvers can be performed for most of the trajectories
with launch dates between April 24 and June 15 and arrival dates before
December 16.
The two-vehicle biasing-maneuver capability is illustrated in Figure 3.1-11.
It exhibits characteristics quite similar to those of Figure 3.1-10,
except that the required 5-day biasing maneuvers are shown to be within
the capability of the two vehicles for most of the constrained launch-
arrival-date region. At the earliest launch dates_ the biasing-performance
envelope falls slightly inside of the previously established DLA boundary.
It is interesting that the biasing _V varies linearly with the arrival-
date bias requirement. For example, the 5-day bias contour for _V -
50 meters per second almost coincides with the _V = i00 meters per
second contour for a lO-day bias.
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3.1.3 Mars Orbit
3.1.3.1 Approach Geometry
Considering the transit trajectories within the study constraints, a
wide variation exists in the direction of the approach asymptote. The
right ascension and declination of the approach asymptote (S-vector)
will each vary over approximately a 30-degree range. This S-vector
direction determines the lowest possible orbit inclination about Mars,
and, to a large degree, the requirements to obtain a particular periapsis
position for the orbit about Mars. Typical view angles to Mars are
described in the cone-clock-angle plot of Figure 3.1-12. The range of
cone and clock angles of Mars at approach along the S-vector is shown
by the shaded region outlined with the dashed curve. Three example
approach trajectories have been shown for a particular S-vector corres-
ponding to a launch on May i, 1971, and an arrival on November i, 1971.
These approach trajectories have orbit inclinations (with respect to
Mars equator) of 20, 40, and 60 degrees. The view angles to Earth and
Canopus are also shown during the approach phase.
3.1.3.2 Insertion
The location of insertion into orbit about Mars is determined by the
particular orbit desired. Various techniques to perform the insertion
maneuver are available to obtain a desired orbit size, location of the
line of apsides, and inclination to the Mars equator. The advantages
and range of applicability of the more promising techniques are dis-
cussed below.
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Insertion Techniques--The most efficient technique involves operation of
the insertion motor at periapsis of the approach hyperbola, resulting
in the orbit periapsis at the same point. Figure 3.1-13 shows the
orbits that are available with insertion at periapsis. The lower limit
on the curve indicates the minimum size orbit, from a lifetime con-
sideration, that is available using the realistic atmosphere presented
in Reference i. The available orbits that can be obtained are shown for
the range of VHP of interest and two propulsion-system capabilities.
Those orbits which fall to the right of a given VHP curve may be
obtained from approach at the VHP. For scientific experiments, however9
other orbit orientations are preferable. Therefore, another periapsis
point must be provided for the satellite orbit. Figure 3.1-14 shows the
minimum _V requirements to insert into an example orbit with varying
positions of the line of apsides. This insertion is accomplished as
shown in the sketch attached to the figure. The nominal aiming point
is selected to provide a hyperbola periapsis at an altitude above the
periapsis of the Mars satellite orbit. At the proper point along the
hyperbola (either before or after hyperbola periapsis), the insertion-
velocity change is applied. This impulse generates a new velocity vector
that corresponds to the proper point on the desired satellite orbit. The
hyperbola aiming point and the magnitude of the velocity change and its
direction are selected to provide a satellite orbit with the desired
size, shape (that is, periapsis altitude and orbit period), and
orientation. The example orbit of Figure 3.1-14 has a periapsis
altitude of i000 km, an orbit period of 13.8 hours, and is entered
from various approach speeds (VHP). The _V requirements are
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increased for the higher values of VHP and for the larger rotation
angles.
The typical insertion geometry is represented in the cone-clock angle
plot of Figure 3.1-15. This curve has the same S-vector as shown on
Figure 3.1-12. A nominal inclination of 40 degrees has been selected
for this example. The center of Mars as it appears from the spacecraft
during the 2 days prior to insertion is shown by the solid curve. The
two dashed curves represent the near and far limbs of Mars. The total
angle subtended at the Planetary Vehicle between these two limbs at
closest approach is approximately i00 degrees. The required orientation
of the insertion engine to provide the necessary _V is shown for various
requirements of rotation of the line of apsides. The cone-clock angle
plot also shows the position of Earth and Canopus. Note that the tra-
jectory approaches in a direction that will not interfere with the
Canopus tracker.
Some gain in knowledge of the spacecraft position can be obtained with
insertion after periapsis because trajectory determination can be
continued slightly longer and Mars will cause a more significant change
in spacecraft velocity. This will provide better navigation data from
the DSN. This also provides the ability to define more accurately the
timing and magnitude of the velocity impulse. At present, it is not
certain that a significant increase of satellite-orbit accuracy results
from insertion after periapsis.
Variable-Impulse Insertion--Figure 3.1-14 showed the amount of apsidal
rotation that can be obtained for an example orbit size. This apsidal
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rotation can be measured in two ways, as shown on the sketch. The data
presented in Figure 3.1-14 has been referenced to an arbitrary inertial
direction. This inertial system has its reference axis located at
periapsis of a hyperbola with VHP of 3.0 km/sec and periapsis altitude
of i000 km. It is computationally more efficient to reference the
angle change in the orbit line of apsides to the periapsis of the approach
hyperbola for the particular insertion considered. However, this method
does not provide a complete and convenient inertial reference for the
periapsis because the reference line changes its orientation to the Sun
as the B-vector size and VHP change. For this latter case, a 490 degree
variation in orbit is less than ±90 degrees when measured in inertial
space. Because the inertial direction is believed to be more meaningful
for mission planning, the subsequent orbit rotation charts will be ref-
erenced to the arbitrary inertial direction listed above. This is the
first step in applying data of the type shown in Section II.D.4 of
Reference i. The most significant advantages of variable-impulse inser-
tion are the capability to change the insertion velocity impulse, to
allow optimum insertion into all orbits with varying VHP, and to account
for known dispersions in the B-vector.
Fixed-Impulse Insertion--If a fixed-impulse motor is used in the space-
craft design, the propulsion subsystem is sized to accommodate the largest
_V that is required through consideration of mission requirements on
apsidal rotation and VHP during the launch period. The excess propellant
must be purposely wasted when the transit trajectory and orbit are such
that an optimum insertion maneuver requires less AV than the motor
provides. One method available for using up this excess propellant is
3-22
BOEING--SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
shown in Figure 3.1-16. For a given approach hyperbola, there is a
range of aiming points (B-vectors) to establish the same satellite
orbit, each with a different _V requirement. It then follows that
if B is varied as VHP is varied over some range, the _V requirement
for establishing the orbit can be maintained at a constant value.
This method can be used to provide for a constant orbit orientation
and size even with varying launch and arrival dates. At the proper
time from periapsis, the insertion _V is applied. The direction of
the fixed impulse is selected to provide the proper orbit. This
pointing problem is no more complicated than that for optimum variable
impulse insertion. The option exists to perform the insertion maneuver
on either side of the periapsis for the approach hyperbola. This tech-
nique can be used so long as the hyperbola periapsis can be maintained
above a minimum value selected on the basis of planetary impact con-
siderations. Figure 3.1-17 shows the _V requirements for establishing
a typical orbit at various apsidal locations.
Figure 3.1-18 is similar, except the orbit shown now has a low periapsis
altitude and a high apoapsis altitude. This is the type of orbit that
is most u_u__^'1* to ac_,............._+_ with _= fixed-impu!__ d_sign. In the
event that the periapsis of such an orbit is too low to allow usage
of the full-orbit-insertion engine impulse_ an in-orbit vernier
capability such as orbit trim can be used to advantage. For such a
case, an intermediate orbit is entered with a higher periapsis.
3.1.3.3 Satellite Orbit about Mars
Orbit Selection Considerations--The orbit parameters can be divided into
two categoriesl those items that determine the size and shape of
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the orbit, such as periapsis altitude and period, and those items that
determine the orientation of the satellite orbit (longitude of ascending
node, argument of periapsis, and inclination to the equator). The size
and shape of the orbit may be selected preliminarily from the insertion
engine performance, orbit lifetime, and the mission objectives. The
orientation of the orbit involves the transit trajectory as well as
interference with lines of sight to Canopus and Sun, communication to
Earth, illumination of photographic regions, and ground coverage of
the orbit.
Periapsis Altitude--Orbit lifetime often dictates the minimum periapsis
altitude. Figure 3.1-19 shows the minimum size orbits that will maintain
a 50-year orbit lifetime. This curve has been generated for the realistic
atmosphere presented in Reference i. The heavy solid curve for an
M/CDA of 0.27 is typical of the Boeing preferred design spacecraft.
Periapsis altitudes as low as 300 km apparently can be used with the
higher orbit periods, but solar gravity and orbit attainment inaccuracies
will raise the number. Dispersions in the B-vector expected at encounter
will require biasing the aiming point. This will result in a higher
constraints. Although the lowest possible orbit is usually preferred
for observation of the planet surface, the Boeing Task A study showed
that typical cameras without image-motion compensation would have the
best resolution for orbits with periapsis altitudes from i000 to
2000 km. Orbits with minimum periapsis altitudes of i000 km have been
chosen in the following representative examples. Higher periapsis
altitudes may be obtained in most cases by a slight increase in _V
requirements.
3-25
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
35
3O
Figure 3.1-19:
25
5
o 20
_8
O
1.0
t BALLISTIC0.4 COEFFICIENT,
0.27 M/CDA (SLUGS/SQ FT)
//!/
I,
200 400
PERIAPStS ALTITUDE (KILOMETERS)
Minimum Orbit Size For A 50-Year Lifetime
e_
o
i..u
,,=,
o
o
"r
z
uJ
N
,,=,
C3
z
<,
o
u_
o
z
<
250 PERIAPSISALTIT[JDE = 1000 KM
APOAPSIS ALTITUDE = 20,000 KM
ORBIT INCLINATION = 40°
LANDER LONGITUDE = 0o
LANDER LATITUDE = 0°20O
m
rU"150
*An I////, . //A//t_
,w //////z // 7//4/////
5O \ /
o I
0 I0 2'0
Figure 3.1-20:
p
" ///_///// ....
W --HORIZON
[
|. /J//t - - - ///.
9/..9"////.4, /X// //// //
I\
J , I
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
TIME FROM PERIAPSIS(HOURS)
0rbiter/Lander Angular Relationship
3-26
I
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
Orbit Period--Propulsion requirements and orbit lifetime, as discussed
in previous paragraphs, determine the minimum allowable orbital period.
The maximum allowable orbital period is determined from the sensitivity
of orbit period to the errors expected in the insertion maneuver and from
the third-body effects caused by the Sun. Considering the above effects,
the allowable maximum for a nominal orbital period is over 50 hours. This
period is longer than required for science objectives, and a more reason-
able upper value of 24 hours can be set. As the orbit period is decreased,
the _V required of the insertion engine increases. Orbits with periods
between 4 and 20 hours appear to meet most of the mission objectives, and
these can be adjusted to give repetitive coverage of preferred target
areas. For future Voyager missions, when communication between the landed
capsule and the spacecraft becomes important, Boeing's preliminary studies
show the strong effect of orbit period on the communication between the
capsule and the spacecraft. Figure 3.1-20 shows the capsule-to-spacecraft
angular relationship for a particular landing-site location of 0-degree
aerographic longitude and O-degree latitude. Example data for the first
5 days in orbit are shown. The angle shown on the vertical scale is
measured from the capsule-local-vertical to the spacecraft. Angles greater
than 90 degrees indicate that the spacecraft is beyond the horizon. A
statistical approach similar to the method presented in Reference 3 can
be applied to short-period orbits. For the longer orbit periods,
especially those that approach synchronization with a specific surface
feature, a different analysis is necessary to evaluate the available
Reference 3: JPL Space Proram Summary, No. 37-24, Vol. IV, June 1
to July 31, 1965.
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communication time. Since maximum communication time is necessary during
the early phase of the capsule mission, the effect of capsule-spacecraft
communication on the selection of an orbit requires a detailed study.
Orbit Inclination--The orbit inclination is determined considering the
desired ground coverage, illumination of specific surface features,
interference with the Sun and Canopus sensors, and communication to the
Earth. It is possible to obtain almost any orbit inclination. The only
restriction is that the orbit inclination must be greater than the
declination of the incoming-velocity asymptote, LVI (see Figure 3.1J).
Polar orbits are possible if desired, and periapsis can be adjusted to a
variety of latitudes in either hemisphere. It should be noted that some
of these orbits have a short interference time with the Canopus tracker.
Although these polar orbits allow total planet mapping, some of the
latitudes covered are not of special interest, the orbit may have its
lowest altitude at far north latitudes, and the altitudes at the interesting
latitudes may be too high. Orbits with inclinations near 45 degrees appear
particularly attractive since solar interference is avoided for the early
part of the mission and good Earth communication can be maintained. As
the orbit inclination is increased, the length of time increases during
which there is Canopus interference. As a result, a 35- to 50-degree
inclination orbit provides a good compromise while still satisfying
desired ground coverage.
Other Orbit Parameters--Two remaining orbit parameters depend in part
upon the orientation of the approach asymptote. These last two orbit
parameters are the longitude of the ascending node and the argument of
periapsis. These parameters influence placement of the orbit plane and
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placement of the line of apsides. They affect mission parameters
through influence upon the illumination angles, latitudes of flight,
photographic resolution at various latitudes or longitudes, and
ease of orbit determination.
Orbit Perturbations--The effect of the atmosphere on orbit lifetime was
discussed in conjunction with Figure 3.1-19. The analysis used to
obtain this figure was based on a nonrotating atmosphere with Mars as the
only perturbing body. The effects of the Sun's gravitational attraction,
solar radiation pressure, Mars oblateness, and a rotating atmosphere
have been considered in a separate study. Two dynamic atmosphere models
have been considered. One model assumes the atmosphere to be rotating
at a constant angular velocity. The other model assumes a slipping
effect wherein the atmosphere at the surface of Mars rotates with the
surface and_ at a distance from the planet_ has zero inertial velocity.
The three models below show a wide variation in the lifetime prediction
for the same orbit.
Atmosphere Model
Stationary Atmosphere
Constant Angular Velocity
Slipping
Predicted Lifetime (Years)
49
65
55
The increase in lifetime for the constant-angular-velocity model is
due to the atmosphere "pushing" the spacecraft at each apoapsis passage.
Currently, the slipping atmosphere model is considered the most realistic.
Solar gravity and radiation pressure do not cause the lifetime to
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decrease by 2 years for orbit periods up to 20 hours. Additional
work could be done in this area to improve the dynamic atmosphere
model. However, the results of a nonrotating atmosphere can be used
as a proven conservative estimate for easterly-moving satellites.
For inclinations below 63.4 degrees, the oblateness of Mars will cause
the longitude of the ascending node to regress and the argument of
periapsis to progress. This movement of the orbit can be used to
increase ground coverage or reduce interference with Sun, Earth, or
Canopus. Figure 3.1-21 shows the angular rates expected for orbits
with a periapsis altitude of 1000 km and periods ranging from 4 to 20
hours. The angular rotation rates are relatively high for short-period
orbits with inclinations near 40 degrees. Note that a variation in
results in a corresponding change in both longitude and latitude, while_
affects only the longitude of a given suborbital point. The rates
will usually be less for higher periapsis altitudes.
The long-term effects of the oblateness of Mars can be seen in F_gure 3.1-22.
The horizontal scale represents the argument of the spacecraft periapsis
(angle measured from the ascending node to the spacecraft periapsis at
any time),and the vertical scale represents the latitude. The solid
lines shown trace the path of the spacecraft periapsis for three different
inclinations. The dashed curves represent the traces of the two orbit
points that have an altitude of 2000 km on a lO00-km periapsis
altitude by 20,O00-km apoapsis altitude orbit with a 40-degree inclination.
This 2:1 change in altitude represents about a 2:1 change in the camera
resolution. Allowed enough time, the spacecraft would eventually
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cover an entire cycle on this graph. The lightly shaded region rep-
resents the range of latitudes that would be covered during this
period of time. A typical initial periapsis location is indicated
by the lefthand heavy dashed vertical line. Over a 180-day period,
the periapsis will progress to the righthand heavy dashed vertical
line. The total region that would be covered within a 2:1 altitude
range is indicated by the heavily shaded region. Higher inclinations
of this orbit size will give more latitude coverage with narrower
longitude bands.
The rotations can also be used to adjust the illumination
angle as the apparent terminator moves. This can be accomplished by
taking the vector sum of_andQsuch that the Mars orbit net precession
rate sums up to approximately 0.52 degree per day, the mean rotational
rate of Mars around the Sun. If desired strongly enough to compromise
other features, solar interference can be avoided during the entire
mission with proper adjustment in the precession rate.
Characteristics of Typical Satellite Orbits--Figure 3.1-23 shows the
latitude versus illumination-angle history for the first orbit at three
different orbit inclinations. An S-vector corresponding to a typical
launch and arrival date has been assumed for this curve. Different S-vectors
will produce different curves,and this is shown only as a typical example.
Insertion takes place at periapsis. The orbit size affects only the
altitudes of the specific points that comprise the curve. The heavy
band indicates the region that has a 2:1 change in the spacecraft
altitude as referenced to periapsis. The blocked-off region indicates a
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band of latitudes and illumination angles that appears desirable. The
range of latitudes considered important is from +i0 degrees to -40 degrees,
and the range of illumination angles is from 5 to 30 degrees, measured from
the terminator. All the orbits shown have good illumination angles and
latitude coverage. Other curves would show that inclinations between 15
and 80 degrees appear to be satisfactory over the 2:1 range of altitudes.
Adjustments of the line of apsides at insertion can improve the latitude
and illumination angle history for many of the orbits that would other-
wise be undesirable. This figure is for the first orbit about Mars. The
same orbits at other days have different illumination angles and latitudes
due to the motion of the Sun and the effects of oblateness of Mars. Figure
3.1-24 shows the effects of time upon the orbit. The ist, 30th, 60th,
and 90th days in orbit are indicated for a 40-degree inclination orbit.
The example shown has excellent illumination angles and latitude coverage
for the first 60 days of the mission and good coverage thereafter.
All of the orbits shown have some degree of Mars interference with the
Canopus tracker. Interference with the Canopus tracker is assumed to
occur when Mars appears in an area defined by a cone angle of 90 ±60
degrees and a clock angle of ±35 degrees. Those orbits which have
Canopus interference for greater than 4 hours have been discarded in this
preliminary analysis. Orbits that give interference with Sun, Earth,
or Canopus prior to the orbit-insertion maneuver have also been discarded.
It is believed that the time just prior to insertion is critical, and any
loss of a reference body or communication will seriously affect the prob-
ability of attaining a satisfactory orbit about Mars. Most orbits with
inclinations between 30 and 115 degrees meet these two requirements.
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Figure 3.1-25 shows the time that spacecraft spends in the solar umbra.
Orbits with inclinations greater than 45 degrees appear to be promising
since they are completely free from occultation during the first 60 days
of the mission. However, a large percentage of orbits with inclinations
greater than 45 degrees have Canopus interference for more than 4 hours,
and, as a result, are unacceptable. The Voyager Flight Spacecraft can
safely be inserted into a wide range of orbits with periods as low as
2.8 hours and corresponding periapsis altitudes as low as i000 km. Fig-
ure 3.1-26 shows the maximum occultation times that can be encountered.
Occultation is assumed to occur when the satellite orbit intersects a
cylinder projected from Mars. The cylinder has its central axis along
the negative projection of a vector leading to the viewed object. When
the spacecraft is in this cylindrical region, total occultation is
assumed to occur. This very closely represents the umbra for the case
of solar occultation. The maximum possible occultation will occur when
the apoapsis of the satellite orbit is on the central axis of the
cylinder. The dashed curves on Figure 3.1-26 show the maximum occultation
time per orbit possible for the satellite orbits under consideration. The
solid curves show the maximum occulted period as a percentage of the orbit
period. The limit shown at the bottom represents the minimum orbit size
that is available to provide a 50-year lifetime with an M/CDA of 0.27
slug/ft 2. Figure 3.1-27 shows a cone-clock angle plot for Mars and the
two limbs during the first orbit. Only those areas that are not shaded are
acceptable for the sensor vision. Interference with the Canopus sensor
occurs for only 2.5 hours in this 40-degree orbit because interference
occurs near periapsis. Interference with communication to the Earth is
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shown by Figure 3.1-28. All of the orbits shown will have some loss of
communication during the mission, but the percentage is small. Note
that small changes in the inclination do not affect communications during
the critical first 20 days of the mission.
Competin 9 0bjects--The two moons, Phobos and Deimos, in orbit around Mars
provide a potential hazard to the spacecraft. In addition, any collision
that might take place in a 50-year period of time could result in an
unsterilized particle impacting the planet. The problem of impacting
Phobos and Deimos during the first 50 years in orbit has been investi-
gated for a variety of orbits. The results are presented below.
PHOBOS AND DEINDS 50-YEAR
IMPACT PROBABILITIES
Periapsis Apoapsis Orbit Phobos-Impact Deimos-Impact
Radius (km I Radius (km) Inclination Probability Probability
4400 23505 400 5.7 x 10 -6 3.8 x 10 -6
4400 9360 40 ° 1.5 x 10 -4 0
9340 9360 400 1.6 x 10 -5 0
4400 23505 0 ° 8.3 x 10 -6 4.3 x 10 -6
4400 9360 0 ° 1.3 x 10 -1 0
9340 9360 0 ° 0.999 0
Orbits with high inclinations have a relatively low probability of
impacting Phobos and Delmos. For low inclinations, the probability of
impact increases considerably as the orbit period approaches the
period of either of the moons.
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3.1.4 Flight Capsule Entry Trajectory
Deflection Geometry--The basic geometry involved in the deflection to
entry maneuvers is shown in Figure 3.1-29. At a point along the satellite
orbit, the Flight Capsule and Spacecraft are separated. The impulse
applied at the separation maneuver will be sufficiently large to achieve
a lO00-meter separation distance in 20 minutes. At this time, the deorbit
motor will be ignited to impart a _V and establish the orbital descent
trajectory. The magnitude of this _V is dependent upon where in the
orbit the maneuver is performed, the entry angle, and the direction in
which the deorbit motor is fired. The location of the deflection maneuver
is measured by its true anomaly (angle from periapsis to deflection point
measured in the direction of motion). The firing angle is referenced to
the entry angle of attack (angle between velocity vector at entry and
thrust axis).
AV Requirements for Deorbit--Figure 3.1-30 shows the AV requirements
to deflect the capsule on an entry trajectory as a function of the
deflection location (true anomaly). The capsule skip-out limit for a
ballistic coefficient, M/CDA , of _ is shown as well as a maximum allow-
able entry angle of 20 degrees. The angle-of-attack limit of 60 degrees
and the _V limit of 550 meters per second narrow the range of allowable
descent trajectories. There is an additional constraint that may be
used to narrow the range of available capsule descent trajectories. This
constraint places the landing site location 15 to 30 degrees above the
terminator. Since desirable satellite orbits have their periapsis at
about the same location relative to the terminator, the capsule descent
trajectory and satellite orbit can be fixed in inertial space.
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Communication Considerations--It is desirable to maintain communication
between the spacecraft and the Earth during the entire descent phase.
Communication can be maintained by selection of deflection-true anomalies
outside the range from 28 to 102 degrees. An additional desire to be in
view of Goldstone during the entry phase affects the timing of the entire
mission. This timing may be controlled by adjustments in the orbital
period, time of separation, and arrival of the Plight Spacecraft.
3.2 ORBIT/ENTRY DETERMINATION UNCERTAINTIES
3.2.1 Initial Mars Orbit Determination
Estimated orbit determination errors versus number of periapsis passages
are summarized below for a 13.8-hour orbit inclined at 40 degrees to the
Mars equator with argument of periapsis at i0 degrees from the ascending
node. Studied data combinations were doppler only, doppler supplemented
with range marks once per hour, and doppler supplemented with range or
with measurements of the direction of Mars local vertical. The l-sigma
data errors assumed were 0.001 meter/second in range rate derived from
doppler, 0.005 km in range, and 0.2 degree in each of two angles fixing
the direction of local vertical. The dominant factor in early orbit deter-
mination is the validity of the model to which the data are fitted. Given
a good model, the dominant error is in the orientation of the orbit plane
about the line of sight from Earth. Using doppler data only, the position
at periapsis is determined to within 4 km after the first periapsis passage
and 0.4 km after the second periapsis passage. Accuracies are not improved
significantly with the addition of range or angle data_ however, the con-
vergence rate is approximately the same with range data only as with
doppler data only. Therefore, the range data may be useful if ranging is
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established before high-accuracy doppler tracking.
summarized in the following table.
Results are
Doppler Doppler Doppler
0nly Plus Range Plus Angle
Number of Periapsis Passages 1 2
Oblateness Constant (Percent)
Mars-Earth Relative Velocity
(Meters per Second)
Ascending Node in Plane of
Sky (Degree)
Position at Periapsis
Vertical (km)
Crossplane (km)
Downrange (km)
1 2 1 2
0.i 0.01 0.i 0.01 0.i 0.01
0°001 0°0001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001
0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01
1.0 0.i 0.8 0.i 1.0 0.i
2.5 0.2 2.2 0.15 1.0 0.2
2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2
3.2.2 Flight Capsule Entry and Impact Conditions
The Flight Capsule orbit parameter uncertainties at atmospheric entry and
impact were estimated using combinations of range rate measured from the
orbiter, local vertical measured on the capsule, and altitude measured on
the capsule. Observation 1-sigma errors of 0.i meter per second, 0.5 de-
gree, and 0.i km, respectively, were assumed. Using range-rate data only,
the l-sigma uncertainty in the prediction of entry velocity is about
0.2 meter per second_ adding altitude measurements, the uncertainties
are reduced to about 0.05 meter per second. Atmospheric parameters can
be estimated from the difference between predicted and measured velocity
in the line of sight when the effect of atmosphere on the measured com-
ponent is i meter per second or greater. The crossplane impact uncertainty
is 4 km. This is not reduced significantly by angle measurements on the
capsule with l-sigma errors of 0.25 degree.
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3.3 VOYAGER FLIGHT SPACECRAFT COMPONENTS DESIGN PARAMETERS
A summary of weights and reliability assessments for major items of the
Planetary Vehicle is presented as Table 3.3-1.
Table 3.3-2 presents component design parameters for the preferred
Spacecraft Bus, PropulsionSubsystem 9 Planetary Vehicle Adapter9 and
Science Subsystem. The table has been simplified in keeping with the
level of detail appropriate to Task B. More complete data will be
prepared and tabulated during Phase IB and Phase II.
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Table 3.3-1: SUMMARY OF PLANh_fARY VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
SYSTEM E.LENENT
SPACECRAFT BUS
Power
Guidance & Control
WEIGHT
541.6
266.4
2,100
RELIABILITY
ALLOC. , ASSESS.
Data Storage
Telemetry
Radio
Command
Computin 9 & Sequencing
107.7
57.3
162.5
31.4
45.0
0.940
0.990
0.970
0.970
0.970
Structural & Mechanical
Pyrotechnic
Temperature Control
Cabling
Contingency (weight)
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
Midcourse & Orbit Trim
Propulsion
Orbit Insertion Propulsion
Cabling & Power Conditioning
Structures & Mechanical
Temperature Control
Contingency (weight)
SCIENCE SUBSY ST F_._
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT TOTAL
CAPSULE SYSYEM
Capsule & Sterilization
Canister
Radio Link & Data Storage
PLANETARY VEHICLE TOTAL
PLANETARY VEHICLE ADAPTER
PLANETARY VEHICLE &
ADAPTER TOTAL
408.5
34.0
80.1
184.0
181.5
3,962.0
10,400.0
25.0
337.0
118.0
158.0
1,968.0
32.0
15,000
400
(17,5oo)
2,000
(19,500)
850
(20,350)
* Includes Propulsion Temperature Control Reliability
0.998
0.999
0.996*
0.999
0.995
0.800
0.621
0.999
0.9932
0.9945
0.9490
0.9978
0.9820
0.9847
0.9860
0.9984
0.9999
0,9990*
0.9960
0.9960
0.8001
0.7202
0.9990
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TABLE 3.3-2:
ITEMS
* EQUIPMENT TOTALS MODIFIED BY DUTY CYCLE
SPACECRAFT BUS
POWER SUBSYSTEM
Solar Panel - Fixed
Substrata Assy.
Support Frame and Struts
Fittings and Attachments
Thermal Coating
Solar Panel - Deployable
Substrate Assy.
Support Frame and Struts
Thermal Coating & Dielectric
Deployment Mechanism
Deploy Latches
Stowage Latches
Battery, Regulator & Inverter Assy (Bay 81
Battery
Battery Charger
DC Regulator
Fail Sense
2400 cps Inverter
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware
Wiring and Connectors
Battery, Regulator & Inverter Assy (Bay 71
Same as Assy. 8 above
Battery, Regulator & Inverter Assy (Bay 51
Same as Asay. 8 above
Power Control Assy (3/4 of Bay 6)
Power Switching and Logic
Booster Converter & Share Sensor
400_Inverter
Power Control Sub Assy
Precision Oscillator Sub Assy
Chassis, Radiator, & Hardware
Wiring & Connectors
RADIO SUBSYSTEM
Radio Electronics Assy (Bay 3)
Power Amplifier Subassembly
Power Ampli fler & Power Converter
Band Reject Filter
Circulator 4 Port
Circulator 3 Port
Hybrid
Relay Receiver Subassembly
Receiver (GFE)
Power Converter (GEE)
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware
Wiring & Connectors
Radio Electronics Assy (Bay 2)
S-Band Radio Subassembly
Receiver
Power Converter
Ranging Unit
Preamplifier
Diplexer
Preselector
Exciter Subassembly
Exciter
Power Converter
Isolator
Band Pass Filter
Launch Transmitter Subassembly
Launch lran&mitter
Power Converter
Isolator
Band Pass Filter
Redundancy Control Subassembly
Redundancy Control S/A
Power Converter
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware
Wiring & Connectors
Antennas
High Gain Antenna
Mad. Gain Antenna
Low Gain Antenna and Boom
VHE Relay Antenna
QTY
PER
s/c
(8)
1
I set
i set
A/R
(4)
1
i set
A/R
1
1 pr
1
(1)
1
1
1
1
1
1
A/R
1
1
(1)
1
1
2
1
1
1
A/R
(1)
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
A/B
(1)
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
(1)
1
1
2
1
OOMPONENY DESIGN PARAMETERS
CURRENT WT. EST.
ITEM TOTAL
(SUBTOTAL)
2100
((541.6))
(18.8) (150.2)
13.6
3.65
.22
i._
(30.5) (121-9)
18.1
3.1
2.1
1.75
2.7
2.75
(80.4)
49.5
4.6
6.7
2.0
5.1
11.0
1.5
80.4 (80.4)
80.4 (80.4)
(28.3)
6.3
2.1
4.2
3.1
4,6
6.8
1.2
((162.5))
(54.2)
20
1,6
4.8
0.8
1.
Her. (9.2)
Ref. (5.0)
23
3
(S1.3)
i1
5
9
3
3
1.6
4
5
2.4
2
2.5
4
0.8
1
8
3.0
11
5.0
(27.0)
12.5
5.0
8.0
1.5
ESTIMATED
HEAT
DISSIPATION
WATTS*
58
8
26
1
26
56
1
2
0
4
100
.12
.03
I0
3
5.6
2.1
5.0
0.3
5.4
1.8
28
6
2
i.i
ALLOCATED
POWER
WATTS
205
172.7
nELl-
ABILITY
ASSESS-
MENT
.9045
.9932
.9820
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TABLE 3.3-2: COMPONENT DESIGN PARAMETERS (CONTINUED)
ITEMS
* EQUIPMENT TOTALS MODIFIED BY DUTY CYCLE
RELI-
QTY CURRENT WT. EST. ESTIMATED ALLOCATED ABILITY
PER
S/C ITEM TOTAL HEAT POWER ASSESS-
(SUBTOTAL) DISSIPATION WATTS MENT
WATTS"
SPACECRAFT BUS (continued)
COMMAND SUBSYSTEM ((31.4))
Electronic Assembly (½ of Bay 16) i (31.4)
Command Detector Subassembly 1 i0.0 3.0
Command Decoder Subassembly 1 7.6 11.2
Command Output Combiner 1 1.0 0
Power Conditioner Subassembly i 4.4 1.6
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware 1 5.5
Wiring and Connectors A/R 2.9
DATA STORAGE SUBSYSTEM ((107.7))
Data Storage Assy (Bay 14) (i) (48.4)
Tq Recorder #I 1 18 12
TV Recorder #2 1 18 12
Capsule Recorder 1 Ref (18) 12
Chassis, Radiator, & Hardware i ll.O
Wiring & Connectors A/R 1.4
Data Storage Assy (_ of Bay 16) (i) (59.3)
IR Scanner Recorder i 12 6
IR - UV Spectrometer Recorder i 12 5
Field & Particles Recorder i 12 6
Maneuver Recorder i 12 6
Interface Unit (Programmer) 1 S
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware i 5.5
Wirin_ & Connectors A/R 2.8
TELEMETRY SUBSYSTE_ (Bay 4) ((57.3))
Electronic Assembly (i) (57.3)
Power Converter Subassembly 2.4
Master Digital Multiplexer Subassembly 2.0
Engineering Multiplexer Subassembly 13.24
Block Encoder Subassembly 0.2
Upper Subcarrier Bi-Phase ModJlator 0.5 13.4
Subassembly
Base Band Generator Subassembly 5.46
Data Buffer Subassembly 2.5
Signal Conditioning & Junction Box 1 8 2.5
Subassembly
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware i ii
Wiring & Connectors 12
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM ((266.4))
Attitude Reference & Autopilot Assy (i) (74.6)
(Bay I)
Inertial Reference Unit i 30 33
Canopus Sensor 2 i0 8
Fine Sun Sensor i I 3
Autopilot Electronics ! 9 61
Attitude Ref. Electronics I ii 56
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware i 11.5 0
Wirin_ _ Connectors A/R 2.1
Guidance Platform Assembly (I) (I0.0)
Planet Tracker 1 2,0 I
Platform, Cover & Roam 1 3.0
Motor Drive & Gimbal i 5.0 16
Coarse Sdn Sensor Assembly (4) .5 ea. (2.0) .05
Reaction Control Assembly (2) (165.0)
Nitrogen Tank (incl. Temp. Trans) 4 96
Thrusters 16 i0 56
Valves, Regulators & Press. Trans. 2 sets 4
Tubing & Instl. Hardware 2 sets ii
Reaction Control Gas (N2) 44
Antenna Pointing Control Assembly i 14 (14) 16
ilmb/Terminator Sensor Assembly 2 .5 (0.5) i
Earth Sensor i 0.3 (0.3) I
20 .9847
50 .9490
7,5 .9978
174 .9945
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TABLE 3.3-2:
ITEMS
* EQUIPMENT TOTALS MODIFIED BY DUTY CYCLE
COMPONENT DESIGN PARAMETERS (CONTINUED)
QTY CURRENT WT. EST. RELI-
PER ESTIMATED
S/C ITEM TOTAL HEAT ALLOCATED ABILITY
(SUBTOTAL) DISSIPATION POWER ASSESS-
WATTS* WATTS MENT
SPACECRAFT BUS (continJed)
STRUCTURAL & MECHANICAL SUBSYSTEM ((408.5))
Primary Structure (218)
Skin & Doublers 87.2
Stiffeners 48 37.B
Longerons 8 16.0
Rings _ 62.0M sc. Fittings & Fasteners A R 15
Secondary Structure (140.5)
Meteoroid Shielding 52.7
Solar Panel Supports 8 5.0
Antenna Supports 19.5
Science System Supports 35.0
Guidance Platform Support 2.0
Reaction Control Tank Supports 4 12.0
Reaction Control Thruster Supports 4 2.0
Misc. Brackets and Fasteners 12.3
Capsule Emergency Separation Provisions (25)
Capslle Support Field Joint Ring 15.0
V Block Band 6.0
Emergency Separation Mechanism 4.0
Planetary Vehicle Separation Provision
Support Ring Ref. (15)
Block Band - Clamp Ref. (i0)
Separation Mechanism Ref. (25)
Deployment Mechanisms (25)
High Gain Ant. Boom Latch & Deploy 1 set 15
Mechanism
Medium Gain Ant. Latch & Deploy i set 3
Mechanism
Low Gain Ant. Latch & Deploy Mechanism 2 sets 6
Guidance Platform Latching Mechanism 1.0
COMPUTING AND SEQUENCING SUBSYS_fEM ((45.0))
CAS Electronic Assy (5/8 of Bay 15) (45.0)
ComMand Register Subassembly 8" 2 (l.lO)
Instruction Register Subassembly 8" 2 (l.lO)
Velocity Conversion Register Subassy. i .55
Countdown Chain Subassembly B" 1 .55
Arithmetic & Memory Control Subassy. i .55
Interrupt Register Subassembly i .55
Memory Subassembly 2 (8.00)
Transformer Subassembly 1 2.08
Signal Conditioning Subassembly 3 (4.80)
Output Matrix Decoder Subassembly 6 (3.30)
Control Register & Timing Subassembly 2 (i.i0)
Power Conditioning Subassembly 2 (8.12)
Chassis, Radiator & Hardware i 6.90
Wiring and Connectors 6.30
PYROTECHNIC SUBSYSTEM ((34.0))
Pyrotechnic Power Switching Assy (30.0)
(3/8 of Bay 15)
Capacitor Bank Subassembly 2 (4.24)
Power Conditioning Subassembly 2 (5.56)
Gates anJ 9rivers Subassembly 8 (12.60)
Chassis, Radiator g Hardware i 4.10
I,,_-:_~ and Connectors ^/o _ _n
Electro-Explosive Devices (EED's) 59
Pyrotechnic Ar_ing Switch _PAS) i
Separation - Initiated Timer (SIT) 1
TEMPERATURE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Louver Assys 13 39.0
Thermal Coating (Radiator Plates & 6.85
Thermal Tie)
Thermal Coating - (Electronic Assys) 3.0
Heater and Switches 8/16 2.46
Thermal Coatings - Ext. Mounted Equip, 2.0
Insulation - Electronic Assemblies g.4
Electronic Assemblies - Thermal Ties A/R 17.4
CABLING
Cabling Ring Harness i set
(Wire, Connectors, and Clamps)
CONTINGENCY
(3.o)
(o.3)(o.7)
((SO.i))
((iS4.0))(184.0)
((181.5))
52
7.5
7O
12
4O
.9984
.9860
.9999
.99g0
.9960
3-47
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
TABLE 3.3-2:
iTEMS
* EQUIPMENT TOTALS MODIFIED BY DUTY CYCLE
PLANETARY VEHICLE ADAPTER
STRUCTURAL & MECHANICAL SUBSYSTEM
Adapter Structure
Cooling Air Duct
Planetary Vehicle Separation Provision
(Ref. Spacecraft Bus - Structural &
Mechanical Subsystem)
CABLING
Adapter Cables, Conn., Hdwr. & EEO's
Inflight Destruct Provision
Instrumentation Provision
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
MIDCOURSEOR/'O-_ TRIM PROPULSION
Monopropellant Engine (incl. jet vanes)
Propellant Tank
Propellant Feed
Pressurant Tank
Pressurant Feed
Pressurant Gas (N 2) (incl. residual)
Usable Propellant (Hydrazine)
Residual Propellant
ORBIT INSERTION PROPULSION
Rocket Motor Inerts
Thrust Vector Controls
Pressurant Feed
Roll Control Jet & Control Valve Set
Preon (liquid) (incl. residual)
Pressurization Gas (N2) (incl. residual)
Usable Solid Propellant
CABLING & POWER CONDITIONING
Converters & Switch Installation
Cable Harness
STRUCTURE
Primary Support Frame
Hydrazine Tank Support
Nitrogen Tank Support
Solid Motor Support
Midcourse Engine Thrust Structure
Meteoroid Shielding - Bus - Capsule
Meteoroid Shielding - Solar Shield
Miscellaneous Support Structure
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
Louver Assembly (installed on Bus)
Radiator Plate (installed on Bus)
Insulation (partly on BUS)
Coatings (partly on Bus)
Electrical Heaters & Switches
Solar Heat Shields (set)
CONTINGENCY
SCIENCE SYSTEm1 (GFE 1
Science Instruments (Platform Mounted)
Science Instruments (Body & External
Mounted)
Data Automation Equipment
Scan Platform No. I
Platform No. II (UV Spectrometer)
Booms and Antennas
Power Switching Electronics
Wire Harness and Miscellaneous
_ote: Science Instrument Remote Electronics
and DAE are located in Bays ii and 12.
UV spectrometer is located in Bay 13.
COMPONENT DESIGN PARAMETERS (CONTINUED)
QTY CURRENT WT. EST. RELI-
ESTIMATED ABILITY
PER ALLOCATED ASSESS-S/C ITEM TOTAL HEAT
(SUBTOTAL) DISSIPATION POWER MENT
WATTS* WATTS
1 730
i i0
50
i set
5
5
A/R
A/R
A/R
1
((sso))
(790)
(20)
20
20 (20)
20 (2o)
(15,ooo))
(3962)
(87)
(263)
17
193
19
89
3190
104
965
130
37
(5)
203
15
9045
11.4
13.6
116
12
3
64
27
53
51
II
(6.1)
(3.9)
43.1
16,6
3.3
45
i00.0
140.0
47.0
53.5
14.0
28.0
6.0
11.5
(10,400)
(25.0)
(337)
(lie)
(lSS)
((400))
1 (continuous)
750 (15 ms
.9990
(contin.) .9960
750 (15 ms)
160 .8001
* Equipment totals modified by duty cycle
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3.4 VOYAGER EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS AND DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFICATION
The method for identifying elements of Voyager Spacecraft System equip-
ment, as described in the Task A formal report, is still fully applicable.
The equipment-list drawing tree (Figure 3.4-1) has been revised to reflect
the Task B preferred spacecraft configuration.
3.5 SYSTEM INTERFACE DEFINITION
This section describes the interfaces between the primary system elements
of the Voyager Project, which are those defined by NASA/JPL in "Voyager
1971 Preliminary Mission Description," dated October 16, 1965. System
elements and their respective interfaces are shown in Figure 3.5-1.
Section references are included in the figure for location of specific
interface details described elsewhere in Volumes A and B of this report.
The details within the Spacecraft System block show the location of
internal interface detail. Schedule interfaces affecting the Voyager
Spacecraft System and its development are discussed in Section 5.3 of
Volume A but are not referenced in the figure. The resulting preliminary
interface definitions will be further defined during Phase IB.
3.5.1 Interface of Spacecraft System and Capsule System
The Spacecraft System (SCS) and Capsule System (CS) have physical, signal,
power, and rf interfaces between the Flight Spacecraft and the Flight
Capsule (Figure 3.5-2). The SCS and CS also have interfaces between
their associated operational support equipment (OSE) in the system test
complexes and in the launch complex equipment. Details of these inter-
faces are described in Section 3.1 of Volume B. The physical interfaces
between the CS-OSE and the SCS-OSE will be the connectors on the inter-
connecting cables. An undefined interface--maintenance of the Flight
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Capsule sterilization level--could cause problems. It will affect the
interfaces of the Capsule System with both the SCS and the Launch Vehicle
System.
3.5.2 Interface of Spacecraft System and Launch Vehicle System
The Spacecraft System (SCS) and the Launch Vehicle System (LVS) have
physical, signal, power, rf, and environmental control interfaces between
the Planetary Vehicle and the launch vehicle (Figure 3.5-2). Temperature,
humidity, and cleanliness of environmental control under the nose fairing
will be maintained by the LVS. Detailed definition of this interface will
require coordination between the Spacecraft, Capsule 9 and Launch Vehicle
Systems. The SCS and LVS have physical_ power_ air-conditioning, and
signal interfaces between the SCS-LCH, the capsule LCH 9 and the launch
complex. The physical interfaces will be the mechanical mounting fixtures
for the LCH, the air-conditioning ducting terminations at the LCH, and
the electrical connectors at the LCH. These interfaces are discussed in
more detail in Section 3.2 of Volume B.
3.5.3 Interface of Spacecraft System and Tracking and Data System
The Spacecraft System (SCS) and Tracking and Data System (TDS) have
command, telemetry, ranging, angle-tracking, and doppler-tracking inter-
faces with the Flight Spacecraft and all tracking and data stations assigned
to the Voyager mission. These interfaces are contained in the S-band
uplink and downlink. The uplink contains command, ranging_ and doppler-
tracking interfaces, whereas the downlink contains telemetry_ ranging,
and angle- and doppler-tracking interfaces. These links are discussed
in Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.8. The launch complex equipment (I,CE)-TDS
interfaces are covered in Section 3.2.5 of Volume B.
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3.5.4 Interface of Tracking and Data System and Mission Operations System
The Tracking and Data System (TDS) and Mission Operations System (MOS)
have signal, power, physical, programming, tracking-data-handling, teleme-
try, command-data-handling, and procedural interfaces. Mission-dependent
hardware and software are necessary at DSIF's and the SFOF. For each
signal path between these systems, there may be physical, signal-program-
ming, procedural, and data-handling interfaces. Training, human engineer-
ing, and other TDS-MOS interfaces are described in Sections 3.4.7, 3.5,
and 3.6 of Volume B.
3.5.5 Interfaces of Spacecraft System and Mission Operations System
The Spacecraft System and the Mission Operations System have functional
interfaces in the command and telemetry data streams. Commands originated
and verified by the mission operations teams of the SFOF constitute the
command data stream, which crosses the MOS-TDS and TDS-SCS interfaces
to the spacecraft. Data for command verification is fed back from the
spacecraft to the M0S via the telemetry data stream. The telemetry data
stream containing spacecraft and capsule data starts in the spacecraft
and crosses the SCS-TDS and TDS-MOS interfaces before reaching the mission
operations teams in the MOS. Possible interfaces exist where data from
Spacecraft System tests and other Voyager Program system tests passes to
the MOS. Training and procedural interfaces are discussed in Section
3.6 of Volume B.
3.5.6 Interface of Capsule System and Mission Operations System
The Capsule System (CS) and the Mission Operations System have a func-
tional interface in the telemetry data stream. Telemetry data originating
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in the capsule crosses the SCS-CS interface to the spacecraft where it
becomes a part of the telemetry data stream. Changes in mission require-
ments for later flights may affect these interfaces.
3.6 TELEMETRY CRITERIA
The following criteria are used to develop the preferred design of the
telemetry subsystem and portions of associated telecommunication subsystem.
i) Provide data modes tailored to the requirements of each mission
phase, but keep the total number of modes to a minimum consistent
with the requirement to minimize equipment complexity. When require-
ments conflict9 resolve the conflict in favor of maximizing the
return of high-rate science data in the first month after Mars
encounter.
2) Provide backup modes to transmit scientific and engineering data at
reduced rates in degraded or emergency conditions.
3) Minimize antenna gain and_ therefore9 size_ weight9 and pointing
accuracy requirements by using efficient coding and modulation tech-
niques to the maximum extent possible without significantly increas-
ing on-board complexity. Apply the weight saving to redundancy_
and thereby increase probability of mission success.
4) Provide a balanced design that matches the data transmission capa-
bility to the total data acquisition and storage capability for at
least the first 30 days after Mars encounter.
Applying the above criteria results in data storage, telemetry, and radio
subsystems with the following characteristics and capabilities.
i) Two 1.2 x 108 bit recorders are provided for television data. In
addition_ after capsule impact and stored-capsule-data playback 9
3-59
BOEING--SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
2)
3)
the 1.2 x 108 bit capsule recorder can be used for augmented storage
of television data_ providing a total picture storage capacity of
3.6 x 108 bits. This corresponds to data acquisition via the data
automation system_ at a rate of 50,O00-bps for the 2-hour period on
the sunlit side of Mars around the periapsis of a nominal 14-hour
orbit. Lower capacity recorders for engineering and other scientific
data increase the total data storage capacity to slightly over 3.8 x
lO 8 bits.
The data rates provided for transmitting planetary science data are
7200 and 1200-bps. At the higher rate_ 3.6 x 108 bits can be trans-
mitted in approximately 14 hours. The entire recorder capacity can
be filled and emptied during each 14-hour orbital period. Adding
approximately 300-bps of engineering and low-rate science data pro-
vides a total data rate per spacecraft of 7500-bps. Thus, the two
spacecraft from a single launch make full use of the maximum data
handling capability of 159000-bps at the deep-space stations for the
time during which the 7200-bps high-rate data can be sustained by
the spacecraft-to-ground link.
The following combination of telemetry and radio subsystem parameters
maintains the 7200-bps rate (plus additional 288-bps on a separate
subcarrier) for 80 days after encounter at a nominal encounter range
of 160 x 106 km:
a) Biorthogonal encoding (16_ 5) of the serial data streams
b) Fifty-watt nominal rf power outputs
c) A 6.5-foot-diameter_ doubly gimbaled_ hlgh-gain antenna.
Although the biorthogonal encoding requires additional ground
processing equipment, it reduces the high-galn-antenna diameter
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4)
from 8 to 6.5 feet and adds only a few components to the
telemetry subsystem. The reduced antenna size saves approxi-
mately 40 pounds in %oral spacecraft weight and relaxes pointing
requirements. This system configuration will support 7488-bps
rate for at least 80 days after encounter and 1260-bps (Mode 3)
for an additional i00 days.
The Mariner IV fixed antenna is incorporated as a medium-gain backup
to the high-gain antenna. I% will support the 1260-bps rate for at
least i00 days after encounter and 80-bps (Mode i) for an additional
45 to 60 days.
A number of configuration variations are possible.
I) The third capsule 108 bit recorder can be held in reserve as a
redundancy backup. A maximum data rate of 4800 bits per second will
then transmit the entire storage capacity in one 14-hour orbit.
2) At 4800-bps, biorthogonal encoding can be eliminated or the high-gain
antenna diameter can be reduced to 5 feet. Hither change will still
support 1200-bps at end of mission.
3) An additional mode (or modes) to provide a rate (or rates) intermedi-
ate between 7200 and 1200-bps can be added, with some increased
complexity, to provide increased total data at end of mission.
These and other possible parameter variations will be explored with
JPL during Phase IB.
A sugary of proposed telemetry modes is presented in Tables 3.6-1 and
3.6-2.
3-61
BOEING--SPACE DMSION
D2-82709-6
Table 3.6-i: TELEMETRY MODULATION AS FUNCTION OF DATA MODE
4
DATA BIT-RATE
(bits per second)
Lower
Channel
8O
288
6O
1.64
Upper
Channe 1
7200
1200
MODULATION
Upper Channel
Lower Channel
Coherent PSK/PM
Coded PSK/PM
Coherent PSK/PM
Coded PSK/PM
Coherent PSK/PM
Two Channel
Coherent PSK/PM
Carrier Only
SUBCARRIER FREQUENCY
(c s)
1440
1440
24O
120
24O
Upper
Channel
92,160
92,160
IISSION PHASE (S)
Launch
!Cruise
Encounter
Early Orbit
Late Orbit Prime,
Early Orbit Backup
Emergency During
Cruise and Orbit
Acquisition
Table 3.6-2: AVERAGE DATA RATE (IN BITS) AS FUNCTION OF DATA MODE
MODE
DATA TYPE
Spacecraft Engineering
per sec.
2
per sec. per sec. per sec.
12.3 44.3 11.5 1.45
Capsule Engineering 6.2 110.8 ....
Cruise Science 36.9 44.3 30.0 --
Tape Recorder Playback*i 15.4 55.4 11.5 --
9.2 33.2 6.9 0.19
60.0 1.64
1200 --
Sync and Frame Ident.
TOTAL OF LOWER CHANNEL 80.0 288.0
-- 7200Planetary Science
(Upper Channel)
*Allocated to Cruise Science except during tape recorder playback.
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3.7 TELEMETRY CHANNEL LIST
The Task B telemetry channel list is a complete revision of the list
presented in Task A. This was necessary to conform to changes in the
spacecraft subsystems due to the Saturn V innovation and changes in data
transmission requirements and priority requirements established in
"Performance and Design Requirements for the Voyager 1971 Spacecraft
System, General Specification For--Preliminary," dated September 17, 1965.
These requirements are in accord with the "Voyager 1971 Preliminary
Mission Descriptiont" dated October 159 1965.
The revision consists of assigning two channels for data transmission
with five modes of operation to accommodate inflight selection of pre-
determined scientific 9 spacecraft engineering 9 and capsule data during
the mission. Table 3.6-i shows the characteristics of the five modes
in respect to both channels. The types of data acquired in each mode
with their average rates are shown in Table 3.6-2.
Table 3.7-1 summarizes spacecraft engineering measurements to be trans-
mitted in real time during cruise; further details are available in
Section 4.1.5. Similar telemetry-measurement lists for capsule engineer-
ing, cruise science, and planetary science will be generated when detailed
science and capsule information becomes available.
3.8 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION MANEUVER ERROR ALLOCATIONS
The gross control accuracy requirements for velocity correction maneuvers
were given in Section 2.3. This section presents the results of an analy-
sis of the pointing and &V proportional and resolution accuracies obtained
from the preferred design.
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3.8.1 Pointing-Angle Accuracy
The contribution to pointing error of each significant instrument error
was calculated. The error sources included Sun- and Canopus-sensor null
offset, dead-zone and dead-zone switching-amplifier null offset errors,
gyro drifts and misalignment, maneuver integrator calibration, resolu-
tion and drift errors, thrust-vector-control null errors, and center-of-
gravity offset errors. In each case, the maximum value of the error
source coefficient, as it appears in the error equation, was used. The
G6B gyro performance characteristics are classified; therefore, GIOB
gyro numbers were used, which provided a conservative estimate. The
results, given in Table 3.8-1, show that the pointing-accuracy require-
ment is met for all maneuvers.
3.8.2 AV Magnitude Accuracy
The _V magnitude accuracy for the midcourse and orbit-insertion maneuvers
is given in Table 3.8-2. For both the midcourse corrections and delayed
orbit insertion vernier corrections, _V magnitude accuracy is controlled
by accelerometer measurement accuracy. Solid-motor orbit-insertion
accuracy is governed by errors in the solid-motor impulse and the varia-
tion in secondary-injection thrust-control fuel used h....... of varia-
tion in thrust center-of-gravity misalignment.
3.9 FLIGHT SEQUENCE
This section describes the nominal sequence of operations performed by
the spacecraft from the period immediately preceding launch until mis-
sion completion. Operational activities for the flight begin upon
mission-acceptance review and the shipment of flight hardware to Kennedy
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TABLE 3.8-1: POINTING ERROR ANALYSIS
ERROR SOURCE
MANEUVER ERROR
Roll Drift Rate Breakdown
Roll G,/ro Uncompensated Bias
Roll O,/ro Random Drift
Roll G,/ro Bias_ Temp
Sensitive for 15°P
Roll G,/ro Bias Stabilit,/
Roll Gyro Rate Integrator Drift
Roll Drift Rate RSS Total
Pitch Drift Rate
Yaw Drift Rate
Roll Gyro Misalignment with
Pitch Axis
Roll O,/ro Misalignment with
Yaw Axis
Pitch Gyro Misalignment with
Roll Axis
Pitch O,/ro Misalignment with
Yaw Axis
Yaw G,/ro Misalignment with
Pitch Axis
Yaw G,/ro Misalignment with
Roll Axis
Roll Limit Cycle Magnitude
Roll Sensor Accuracy
Roll Switching Amplifier Null
Offset
Pitch Limit Cycle Magnitude
Pitch Sensor Accuracy
Pitch Switching Amplifier
Null Offset
Yaw Limit Cycle Magnitude
Yaw Sensor Accuracy
Yaw Switching Amplifier Null
Offset
Roll Turn-Time Resolution
Roll Turn-Rate Calibration
Error
Roll Turn Torquer Current
Error
Yaw Turn-Time Resolution
Yaw Turn-Rate Calibration Error
Yaw Turn Torquer Current Error
THRUST VECTOR CONTROL ERRORS
Midcourse
Orbit-Insertion Capsule Off
Orbit-Insertion Capsule On
Orbit-Trim Capsule Off
Orbit-Trim Capsule On
ERROR
UNITS (3o)
r/s
r/s 4.85xi0 -7
r/s 7.28x10 -8
r/s 3.64xi0 -7
r/s 7.2SxlO-_
r/s 1.09xlO -°
r/s 1.448xi0 -6
r/s 1.448xi0 -6
r/s 1.448xi0 -6
tad 8.93xi0 -4
tad 8.93xi0 -4
mad ---
rad 8.93xi0 -4
tad 8.93x10 -4
rad 8.93xi0 -4
rad ).05xlO -3
tad 5.3xi0 -3
tad 5.23xi0 -4
tad 9.05xi0 -3
tad 2.77xi0 -3
tad 5.23xi0 -4
tad 9.05xi0 -3
tad 2.77xi0 -3
tad 5.23xi0 -4
sec O.l
r/s 1.15xlO -6
tad 7.85xi0 -5
sec O.l
r/s 1.15xlO -6
tad 3.15xi0 -4
rad
rad
rad
rad
rad
PITCH MAX
MULTIPLIER VALUE
.l-y(l-cos @ y ) 571
- sin@Y(_RR +t ])
F-sin@Y +t ] 346
L #,/ 2j
-sin 0 R cos@,/
cos 8,/(l-cos@ R]
0
sin@y
sin@y
(1-cos@,/)
- sin@y
-sin@y
- sin@y
cOS@y
cos@,/
cos@y 0
0
0
-eR sinOy
@R sin@`/8R
- sin@y
0
0
0
PITCH ERROR
2.69xi0-_
7.31×1<3
6.48xi0 _
9.28xi0-_
2.48xi0 -d
i
2
0
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
3.5xi0 -_
225
1
0
0
YAW MAX
MULTIPLIER VALUE SQUARED ERROR
0 7.2xi0 -7
0 2.64x10-7
q o ooo
(1-COS@ R ) 2 3.99xi0 -6
sin@ R i 3.99xi0 -6
0 0 ---
0 0 7.99xi0 -7
0 0 7.99xi0 -7
0 0 3.18xi0 -6
0 0 81.5xi0 -6
0 0 28.1xi0 -6
0 0 2.73xlOT 7
0 0 81.5xi0 -6
0 0 7.65xi0 -6
O 0 2.73xi0 "7
1 I 81.5xi0 -6
1 1 7.65xi0 -6
i 1 2.73xi0 -7
0 0 1.225xi0 -8
0 0 6.71xi0 -8
• O 0 6.16xi0 -II
Oy 3.5x10 -3 1.225xi0 -8
@Y 900 1.07xlO -6
1 1 9.92xi0-8
TOTAL 303.77xi0-6
RSS MANE]VER ERROR = 17.42 m ra_
YAW ERROR
2.55xI0-_
r.31xlO-
i.48xlO-_
T.80xlO--
L55xlO -3
SQUARED ERROF
13.74xi0-_
106.8 xlO-_
84.0 XI0--
147.0 xl0 -6
12.65xi0 -6
TOTAL POINTING ERRORS (3 o) UNITS
Midcourse m rad
Orbit Insertion m rad
Orbit Trim m rad
CAPSULE ON
17.8 (1.02 ° )
19.7 (1.13 ° )
17.8 (1.02 ° )
CAPSULE OFF
20.3 (1.16 ° )
21.4 (1.23 ° )
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Table 3.8-2: A V MAGNITUDE ERROR TABULATION
Midcourse and Orbit Insertion Vernier Corrections
Error Source
Accelerometer Null Bias
Accelerometer Scale Factor
Accelerometer Resolution
Engine Tail-Off Uncertainty
Magnitude _V Error, 3a
Error_ 30 (Meters/Sec)
! x I0 -4 g 0.25% _V
0.01% 0.01% A V
0.012 m/sec 0.012
0.01 m/sec 0.01
Total rss Error, 30 = (0.0025 AV + 0.015) Meters/sec
Solid-Motor Orbit-Insertion Maneuver
Error Source
Propellant Weight
Propellant Isp
Inert Weight
Midcourse Fuel Weight
o_uu_,uary injection r±ow Rate
Magnitude AV Error 3o
Error_ 3o (Meters/Sec)
0.15% 4.27
0.45 _ 8.85
10 lb 1.34
10 lb 1.34
i ib/sec 7.2
Total rss Error, 3a = 12.3 Meters/sec
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Mission operations terminate at the end of Mars orbital
The nominal flight sequence of operations for the 1971 Voyager represents
an expansion of mission profile data provided by JPL. The nominal sequence
for the Flight Spacecraft is summarized in Figure 3.9-1. The vertical
lines on the correlation chart represent mission phases as contained in
"Preliminary Voyager 1971 Mission Specification." Horizontal portions of
the chart represent the Flight Spacecraft subsystems and their functions
per flight phase. Any event or sequence of events within the described
flight sequence can be altered by reprogramming the computing and sequenc-
ing (C&S) subsystem. The C&S subsystem can be reprogrammed any time prior
to launch or while the spacecraft is in flight.
A discussion of the nominal sequence follows. Information additional to
that contained in Figure 3.9-1 is presented for selected phases.
3.9.1 Prelaunch
Prelaunch activities include final assembly, sterilization certification,
system tests, and other activities resulting in the commitment to launch.
3.9.2 Launch and Injection (Fiqure 3.9-2)
Launch of the 1971 space vehicle takes place at ETR using the Saturn V
three-stage launch vehicle. The Saturn V payload consists of two Planetary
Vehicles and a nose fairing. Command carrier signals can be transmitted to
the spacecraft via a low-gain antenna through the rf window in the nose
fairing. RF signals from the payload are received by the launch-complex
equipment (LCE) through the same antenna arrangement. The telemetry base-
band is available on the umbilical and is analyzed by the LCE. Additional
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0.1
PRELAUNCH
FORWARD PLANETARY VEHICLE
TIME
AFT PLANETARY VEHIC_
LOS
MOS
DSN
POWER
COMPUTING & SEQUENCE (C&S)
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
RADIO
A. MONITOR S/C CONDITIONED AiR
B, CONDUCT S/C & LV CHECKS
C. CHECK RANGE SAFETY
o, RF & TELEMETRY CHECK
E, EVALUATE TELEMETRY AT DSIE 71
F. VERIFY pV SYSTEMS By RF LINK
o. VEmFy pv OpERA, ION ON EXTERNAL pOV, ER
H. VERrFy pV OPERATION ON INTERNAL POWER
i. PERFOR,M LCE SYSTEMS TESTS
], PERFORM AUTOMATIC COUNTDOWN
K. COMMAND FIRST-STAGE IGNITION
A. START SPACFCRA[T CLOCK (CUMULATIVE TIME REEl ot T - 180 SEC
A. RECEIVER A 'ON
I B. TRANS_AIT SYSTE_ STATUS TO LOS
A. SELECT MODE I
TELEMETRY B. ENGINEERING DATA (_OTH S/C & CAPSULE)
RELAY TO LOS VIA HARDLJNE
A, PROJlDE GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S
COMMAND
DATA STORAGE
STRUCTURAL & MECHANICAL
PYROTECHNICS
TEMPERATURECONTROL
PROPULSION
SCIENCE
ADAPTER
LAUNCH VEHICLE
A. pROVIDE STRUCIURAL SUPPORT TO SC SUBSYSTEMS
A. PROVIDE SC ENVIRONMENT CONTROL (PR_CHIEL TO 40° _ 5o By T - i HR_
B, AUIOMAIrC COUNTDO_ N
C. IGNITION S-I ENGINE
0.2
LAUNCH & INJECTION
I
I
0.3
CELESTIAL REFERENCE ACQUISITION
I
• 40 MIN
I
_55 MIN
1
I
I
J
A. MONITOR BOOSTER SEPARATION
B. TRACK DURING BOOST
C
. RELAY TRACKING DATATO LOS
A. STANDBY ON ALERT
B. ASSUME CONTROL AFTER INJECTION
INTO HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT
DSIF 71
A. STANDBY ON ALERT
B. RECEIVE ANTENNA SEARCH OA_A
C. SEARCH a ACQUlR_ SPACE VEHICLE
D. ESTABLISH a WRIEYCONTROL
E • TRACK SPACECRAFT
DSN
A. RECEIVE DATA rRo_ OSlF 7
B. STANDBY
C. TRACK
A. CANOPUS SENSOR PROTECTIVE SHUTTER "ON,,
B. G&C "OFF"
A, TRANSMIT DOWNLINK SIGNAL
B. TRANSMIT ENGRG. DATA
A, DATA RELAY TO BOOSTER TELEMETRY DUR1NG POWERED FLIGHT
B. RECEIVE _ ENCODE ENGRG. DATA
A, MONITOR PV DOWNLINK TRANSMISSION A. RECEIVE MONITOR DATA FROM DSh
B. ACHIEVE DOWNL_NK,IJPLINK PHASE LOCK B, RECEIVE & ANALYZE ROLL
C. MONITOR PV DEPLOYMENT CALIBRATION DATA
• SOLAR pANELS C, RECEIVE & ANALYZE CANOPUS
• ANTENNAS ACQUISITION DATA
SCIENCE ELEMENTS D. VERIFY CANOPUS ACQUISITION
D, RECEIVE SOLAR ACQUISITION DATA & RELAy OR COMMAND CANOPUS
E. RECEIVE & RELAY ROLL CALIBRATION DATA TO SFOF REACQUISITION
P, RECEIVE & RELAy CANOPUS ACQUISITION DATA E. MONITOR PLANETARY VEHICLE
TO SFOF TRAJECTORIES & UPDATE
n. RELAY _ACKUR COMMAND REACQUIRE CANOPUS • TRAJECTORY pARAMETERS
AS REQUIRED
A. SENSE SOLAR PANEL OUTPUT
B. SWITCH pOWER SUBSYSTEM TO SOLAR pOWER MODE
C. TURN ON BATTERY CHARGER
D. PROVID_ pOWER TO S/C & FLIGHT CAPSULE
A. COMMAND PYROTECHNICS UNLOCK & RELEASE ANTENNAS
B. COMMAND PYROTECHNICS UNLOCK & RELEASE SCIENCE ELEMENTS
MAGNETOMETER BOOM
C. COMMAND PYROTECHNICS BACKUp COMMANDS (AS REQUIRED)
D, COMMAND TELEMETRY MODE I, MANEUVER "ON"
E. COMMAND CRUISE SCIENCE "ON"
F. COMMAND G&C TURN "ON" G&C EQUl p MENT
G. COMAAAND SOI.AR ACQUISITION
H. COMMAND COMMUNICATION PHASE LOCK
I. COMMAND CALIBRA_ION ROLL
J. COMMAND CELESTIAL REFERENCE ,,ON,,
A. TURN ON O&C POV¢ER
B. GYROS IN RAl_ MODE, DAMP OUT PV tUMBLING RATE
C, ENABLE SUN SENSOR
D. PITCH & YAW PV, ACQUIRE SUN, SWITCH GYRO RATE "OUT"
E. CALIBRATION ROLL
F. STABILI ZE PV DURING PHASE LOCK ACQUISITION
• DERIVED RATE: PITCH & YAW AXES (SUN SENSOR)
• SL_W ROLL AT .2O/SEC.
G. CALIBRATE CANOPUS SENSOR MAGNETOMETERS & EARTH SENSOR
H. RELAy STAR TEACKER & _&AGNETOMETER DATA TO EARTH
I, ACQUIRE CANOPUS
• ENABLE CANOPUSSENSOR
• SENSE C,a, NOPUS pp_s_ NCE + EARTH PRESENCE
J. SWITCH TO CANOPUS PEp., GyRo RATE 'OUT"
K. VERIFY CELESTIAL REF ACQUISITION (TO C&S)
L. DISABLE CANOPUS H_GH INTENSITY GATE
A. TRANSMIT DOWN LINK SIGNAL
B. TRANSMIT VERIPPCAT_ON DATA--SOLAR ACOUPSITION
C. TRANSMIT ROLL CALIBRATION DATA
D, TRANSMIT CANOPUB ACQUISITION DATA TO DSN
E• RECEIVE GROUND BACKUP COMMANDS. IF REQUIRED
A. TELEMETRY IN MODE I
B. RECEIVE DEPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SIGNALS
• SOLAR pANELS • SCIENCE ELEMENTS
- _HTEt
• GUIDANCE SCAN PLATFORM
RECEIVE & ENCODE ROLL CALIBRATION DATA
PROVIDE COMMAND BACKUP OF C&S AS REQUIRED
RELAy GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S, I_ REQUIRED
STORE DATA DURING MANEUVER
A. pROVIDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S 'C SUBSYSTEMS
e. PROVIDE SEPARATION SENSOR
C. PROVIDE SEPARATION SIGNALS TO TELEMETRY & C&S
A. DRIVE SOLAR PANELS TO LIMIT
B. DRIVE ANTENNAS TO LIMIT
C, DEPLOY GUIDANCE SCAN PLATFORM
D. PROVIDE VERIFICATION SIGNALS TO TELEMETRY
A. ARM PYROTECHNICS
A. PROVIDE HEAT-SINK COOLING
B. MONITOR FLIGHT S C TEMPERATURES
PROVIDE RELEASE & SEPARATION MECHANISM FOR FWD & AFT PVS
PROVIDE SEPARATION SENSOR ACTIVATION
A. LAUNCH: S-I & S-II BURN
B, NOSE PAIRING JETTISON AT 350,000 FT,
C, S-IVB FIRST BURN: INSERT IN PARKING ORBJT
D. S-IV3 SECOND BURN: INSERT IN TRANS-MARS
TRAJECTORY
E, PROVIDE SEPARATION SIGNAL TO FOR_*vARD pV
F, MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING FORWARD PV
SEPARATION
0. FOLD BACK AFT NOSE FAIRING
H, PROVIDE SIGNAL TO SEPARATE AFT PV
I. MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING AFl pV
SEPARATION
J. AppLy RETROTHRUST
A. F_RE SOLAR PANEL SQUIBS
B. PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
C MONITOR PLIGHT 5 C TEMPERATURES
A. TURN ON CRUISE SCIENCE, GATHER DATA DURING
CAUBRATION ROLL (DAE)
B, RELAY ROLL CALIBRATION DATA TO TELEMETRY
• REAl -TIME MAGNETOMETER DATA
MANEUVER MODE CRUISE DAIA
0.4
INTERPLANETARY CRUISE
0.5
INTERPLANETARY TRAJECTORYCORRECTION
0.6
FLIGHT CAPSULE CAN ISTER SEPARATION
I
22ODaYS
I
230D_YS
iST - 3.4 DAYS
2ND - 23 DAYS
_RD - _ _ DAYS
I ST - 4.4 DAyS
2ND - 25 DAYS
3RD led DAyS
DS_ SFO_
A. TRACK pV A. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA &
B. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DISPLA Y
DATA & RELAy TO SFOE B, RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK & RANGE DATA
C. PROVIDE PV RANGE DATA (DERIVED) C COMPUTE TRAJECTORY pARAMETERS
D. COMMAND DATA PLAYBACK
A. COMMAND CANO_US CONE ANGLE UPDATE
B. COMMAND G&C SET HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA ELEVATION & AZIMUTH
D. COMMAND RADIO SWITCH TO HIGH-POWER TRANSMITTER (T ÷ 3 DAYS)
E. COMM_AND RANGING ii _i, & "OFF'
A. UPDATE CANOPUS CONE ANGLE
B
• SET HIGH GAIN ANTENNA ELEVATION & AZIMUTH
C. ZERO GYRO iNTEGRATORS OBSERVE DRIP', ADJUST GYRO BIAS
D. REACQU R CELEST AL REPERENCES (AS REQUIRED)
A. TRANSMIT ENGINEERING DATA & SCIENCE DATA TO DSN
B. TRANSMIT PLAYBACK DATA ON COMMAND (FROM DSN$
C. SWITCH ON TWTA (AT 3 DAYS)
O. RECEIVE COMMANDS FROM DSN
A. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION (MOD E T)
B. PROVIDE CaS BACKUP AS REQUIRED
A, PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
B. MONITOR ELIGHT SPACECRAFT TEMPERATURES
A. GATHER CRUISE DATA
B. SWITCH TO SOLAR FLARE MODE DURING SOLAR FLARE
-SOLAR RADIATION & PARTICLE LEVEL mRESHOLD
-TRAPPED RADIATION
C. RE_RN TO CRUlSE MODE AFTER FLARE
DS_
A. TRANSMIT MANEUVER pAR.A.METERS TO PV
• ROLL TURN MAGNITUDE & DrRECTPON
• yAW (OR PITCH) TURN MAGNITUDE
& DIRECTION
• MOTOR BURNTIME & 3V
B. TRANSMIT INITIATE MANEUVER
SEQUENCE COMMAND
C. RECEIVE VERIFICATION OF
CORRECTION MANEUVER
D. tRACK PV
PROVIDE POINTING ANGLE &
KANGE DATA TOALL DSS
F. RELAy DATA TO SLOE
O. BACKUP CANOPUS ACQUPSITION COMMAND
SFOF
A. COMPUTE MANEUVER pARAMETERS
& TRANSMIT TO DSN
B. VERIFY CORRECTION MANEUVER
C. RECEIVE & DISPLAy ENGINEERING
& SCIENCE DATA
A. PROVIDE SOLAR POWER TO S,C SUBSYSTEMS
B. SWITCH TO BATTERY POWER
C. NO POWER TO CAPSULE DURING BATTERY (GEE BUNt OPERATION
D. SENSE SOLAR PANEL OUTPUT
E. SCHTCH po,',ER SUSSYSTEM TO SOt _R POWER MODE
F. TURN ON BATTERY CHARGER
G. PROVIDE pO_',ER TO S C & FLIGHT CAPSULE _CONTINUOUS)
A. RECEIVE MANEUVER PARAMETERS FROM COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
B. COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDER "ON"
COMMAND RADIO SWITCH TO LOW-GAIN ANTENNA
C. COMMANO ACCELEROMETER ,, ON,,
Du COM_ND ATJITLIDE CHANGE (ROLL, PITCH OR YAW)
E. COMMAND AUTOPILOT OUTPUT SWITCH TO JET VANE ELECTRONICS
F. COMMAND INERTIAL "HOLD" MODE FOR 5V
0. COMMAND PYROTECHNIC FIRE EED PRESSURIZE pROPELL_NT {SQUIB VALVE) [_
H, COMMAND PYROTECHNIC FIRE EED, OPEN PROPELLANT VALVE S_
I. COMMAND CORRECTION N_NEUVER FIRING
J. COMMAND pYROTECHNIC FIRE EED, CLOSE PROPELLANT VALVES _"
K. COMMAND PYROTECHNIC FIRE LED, CLOSE PRESSURIZATION VALVE L_
t. CONV_AND REACQUISITION OF CELESTIAL REF (PITCH OR YAW BACK, ROLL BACK)
M. COMMAND SWITCH TO HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA (T + B0 DAYS)
N, COMMAND MAN_LIVER RECORDER. OFF,, SCIENCE IN CRUISE MODE
O. COMMAND DATA STORAGE PLAYBACK STORED DATA TO DSN
J_ IST & 2ND CORRECTION ONLY---COMMAND SOLENOID VALVES ONSUBSEQUENt MANEUVERS
[_ IST CORRECTION ONLY, COMMAND PROPULSION SOLENOID VALVES ON
SUBSEQUENT MANEUVERS
A. ZERO GYRO INTEGRATOR
B. ROLL AND YAW /OR _JTCHI
C. SWITCH G&C OUTPUT TO JET VANE ELECTRONICS
D. INERTIAL"HOLD'MODE FOR _v (CONTROL ATTITUDE WITH JET VANES]
E. YAW BACK, REACQUIRE SUN
F. ROLL BACK, REACQUIRE CANOPUS
G. REMOVE GYRO DAMPING
A. RECEIVE MANEUVER pAP,_,METERS FROM DSN & RELAY TO CO_'u_'_AND SUBSYSTEM
B. RECEIVE INITIATE MANEUVER COMMAND & RELAY TO COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
C. SWIICH TO LOW-GAIN ANTENNA
D • SWITCH TO HPOH-GAIN ANTENNA
E. RELAy MANEUVER VERIFICATION TO DSN
A. MANEUVER RECORDER 'ON"
B. MANEUVER RECORDER OFF; PLAY BACK
C. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSPON (MOD_ ]'
A. RECEIVE MANEUVER pARAMETERS FROM RADIO & RELAY TO C&S
B. BACKUP C&S (AS REQUIRED)
A. RECORD MANEUVER DATA
B. RELAY MANEUVER DATA TO RADIO (pLAy BACK)
A. FIRE SQUIB, OPEN N 2 VALVE
B. F_RE SQUIB, OPEN pROpELLANT VALVE_ FPRST r_O MIDCOURSE MANEUVERS
C. FLRE SQUIB, CLOSE PROPELLANT VALVE']
D. FIRE SQUIB, CLOSE N 2 VALV_ .__ FrRST MANEUVER ONLY
A. PROVIDE HEAT SINK COOLING
B. PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
C. MONITOR FLIGHT SC TEJv_pERATURE
A. OPEN N VALVE, PRESSURIZE PROPELLANT
OPEN P_C)PELLANT VALVE, PROVIDE THRUSTB
C' PROVIDE THRUST VECTOR CONTROL (JET VANES)
D_ CLOSE PROPELLANT VALVE
E. CLOSE N 2 VALVE
A. GATHER CRUISE DATA
DS_
A. TRACK pV
B. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA
& RELAy TO SFOE
C. PROVIDE PV RANOE DATA ,DERIVED]
D. COMMAND DATA PLAYBACK
E. RECEIVE CANISTER SEPARATION
VERIFICATION & RELAY TO SFOF
F. TRANSMIT BACKUP COMMAND
lAB REQUIRED_
SFOF
A. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA
& DISPLAy
B. RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK &
RANGE DATA
C. COMPUTE TRAJECTORY PARAMETER S
D. RECEIVE VERIFICATION OF
CANISTER SEPARATION
A. COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDER ,,ON,, DATA RECORDING IN 'MANEUVER MODE
B. COMMAND RADIO SV, ITCH TO LO'/.-GAIN ANTENNA
C. COMMAND ATTITUDE CHANGE (ROLL, PITCH OR YAW)
O. COMMAND PYROTECHNIC SUBSYSTEM FIRE CAPSULE CANISTER
SEPARATION SQUIB
E. COMMAND INER1]AL ,, HOLD,, FOR TEN MINUTES
F, COMMAND REACOUIRE CELESTIAL REFERENCES
• (PITCH OR YAW BACK, ROLL BACK)
G. COMMAND RADIO S_VITCH TO HIOR-OAIN ANTENNA
H. COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDER "OFF" CRUISE SCIENCE ,,ON,,
I, COMMAND DATA STORAGE PLAYBACK STORED DATA
A. ZERO GYRO INTEGRATOR
B. ROLL, & PITCH OR YAW
C • JNERT_AL "HOLD"
D. PITCH OR yA/, BACK. ROLL BACK
E. REMOVE GYRO DAMPING
F. REACQUIRE CELESTIAL REFERENCES
A. TRANSMit ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA TO DSN
B. S,'HTCH TOLOW GAIN ANTENNA
C. S,',ITC_ TO HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA
D. REESTABLISH PHASE LOCK
E. TRAN_n PLAYBACK DATA ON COMMAND (FROM DSN)
F. TRANSMIT CANISTER SEPARATION VERIFICATION TO DSN
O. RECEIVE COMMANDS EROM DSN !AS REQUlREm
A. ENCODE CANISTER SEPARATION VERIFICATION
B. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION ,MODE I
A, pROVIDE DATA pLAYBACK COMMAND (AS REQD)
B. PROVIDE C&S BACKUP AS REQD
C. RELAY GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S AS REQUFRED
A. RECORD MANEUVER DATA
L RELAY MANEUVER DATA TO TELEMETRY
A. PROVIDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S C SYSTEMS
A. FiRE LED, SEPARATE CAPSULE CANISTER
A. PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
B. MONITOR FLIGHT S C TEMPERATURES
A. GATHER CRUISE DATA
0.7
MARS ORBIT INSERTION
0.8
PLANETARY VEH ICLE IPV) ORB ITAL
OPERATIONS
0.9
PLANETARY VEHICLE MARS ORBIT TRIM
DSN
A. RELAy ORBIT INSERTION pARAMETERS
C. RECEIVE ENGINEERSNG & SCIENCE
DATA & RELAy TO SFOF
D. eROVlDE RV RANGE DATA (DERIVED)
E. COMMAN_ DATA pLAyBACK
r. RECEIVE VERIFICATION OF ORBrr
INSERTION SEQUENCE & RELAY
TO SFOE
A. PROV1DE SOLAR POWE R TO S/C SUI}SYSTEMS
C. SENSE SOLAR PANEL OUTPUT
O. SWITCH POWER SUBSYSTEM TO SOLAR POWER MODE
E. tURN ON BATTERY CHARGER
E. PROVlDE ROWER TO S/C & FLIGHT CAPSULE
I
220 DAYS
I
23O bA¥_
SFOF
A_OMPUTE ORBIT INSERTION
pARAMETERS & pROVIDE
BACKUP CC_MANDS AS REQD
B. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE
DATA & DIS_LAY
C. RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK &
RANGE DATA
D. COMPUTE TRAJECTORy pARAMETERS
E. RECEIVE ORBIT INSERTION VERIFICATION
A. COMMAND PLANET SCIENCE"ON"fAFT[E _,o ORBITS)
B. COMMAND G&C PERFORM PREMANEUVER SEQUENCE
C. CO'_MAND G&C PERFORM ORBIT INSERTION ,W_NEUVER
D. COMMAND PYROTECHNICS IGNITE ORBIT _NSE_TION ENGINE
E. RECEIVE MANEUVER VERIFICATION FROM G&C
F. COMMAND TELEMETER ENCODE MANEUVER VERIFICATION TO RADIO &
TRANS/alT
A. SENSE pLANET APPROACH GEOMETRY, RELAY TO TELEMETRy
B. ZERO GYRO INIEG_TOR
O. INERTIAL HOLD M_DE rob .'_'
E. POINT HI_,_-';A_N ANTENNA ;O EART_
OUTPUTS TO TVC
G. YAW _ACK TO PREVIOUS ATTITUDE
H. ACQUIRE SUN, SWITCH OyRo RATE "OUT" (PITCH & YAWAXES)
/, ROLL _CK TO E_VIOUS ATTITUDE
J. ACQUIre CANOPUS, SWITCH GYRO RATE "OUT" ROLL AX_S
A. RECEIVEINSERTIONpARAMETERSFROMDSN(AS REQUIRED)& RELAY TO C&S
B. SWITCH TO LOW-GAIN ANTENNA
O. REESTABLISH PHASE LOCK
E. TRANSt_IT ENGINEERING DATA & SCIENCE DATA TO DSN
A. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION (MODE I}
• ENGINE ERING & SCIENCE DATA
• FLIGHT CAPSULE STATUS INFORMATION AND ENCODE
A. BACKUP C&S AS REQUIRED
9. P_CEIVIE UPDATED ORBIT PARA_ETERS FROM DSN (AS REQUIRED)
A. RECORD DATA DURING MANEUVER
B. PLAY BACK RECORDED DATA
A. PROVIDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S/C SyST EMS
A. PROVIDE HEAT SINK COOLING
B. PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMI pASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
C. MONITOR fLIGHT S/C TEMPERATURE
A. PRESSURIZE TVC EREON TANK
B. THRUST VECTOR CONTROL " ON": INPUT TO G&C IRU & ACCELEROMETER
DSN SFOF
"/_TRACK pV _ECE[VE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE
B. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA & DI_LAy
DATA & RELAy TO SFOF B. RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK &
C. PROVIDE PV RANGE DATA (DERIVED) RANGE DATA
D. COMMAND DATA PLAYBACK C. CO_pLITETRAJECTORYpARAMETERS
E. RECEIVEMARSORBITDATA;RELAyTo o. RECEIVE & DISPLAy MARS ORBIT DATA
SFOF E. CC_._PUT E ORBIT PARAMETERS
DSN
A_TRANSMIT MANEUVER PARAMETERS
TO PV
• ROLL TURN MAGNITUDE AND
DIRECTION
• Y_W(OR P_TC_ TURN MAGNI-
TUDE & DIRECnON
• MOTOR BURNTI_E & _V
D. TRANSMIT INMATE MANEUVER
SEQUENCE COMMAND
C. RECEIVE VERIF_CAn ON OF CORREC-
TION MANEUVER
D. T_CK PV
E. PROWDE POINTING ANGLE & RANGE
DATA TO ALL DSS
A. PROVIDE SOI.AR POWER TO S/C SUBSYSTEMS A.
B. PROVID EpOWER TO FLIGHT CAPSULE B.
C. SWITC_ TO BATTERY POWER DURING SOLAR OCCULTATION [_ C.D.
E.
[_ SUN OCCULTATION CONTINGENT UPON ORBIT SELECTION F.
G.
A. COMMAND LIMB/TERMINATOR UNIT " ON" e_.'B. COMMANDORBITALSClENCE"ON"_PLANET SCIENCE"OFF", C_UISE"OFF"
C. COMMAND CANOeUS ANGLE UPDATE C.
O. COMMAND H_G_-GA_N ANTENNA POSITION U_DATE
E. COMMAND DEPLOY SCIENCE SCAN PLATFORM E.
F. COMMAND RANGING " ON" & " GEE' F.
G.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
A. SENSE CANOgUS OCCULTED; SWITCH ROLL AXIS TO INERTIAL " HOLD.,
B. REACOUIRE CANOPUS; SWITCH ROLL AXl S IRU "OU 'r_
C. SENSE LIMB & TERMINATOR CROSSINGS, RELAy TO TELEMETRY & G&C
D, UPDATE CANOPUS CONE ANGLE
E. UPDATEHIGH-GAINANTENNApOSITiON(ASREQD)
F. SENSE SUN OCCULTED: SWITCH PITC_ & y_w AXES J'_
TO INERTIAL "HOLD
G. SENSE SUN PRESENCE, SWITCH GYRO RATE "OUT
_:_" SUN OCCULTATION DURING THIS PHASE OF THE MISSION
IS CONTINGENT UPON THE OR81T SELECTED
A. MAINTAIN DOWNLINK pHASE LOCK
B. RECEIVE DSN COMMANDS
C. TRANSMIT ENGINEERING DATA TO DSN (MARS ACQUI SITION & PV EPHEMERIS)
D, _ RTH OCCULT,_TION - R2ESTABL[SH pHASE LOCK
A. SCAN PLATFORMDEPLOYMENTVERIFICATION
B. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSrON (MODE 2]
A. BACK UP C&S AS REQUIRED
B. RELAY GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S AS REOUIRED
A. RECORD ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA _MODE2_
B. PLAY BACK RECORDED DATA
A. PROVIDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S/C SYSTEMS
B. DEI_LOY SCIENCE SCAN PLATFORM
C. VERIFICATION SIGNAL TO TELEM
A* PROVID E PASSIVE & SEMIpA SSIVE _ADI AT$VE CODLIN G
i. MONITOR FLIGHT S/C TEMP ERATU RES
A. _URN OFF CRUIS_ SCieNCE _ OPTIONAL; ENO_N_ERINO DATA _ MANEUVE_
B. TLIRN ON ORBITAL SCIENCE E_" DURING EARLY ORBITAL OPE RATION S MAy
REQWRE SCIENCE TO fie SWITCHED OFF
SFOF
A._-_OMPUT E MANEUVER PA_METERS
& TRANSMIT TO DSN
_. VERIFY CORRECTION MANEUVER
C. RECEIVE & DISPLAY ENGINEERING &
SCIENCE DATA
PROVIDE SOLAR pOWER TO S/C SUBSYSTEMS
SWITCH TO BATTERY pOWER
NO pOWER TO CAR_LE DURING _TTERVIOFF SUN) O_ERATION
SENSE SC_AR PANEL OU_UT
SWITCH _OWER SUBSYSTEM TO SO_AR pOWER MOOR
tuRN ON _ATTERY CHARGE_
PROVlD_ pOWER TO S/C & FLIGm CAPSULE (CONTINUOUS)
RECEIVE MANEUVER PARAMETERS FROM COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDE R " ON"
COMMAND SELECT LOW-GAIN ANTENNA
COMMAND ACCELEROMETER "ON"
COMMAND ATTITUDE CHANGE tROLL, & _ITCH OR YAW_
COMMAND AUTOPILOT OUTPUT SWITCH TO JET VANE ELECTRONICS
COMMAND INE_IAL HOLD ,_OOE FOR _V
COMMAND PROeULSlON SYSTEM ACTIWTE
COMMAND CORRECTIO_ MANEUVER FI_INO
CO_MANr_ TER_INAT E THRUST
COMMAND _C t_OF_"
COMMANO pROPULSION SYSTEM DEACTIVATE
COMMAND REACQUlSITION OF CELESTIAL REF (PITCH OR yaw BACK, RO_ BACK)
COMMAND _ANEUVER RECORDER "OF_" SCIENCE IN ORBIT MODE
COMMAND SELECT _IOH-GAIN ANTENNA
CO--AND TELEMETRY & RADIO TRANSMIT STORED DAXA TO DSN
A. ZERO GYRO INTEGRATORS
B. ROLL, yAW ,OR PITCH1
C. SWITCH O&C OUTPUT TO JET VANE _LECTRONICS
O. INERTIAL"HOLD"_ODE FOR _V
E. YAW BACK; REACOUIR_ SUN
F. ROlL _ACK; RFACQUIRE CANOeUS
G. REMOVE GY_O DAMPING
A. RECEIVE MANEUVER pARAMETERS FROM DSN & RELAY TO COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
B. RECEIVE INMATE _ANEUVER CO,AND & RELAy TO COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
C_ SW_TCH TO LOW-GAIN ANTENNA
O_ SWITCH TO HIO_-GAIN ANTENNA
L RELAy _NEUVER VErifiCaTION & r_ATA TO DSN
TURN ON' MANEUVER RECORDER
TURN "OFF"MANEUVER RECOROER & pLAy BACK
FORMAT DA_A FOR TRANSMISSION CMO_E 1_
A, RECEIVEMANEdVERpARAMETEBSFROMRADIO, RELAYTOC&S
_CKU_ C&_ AS REOUIREO
A. RECORD MANEUVER DA_A
B. RELAY MANEUVER DATA TO TELEMETRY
A. PROWDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S/C SYSTEMS
A_ PROVIDE HEAT_S_NK COOL_NG
B_ _ROV_DE RASS_VE _, SEM_RASS_VE _AD_AT_VE COOLING
C_ _ON_TO_ FL_oEr S_CTEM_ER_URE
_ OPEN N_ VALVE, PRESSURIZE pROPElLANT
B_ OPEN pROPELLANT VALVE_ pROViDE THRUST
C_ CLOSE pRO_ELLAN_ VALVE
D_ CLOSE N 2 VALVE
A_ GATHER CR_SE SCIENCE DAT_ D_R_N_ _ANEUVER
ELIONT CAPSULE
BOEING-- SPACE DMSION
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& RELAy TO SFOF
fIDE RANGE DATA
O. 10
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT (S/C) --
FLIGHT CAPSULE SEPARATION
1 I r r
i,l TM i1._1 °= i1_
FLIGHT CAPSULE DEORBIT FLIGHT CAPSULEORBITA
I[ MANEUVER DESCENTJ L J L
0.15
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT ORBITAL OPERATIONS
225 DAyS
236 DAYS
SFOF
A.--._RECEIV[ SCIENCE/ENGINEERING DATA
AND DISPLAY
B, RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK & _NGE DATA
C. RECEIVE CAPSULE S_ARATION VERIFICATION
D. G ENER_TE BACKUP COMMANDS & RELAy
TO DSN (INCLUDING CAPSUL_
SEPARATION COMMAND!
tIDE SOLAR POWER TO S/C & FLIGHT
;ULE
CH CAPSULE POWER r OFF"
CH POWER SUBSYSTEM BACK TO SOLAR pANEL MODE; CHARGE BATTERIES
,MAND RADIO TURN RELAY RECEIVERS ON
,MAND DATA STORAGE TO MODE 2
,ISFER DATA TO CAPSULE ( AS REQUIRED)
_MAND CAPSULE SWITCH TO INTERNAL POWER
IMAND CAPSULE RECORDER "ON"
_MAND PREMAN BUYER SEQUENCE
_MAND ATTITUDE CHANGE (ROLL s AND PITCH OR YAW)
AI,,CAND PYROTEC INICS FIRE LED, SEPARATE CAPSULE UM_LICAL
_MAND PYROTECHNICS FIRE BED SEPARATE CAPSULE
_MANO REACOUISITION OF CELESTIAL REFERENCES
:H OR YAW BACK, ROLL BACK)
MAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION (MODE 2_
C DATA
'IDE STRUCTURAL SUppORT TO S/C SYSTEMS
'IDE HEAT.SINK COOLING
'IDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLIN G
IITOR FLIGHT S/C TEMPERATURE
iE SCIENCE ,,ON,,
I ON CAPSULE DATA RECORDER
OSN
_'T--TRACK S/C
B. RECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE DATA
C. RECEIVE CAPSULE DATA
D. PROVIDE RANGE & TRACK DATA
E. COMMAND DATA P_..AYBACK
A. PROVIOE S(_AR POWER TO S/C
B. PR OVID E BATE ERY POWER DURI NG OCCUL TATl ON
C. SENSESOLARPANELOUTPUT, SWITCHTOSOLARPOWER
D, CHARGE BAITERY
I
40S DAYS
I
405 DAYS
sror
_ECEIVE ENGINEERING & SCIENCE
DATA & DISPLAY
B. RECEIVE & ANALYZE TRACK a RANGE DATA
A. COMMAND CAPSULE RECCR DER pLAyBACK
B. COMMAND RELAy RECEIVER OFF AFTER CAPSULE IMPACT
C. SWITCH TO DATA MODE 2 RECORD DATA DURING EARTH OCCULTAT ON
D. RECEIVE LIMB & TERMINATOR CROSSINGS,
COM_AAND SCIENCE SUBSYSTEM "C)N" & "OFF', A S DESIRED
E. COMMAND DATA TRANSFER TO DAB (AS REQUIRED)
F. COMMAND CANC_US CONE ANGLE UPDATE
O. COMMAND HIGH-GArN ANTENNA POSITION UPDATE
A. SENSE SUN OCCULTATION; SW]TCH TO INERTIA[ "HOLD"
PITCH & YAW AXES
B. SENSE SO_AR PRESENCE; S_VITCH GYRO RATE ,,OUt _
PITCH & YAW AXES
C. SENSE CANOPUS OCCULTATION; SWIT CH TO INERTIAL 'H OLD '
MODE, ROLL AXIS
D. PEA(QUIRE CANC_US; SWITCH GYRO RATE OUT; ROLL AXIS
E. SENSE LIMB & TERMINATOR CROSSINGS. R__Ay TO C&S
F. UPDATE _NOPUS CONE ANGLE
G. UPDATE HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA POSITION {AS REQUIRED)
A. RECEIVE CAPSULE DATA & RELAY TO CAPSULE DATA RECORDER
B. RELAy RECEIVER " OFF"
C. TRANSMIT CAPSULE DATA PLAY_CK TO DSN
D. LARTH OCCULTATION - RZESTABLJSH PHASE LOCK
A. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION (MODE 21
BACK UP (AS AS REQD
RELAY GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S AS REQUIRED
A. SWITCH TO RECORD MODE 2
B. RECORD DATA DURING EARTH OCCULTATION
A. PROV1DE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S/C sYSTEMS
A. PROVIDE PASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
S. MON ITOR FLIGHT S/C T EMPE RATURE S
A. RECORD CAPSULE DATA
B. pLAy BACK CAPSULE DATA
C. ORBIT SCIENCE "ON & "OFF" per C&S COMMANDS
I [ I
o.13 I ll,,,..i 0.i4 I
FLIGHT CAPSULE ENTRY _j FLIGHT CAPSULE TERMINALDESCENT I
I L
ON INTERNAL POWER A. TRANSMIT DATA
_tlSH RADIO LINK WITH S/C
VE DATA; UPDATE CAPSULE PROGRAM (AS REQUIRED)
_TE FROM S/C
'OST
O. 16
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT MARS 0RBITAL TRIM
227 DAyS
239 DAYS
SROF
_OMPUTE MANEUVER pARAMETERS
& TI_ANSMIT TO DSN
B. VERI FY CORR£Cll ON MAN EUVE R
C I RECEIVE & DISPLAY ENGINEERING &
SCIENCE DATA
DSN
A_TRANSMIT _NEUVER pARAMETERS TO
_/_OLL IIJRN MAGNITUDE & DIREC11 ON
• yaw (OR PITCH) IURN MAGNITUDE &
DIRECTION
• MOTOR BURNTIME & _V
B. TRANSMIT INITIATE MANEUVER SEQUENCE
COMMAND
C. RECEIVE VERIFICATION OPCORRECTION
_,N EUVER
D. TRACK S/C
E. PROVIDE P DINTING ANGLE & RANG E
DATA To ALL ubS
A, PROVIDE SC_.AR P(_ER TO S/'C SUBSYSTEMS
B. SWITCH TO BATTERY pO_ R
C. SENSE SOLAR pANEL OUTPUT
D. SWITCH POWER SYSTEM TO SOLAR pOWER MODE
E. _JRN ON BATTERY CHARGER
a. RECEIVE MAN EUVER PARAMETERS FrOM COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
B. COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDER " ON"! SCIENCE IN MANEUVER MODE
C. COMMAND PREMANEUVER SEQUENCE
D. COMMAND ACCELEROMETER " ON"
E. COMMAND SWITCH TO LOW-GMN ANTENNA
F. COMMAND ATTITUDE CHANGE
• ROLL
• PITCH OR yAW
G, COMMAND AUTOPILOT OLr_UT SWITCHTO JETVANE ELECTRONICS
H. COMMANDINERTIAL"HOL{_' MOOEEOR _V
I. COMMAND PROPULSION SYSTEM ACTIVATE
J, COMMAND CORRECTION MANEUVER FIRING
K. COMMAND T ERMINATE THRUST
L. COMMON D JE_ VANE TVC ,, OF P,
M. COMMANDPRO@ULSION SYSTEM DEACTIVATE
N. COMMAND REACOUISITION OF CELESTIAL REF
• PITCH Or yAW BACK
• RC_ L BACK
O, COMMAND MANEUVER RECORDER ,,OFF" SCIENCE IN ORBIT MOO[
P. COMMAND SWITCH TO HIGh-GAIN ANTENNA
O. COMMANDDATASTORAGEPLAYBACK TODSN
A. ZERO GYRO INTEGRATORS
B. ROLL, PITCH _OR YAW/
C. SWITCH G&C O_TPUT TO JEt VANE ELECT RONICS
D. INERTIAL'HOLDrMODEFOR _V
E. PITCH OR yAW BACK; REAC_UIRE SUN
F. ROLL BACK; REACQU)RE CANOPUS
G, REMOVE GYRO DAMPING
A. RECeiVE MANEUVER PARAMETERS FROM DSN & RELAy TO COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
B. RECEIVE INITIATE MANEUVER COMMAND & RELAy TO COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
C. SWITCH TO LO_-GAIN ANTENNA
D. SWITCH TO HIGF'-GAIN ANTENNA
E. RELAY MAN EUVER VERIFICATION TO DSN
A. TURN 'ON" MANEUVER RECORDER
B. TURN 'OFF ' MANEUVER RECORDER & pLAy BACK
C. FORMAT DATA FOR TRANSMISSION (MODE 2)
A. RECEIVE MAN EUVER PARAMETERS FROM RADIO; RELAY TO C&S
B. RELAY GROUND COMMANDS TO C&S AS RECtUIRED
c. PROVIDE BACKUP TO C&S IAS REQUIRED)
A. RECORD MAN EUVER DATA
B. RELAY MANEUVERDATA TORADI©(PLAY_ACK)
A, PROVIDE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT TO S/C SYSTEMS
A PROVIDE H_AT SINK COOLING
B. PROVIDE pASSIVE & SEMIPASSIVE RADIATIVE COOLING
_. MC_NITOR FLI_m S/C TEMPERATURE
A. OPEN N 2 VALVE, PRESSURIZE PROPELLANT
B. OR_N PROPELLANT VALVE, PROVIDE THRUST
C. CLOSE pROPELLANT VALVE
D. CLOSE N 2 VALVE
A. ORSlTAL SCIENCE " ON"
SWITCH TO MANEUVER MODE (CRUISE SCIENCE ,, ON,, )
Figure 3.9-h Nominal Flight Sequence
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Planetary Vehicle functions are monitored over umbilical hardlines during
countdown. The launch vehicle provides environmental control for the payload.
From liftoff, through boost, injection, and subsequent celestial reference
acquisition, the radio subsystem operates in the standard receive mode and
a low-power transmit mode. The launch transmitter operates over a low-
gain antenna to transmit telemetry information and give initial acquisition
capability prior to utilization of the high-power traveling-wave tube
amplifiers (TWTA's). Mode ] (as defined in Table 3.6-1) is the primary
data mode used during all flight phases prior to Mars encounter. This mode
transmits cruise-science, capsule, and spacecraft-engineering data. The
Cape Kennedy station provides telemetry reception from liftoff to local
horizon. Telemetry data is also transmitted by the S-IVB telemetry system
during boost and parking-orbit phases.
The forward nose fairing, which includes everything back to the forward
Planetary Vehicle Adapter, is jettisoned at 350,000 feet during S-IIB burn.
The S-IVB first burn injects the S-IVB and payload into an Earth-parking
orbit.
After 2 to 90 minutes in the parking orbit, the launch vehicle injects
the payload on a trans-Mars trajectory and provides the signal to initiate
separation of the forward Planetary Vehicle. The launch vehicle then
provides the signal to fold back the rear Planetary Vehicle fairing
elements; 15 minutes later it provides the signal to separate the rear
Planetary Vehicle. Sixty minutes after aft Planetary Vehicle separation,
the S-IVB stage retrothrusts to deflect the S-IVB/rear nose fairing
assembly from the trans-Mars trajectory.
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3.9.3 Celestial Reference Acquisition (Figure 3.9-3)
The automatic celestial-reference acquisition procedure is as follows:
C&S command turns on gyros and switches power to autopilot. The gyros
are in rate mode and initial vehicle rates are damped. Power during
boost and acquisition is supplied by batteries. The solar panels, antennas,
magnetometer boom, and the guidance scan platform are unlatched and
deployed. Pitch-and-yaw attitude-error signals from the Sun sensors cause
the autopilot to drive the reaction jets, rotating the vehicle to reduce
the error. With no position signal, the roll axis remains in rate-damp-
ing mode. Solar acquisition is nominally completed within 30 minutes
after separation.
When Sun acquisition is accomplished and the roll axis is pointing toward
the Sun, a signal from a Sun-gate causes a constant rate command to be
applied to the roll autopilot input. The resulting maneuver allows cali-
bration of the magnetometer and Canopus and Earth sensors. The outputs of
these sensors are transmitted to the ground station. At the end of the
time allotted for the calibration maneuver (about 16 hours from launch
for Mariner) the automatic Canopus-acquisition sequence is initiated.
Roll continues at constant rate in the direction that, according to the
predicted star pattern, ensures the greatest probability of acquiring
Canopus. Onboard logic is activated which combines the outputs of the
Canopus sensor intensity gates and the Earth sensor.
When an acquirable object enters the Canopus sensor field of view, and
the Earth sensor is also illuminated, the onboard logic initiates the
following actions: The roll-slew command is replaced by the star-tracked
error signal as the controlling input to the roll autopilot and, after
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a time delay of several hours to allow for ground evaluation, the derived-
rate compensation is switched in to replace the gyros as a source of rate
information for damping. The Earth-presence condition on Canopus acquisi-
tion is removed later.
The ground facility will monitor and analyze all information developed
during the automatic procedure. The ground facility can override the
automatic sequence since it has the following flight-generated data:
magnetometer calibration information, star-intensity map (Canopus sensor
calibration), Earth-sensor intensity map, and antenna-signal-strength
data, all correlated to the same time base.
3.9.4 Interplanetary Cruise (Figure 3.9-4)
The cruise mode is established automatically by the guidance and control
(C_C) subsystem subsequent to an acquisition. This mode utilizes the
optical sensors and lag derived rate to control the nitrogen thrusters.
Reacquisition of the celestial references, after inadvertent loss or
occultation, is automatic.
During this phase, transmitter output is radiated over the low-gain
antenna during early mission phases to approximately i00 days. The
steerable high-gain antenna is employed thereafter. Prior to first mid-
course maneuver, the high-power transmitter chain is activated and the
launch transmitter turned off. Throughout the mission the receive
function is maintained over the low-gain antenna configuration.
Cruise science data from the radiation detectors, magnetometer, and
cosmic-dust detector is sequenced by the data automation equipment (DAE)
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throughout the cruise mode9 and routed to the telemetry subsystem for
real-time transmission to Harth. The flare-mode recorder is turned on
by the DAE when a solar flare is detected.
3.9.5 Trajectory-Correction Maneuvers (Figure 3.9-5)
3.9.5.1 Application
A trajectory-correction maneuver consists of inertially (gyro) controlled
turns which orient the thrust axis in the selected direction. This opera-
tion is followed by a midcourse engine propulsion-burn to achieve a velocity
increment of a selected magnitude. Following the burn, the subsequent re-
positioning and celestial reference acquisition is automatic. Trajectory-
correction maneuvers may be required during the following mission phases:
i) Interplanetary Trajectory Correction--Using onboard stored commands,
the forward Planetary Vehicle will make an aiming point bias trajec-
tory correction maneuver. The aft Planetary Vehicle will undertake
the same maneuver and in addition will provide the maneuver for the
required lO-day arrival separation time between Planetary Vehicles.
The stored maneuver requirements can be updated by ground command.
2) Planetary-Vehicle Mars-Orbit Trim--Upon receipt of ground commands,
the Planetary Vehicle performs the necessary trajectory correction
maneuvers to adjust the orbital parameters to the required values.
Following celestial reference reacquisition, the scan platform will
be positioned and the planetary science acquisition program relniti-
ated.
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3) Flight Spacecraft Orbit Trim--Upon receipt of ground commands, the
Flight Spacecraft performs the necessary trajectory correction
maneuvers to readjust the orbital parameters if deflections result
from capsule separation or other long-term perturbations.
3.9.5.2 Sequence
If a maneuver is required, the DSIF transmits a signal, which is re-
ceived and demodulated in the radio subsystem and sent to the command
subsystem for detection, decoding, and routing to the C&S subsystem.
The required command data is: roll turn magnitude and direction, yaw
or pitch turn magnitude and direction, AV magnitude, thrust termina-
tion time for backup (if the _ccelerometers malfunction), and maneuver
start time.
The autopilot uses both position and rate from the inertial reference
unit to control the N 2 thrusters. This mode is common to all axes.
Maneuvering is accomplished by sequentially feeding a precision pre-
timed rate command into the gyro-rate integrator of the roll and either
the pitch or yaw axes. Proportional TVC control is obtained in all
axes using autopilot commands and maneuver-engine jet vanes.
During off-Sun periods, spacecraft power will come from batteries.
During trajectory-correction maneuvers in the late cruise phase, the
radio subsystem is switched to the low-galn antenna to minimize loss
of signal
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Spacecraft engineering data, capsule engineering data, and cruise
science data will be accumulated during maneuvers by the data storage
subsystem and reproduced later at a constant rate for inclusion in the
master data format. Reproduced maneuver data will have priority over
reproduced cruise science data. After the maneuver is completed, it is
necessary to allow for a downlink phase lock-in time before the stored
data is played back. Additional transmission time lag and phase lock-in
time must be allowed before the uplink co_nand capability is re-estab-
lished.
3.9.6 Fliqht Capsule Canister Separation
The Flight Capsule biological barrier will be separated from each
Planetary Vehicle prior to orbit insertion° Separation of the forward
half of the canister from the Flight Capsule will be done by the Flight
Capsule upon a stored command from the spacecraft. Canister separation
time can be updated by ground command. Ground commands will be sent to
reorient the spacecraft before canister separation, if required, in
which case the down link may be broken and the time-lag and phase-lock
sequences for the trajectory correction maneuvers of Section 3.9.5 would
also apply.
3.9.7 Mars-Orbit Insertion
Each Planetary Vehicle orbit insertion will occur within view of Gold-
stone. The guidance scan platform assembly will track Mars during the
planet approach phase to improve navigation accuracy prior to injection.
An encoder in the scan-platform pointing mechanism will deliver pointing
angle information to the telemetry subsystem for transmission to Earth.
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The orbit-insertion-phase sequence is initiated by an on-board command.
The requirements for maneuvers, propulsion burn, and reference reacquisi-
tion are functionally the same as for an interplanetary trajectory
correction. Nominal maneuver times are as follows:
Maneuver
Roll (+140 dog)
Stabilize
Yaw (-35 deg)
Stabilize
Rocket Burn
Stabilize
Yaw Back (+35 deg)
Stabilize
Roll Back (-140 deg)
Stabilize
Total
I
Time (Minutes 1
12
i
3
i
1.5
i
3
i
12
i
36.5
0ff-Sun
10.5 Minutes
The stored maneuver and velocity-increment commands can be updated by
ground control. Pitch and yaw thrust-vector control is provided by Freon
secondary injection into the exhaust stream of the solid-propellant orbit-
insertion engine. Roll is controlled by activating a set of high-level
thrusters using N 2 from the secondary injection pressurant storage. Angular
position and rate information for all axes is obtained from the inertial
reference unit. Following orbit insertion, the Planetary Vehicle performs
the necessary maneuvers to reacquire the celestial attitude references. The
high-gain antenna is pointed to illuminate Earth during orbit-insertion-
rocket burn, thus providing data during insertion. Flight Spacecraft,
cruise science, and capsule data are also recorded during the maneuver
for later playback. 3-84
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3.9.8 Planetary Vehicle Orbital Operations <Figure 3.9-6)
After Mars-orbit insertion, the Planetary Vehicle will maintain Canopus
and Sun stabilization while orbiting around Mars. The Canopus sensor
cone angles will be updated as required by the C&S subsystem or ground
command. The limb and terminator detectors, one on each side of the
spacecraft, will detect both morning and evening terminators and limb
crossing for the first few orbits. Subsequently the DSIF/SFOF will
determine these crossings.
Depending on orbit constants, occultation may occur with respect to
Canopus, Sun, and Earth. If Canopus is occulted, the loss of the Cano-
pus presence signal will switch the roll axes to the inertial hold mode.
If the Sun is occulted, the loss of the Sun-presence signal will switch
the pitch and yaw axes to the inertial hold mode; also the spacecraft
power source will switch from the solar panels to the batteries. Earth-
occultation information must be programmed in advance to the C&S sub-
system. Under C&S control, the data storage system will record the space-
craft engineering and science data for delayed transmission to Earth.
The radio subsystem functions as in the cruise mode during Mars orbit
operations, except that the transmission of orbital information requires
the high-gain antenna. The high-gain antenna (HGA) pointing control
assembly responds to C&S programmed commands and points the high-gain
antenna towards Earth. The C&S also commands, through the DAE, the
off-on cycles of the science instruments.
Mode 2 is the primary data mode for this mission phase. The lower sub-
carrier is modulated with a composite PCM data train containing spacecraft-
engineering, capsule-engineering, cruise-science, synchronization, and
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recorded data. The upper frequency subcarrier provides conveyance of
planetary-science data to Earth from the temporary storage provided by
the data storage subsystem. Included are data from each of the two TV
cameras, IR scanner recorder, IR-UV spectrometer recorder, and capsule
recorder.
3.9.9 Separation of Fliqht Spacecraft and Flight Capsule
Capsule separation will occur within view of Goldstone. Flight Capsule
separation sequence will consist of gyro-controlled turns programmed by
on-board command with ground-controlled updating, if required, to posi-
tion the Planetary Vehicle to the required orientation. Signals for cap-
sule control functions and for capsule separation are programmed by C&S
stored commands and ground updating, if updating is required. Data Mode 2
can handle the increased activity during capsule checkout prior to release
and subsequent relay of capsule engineering data after separation.
The capsule relay link is established prior to separation. After
separation, capsule data is received by the radio subsystem. During
the spacecraft maneuver for capsule separation, the spacecraft-DSN link
will go out of phase-lock. The data received from the capsule is
stored for transmission after ground reacquisition of the spacecraft
signal. After capsule separation9 the Flight Spacecraft automatically
reorients to reacquire the Sun and Canopus.
3.9.10 Capsule Operations
Flight Capsule operations consist of
entry, and terminal descent.
orbit maneuver, orbital descent,
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After separation, the Flight Capsule performs the necessary maneu-
vers to achieve deorbit along a selected Mars-impact trajectory.
During descent, the Flight Capsule will transmit data to the Flight
Spacecraft for subsequent relay to Earth. Flight Capsule operations
continue until Mars impact.
3.9.11 Fliht Spacecraft Orbital Operations
After Flight Capsule impact, the Mode 2 data channels allocated to the
capsule are available for use by the data automation equipment as addi-
tional science-data capacity. The Flight Spacecraft operational
sequence is essentially the same as given in Section 3.9.8, except that
references to capsule operations are no longer applicable. After approxi-
mately 80 days in orbit, Data Mode 3 is initiated to maintain telecom-
munication-link margins.
3.10 PREFERRED SPACECRAFT LAYOUT AND CONFIGURATION
This section describes the 1971 Voyager spacecraft and includes: (1) a
general-arrangement drawing of its exterior and inboard profile of
subsystem equipment arrangement, and a functional block diagram of the
spacecraft; (2) the structural alignment requirements, spacecraft
reference axes and planes, coordinate system, and mechanical alignment;
(3) the evaluation of various designs leading to the preferred design.
3.10.1 Summary
Several spacecraft configurations were studied in Task B. These studies
included examination of the following candidate propulsion systems:
(i) solid-propellant insertion motor and liquid monopropellant system_
(2) LEM descent propulsion, and (3) Titan IIIC transtage--modified and
unmodified.
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The solid-propellant motor with monopropellant midcourse and orbit-trim
engines waschosen for the preferred spacecraft design. The propulsion
trades and configuration evaluation leading to this choice is reported in
Section 3.11 of this document and in Volume C.
Configuration Model 945-8055 was selected as the preferred design
because it excelled in the following features.
i) Subsystems are modular, which allows their complete checkout prior
to installation in the spacecraft.
2) Electronic assemblies and propulsion subsystems are easily accessible
for installation, maintenance, and testing.
3) Electronic assemblies are versatile in size, location, and construc-
tion, which permits grouping of electronic functions for simple
interfaces, installation, and testing. Thermal balance and center of
gravity (CG) location are easily obtained and can be revised to meet
new requirements.
4) The 6.5-foot-diameter high-gain antenna provides margin over require-
ments for system gain consistent with transmission rates. Growth
capability exists to accommodate an 8- by 12-foot paraboloid antenna
with no effect on spacecraft length.
5) The solar am_ay of eight fixed and four deployable panels (total
area of 316 square feet) provides good growth potential by adding
one segment to each folding panel (an increase of 138 square feet)
or by modifying existing tab geometry.
6) The configuration is versatile and adaptable to 1973, 1975 and 1977
missions. The spacecraft is designed so that a range of trajectories
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and Mars orbits can be achieved with minor changes to the 1971
design. It is also adaptable for missions to other planets.
3.10.2 General Description of Preferred Design
The general arrangement of the preferred spacecraft design is shown in
Figure 3.10-1. Boeing Model 945-8055 complies with JPL "Mission
Specification" capsule and launch vehicle interfaces and requires a
height 50 inches less than the allotted spacecraft dynamic envelope
height. Primary system elements and their interfaces are discussed in
Section 3.5. Figure 3.5-1 includes references to spacecraft subsystem
interface details described in Volumes A and B.
The preferred design utilizes a 120-inch-diameter semimonocoque cylinder as
primary structure extending between the Planetary Vehicle Adapter and
Flight Capsule interfaces. The adapter, a semimonocoque shell, supports
the Planetary Vehicle at the base of the 120-inch-diameter shell and
carries the loading to the nose fairing. The Planetary Vehicle is
separated from the adapter at the base.
Two circular frames, 37 inches apart, define an electronic-assembly bay
located approximately midway on the exterior of the primary structure.
Electronic assemblies are mounted between these frames. Each assembly is
an entity and can be adjusted around the periphery during design to meet
thermal-balance, CG, radio-frequency interference, and magnetic-field
requirements. If required, thermal-control louvers will be on the exterior
surface of each assembly. The design allows maximum access for installation,
maintenance, repair, inspection, and test. Space is available
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for 16 separate standard assemblies, each 16 inches wide, 32 inches high, and
7.8 inches deep. A usable volume of 33 cubic feet is provided in 14 assem-
blies. Two assemblies are available for growth. The 52-square-foot radiator
area is approximately 50-percent greater than required to maintain a gross
thermal balance. The packaging concept is described in Section 4.1.13.
The propulsion subsystem module, which can be assembled, bench-checked,
leak-tested, or test fired as a complete unit prior to installation in
the spacecraft, is located within the primary structure and attached
to the base of the bus. This module consists of a solid-propellant
orbit-insertion motor using Freon injection for thrust-vector control,
four 200-pound-thrust monopropellant (N2H 4) engines for midcourse and
orbit-trim maneuvers, and two orbit-insertion roll thrusters. The motor
nozzle is in the direction of the -Z axis. The midcourse and orbit-trim
engines are located in pairs 45 degrees off the X and Y axes. The
roll-control thrusters are located on the -Y axis. Four monopropellant
tanks are located symmetrically about the principal control axes to
maintain CG control. Tank pressurant (N2) is stored in two spherical
tanks.
The reaction-control subsystem module uses cold gas (N2) with coupled
jet nozzles for attitude control. The four 0.25-pound-thrust nozzles are
located on a 234-inch diameter, 45 degrees from the X and Y axes. Gas
is supplied from four spherical tanks located on the X and Y axes. The
reaction control subsystem is a two-part unitized system. Each half-
section can provide the required torques, autonomously, if a component
fails in the other half-section. This multichannel redundancy concept
is used wherever possible throughout the design of the spacecraft sub-
systems and is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.2.
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The solar panels are attached at the base of the primary structure to pro-
vide for equipment installation between the panels and Flight Capsule and
to optimize back-face radiation of panel heat. The array consists of
eight fixed trapezoidal panels (178 square feet) and four deployable
rectangular panels (138 square feet). The deployable panels stow verti-
cally on the dark side of the fixed panels. One segment added to each
of the deployable panels will increase the area 138 square feet. Revising
existing deployable panel shape will increase the area 46 square feet.
A 6.5-foot-diameter high-gain antenna with two rotation axes is located
off the -Y axis and is stowed on the dark side of the solar panels.
The primary and secondary axes are oriented to provide a minimum amount
of rotation (Figure 3.10-2) and for maximum coverage of Earth during
the orbit insertion burn, transit, and orbiting flight. An 8-
by 12-foot parabaloid antenna (equivalent area of i0 feet in diameter)
may be substituted without lengthening the spacecraft.
A Mariner C paraboloid antenna providing backup to the high-gain antenna
is mounted on a boom in the +X, -Y quadrant. It is stowed on the dark
side of the solar panels and is nonsteerable when deployed. The antenna
is positioned to provide maximum coverage of Earth during the first
month of Mars orbit.
Two boom-mounted low-gain antennas are stowed on the Sun side of the
solar panels. When deployed, these antennas are positioned in the -X +Y
and +X -Y quadrants. One antenna functions as the launch and acquisition
antenna, which must radiate through the nose fairing during the launch
phase. A Flight Capsule relay antenna is located in the -X +Y
quadrant and is bus-mounted on the dark side of the solar panels.
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A magnetometer (GFE) can be boom-mounted and located in the +X +Y quad-
rant when de_loyed. The boom is supported in a manner similar to the
low-gain antennas.
The assume.l science scan platform (GFE), stowed outboard of the elec-
tronic assemblies, is located on the +Y axis. The platform science
equipment consists of an IR spectrometer, IR scanner, and two TV cameras.
When deployed, the platform, which has a two-axis qimbal drive, can
view the entire planet from any point in the orbit. The scan platform's
field of view is shown in Figure 3.10-2. The UV spectrometer, with pro-
vision for two-axis motion, is mounted in an equipment bay. The assumed
body- and boom-mounted science instruments (GFH) are described in Section
4.4 and located as shown in Figure 3.10-1.
The Canopus sensor is located in an electronic assembly 12 degrees
counterclockwise from the -Y axis. This location provides the scan
platform with maximum possible views of the planet while the spacecraft
remains locked on its celestial references. The resulting spacecraft
orientation provides the Canopus Sensor with proper views (Figure 3.10-2).
Redundant, fine Sun sensors are located on the base of the c?lectronic
assembly chassis containing the Canopus sensor and inertial-reference
unit in the attitude-reference subsystem assembly. This grouping onto
a single chassis reduces alignment tolerances to a minimum. Coarse Sun
sensors are mounted on the Sun side of fixed solar panels located on
the X axes. A second set of coarse Sun sensors is mounted on the dark
side of the deployed solar panels and is used during initial acquisi-
tion of the Sun. Limb and terminator sensors are located on the X axis
and are fixed on opposite sides and at the base of the electronic-
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assembly bay. A guidance scan platform is located off the _Y axis
adjacent to the science scan platform. This platform with two rotation
axes contains a planet tracker. Its field of view is shown in Figure
3.i0-2.
The inboard profile of the electronic assemblies and other subsystems is
shown in Figure 3.10-3. Installation of the electronic assemblies and
subassemblies is defined in Section 4.1.13. Figure 3.10-4 is the func-
tional block diagram.
3.10.2.1 Structural Alignments
Spacecraft design requirements include provisions for maintaining
alignments during shipping, handling, boost accelerations and vibrations_
and thermal deflections during flight.
The spacecraft coordinate system consists of three mutually perpendicu-
lar reference axes (Figure 3.10-5). The plane in which the X and Y
axes lie is defined as the baseplane or Plane A. It is defined as
spacecraft Station 0 (Saturn Station 3238.5) and spacecraft stations
are numbered positively in a plus Z direction from this base. The
Z axis is perpendicular to this plane and is located at the centerline
of the spacecraft to coincide with the launch vehicle centerline. A
secondary reference, Plane B, is established as being normal to
reference Plane A and passing through the attitude reference subsystem
mounting plate located on the -Y side of the spacecraft. This plane
will be perpendicular to Reference Plane A within 0.20 milliradians.
The principal control axes are located 45 degrees from the X and Y
spacecraft axes. Positive yaw is clockwise when the spacecraft is
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viewed from the -Y side of the spacecraft. Positive pitch is clockwise
when the spacecraft is viewed from the -X side of the spacecraft. The
z axis is the reference for roll, and positive direction is defined as
clockwise when the spacecraft is viewed from the Sun side. An alignment
summary chart for subsystem elements, sensors, and science instruments
is shown in Table 3.10-1.
3.10.2.2 Interfaces
The Spacecraft Bus interfaces with the Planetary Vehicle Adapter sub-
system, propulsion subsystem, and space science subsystem are discussed
in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4_ respectively. These subsystem elements
and their interfaces are diagrammed in Figure 3.5-1.
3.10.3 Selection of the Preferred Desiqn
This section describes the sequence of design and evaluation used to
select the preferred design. The selection process is described below.
Review of Task A Configuration Aqainst Task B Requirements--This
review revealed major differences in mission constraints affecting
the configurations. The Task A 1971 mission configuration features all
deployable solar panels that were also usable in the 1969 test vehicle
at a stowed envelope consistent with the Surveyor nose fairing on the
Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle. This was done to meet the objective of
maximum similarity between the 1971 Mars mission and the 1969 test mission
configurations. This objective does not apply %o Task B; therefore, a
maximum amount of the 20-foot diameter was used for fixed panels.
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A Task A capsule was not carried into Mars orbit, which allowed the
insertion motor to be oriented away from the Sun and the solar cells.
In Task B, a much larger insertion motor is oriented so that the
spacecraft/capsule combination is placed in Mars orbit. Considera-
tions of CG control tend to favor orientations of the insertion thrust
line along the capsule-spacecraft centerline; thus, the motor exit plane
is toward the Sun.
Other Task B considerations that influenced spacecraft dimensions and
arrangements are: (1) a 120-inch-diameter capsule interface (was 80
inches on Task A), (2) an approximate 21,O00-pound planetary vehicle
weight (was approximately 8,000 pounds on Task A), and (3) solar-panel
area of approximately 320 square feet (was approximately 240 square
feet on Task A).
Establish a Baseline Configuration Concept--This step provided a
configuration used as a basis for variation of the major configuration
features with subsequent analysis of the resulting designs. Properties
such as weight and mass balance, thermal balance, sensor views, and
spacecraft size were evaluated.
Confiquration Evolution--Configuration evolution for the proposed
Voyager spacecraft is shown in Table 3.10-2. A total of 29 spacecraft
configurations were evaluate/ in gross terms. This evaluation empha-
sized enhancing features such as reduced spacecraft length, improved
views, and reduced panel temperatures. Using these design features,
nine additional configurations were developed and, from the original
29, two were selected for further evaluation. These ii included the
configurations used in the propulsion trades reported in Volume C.
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Boeing
_onrlg,
Model
Number
_ _ 945-8010
m o 945-8011
_ 945-8012
945-8013
m 945-8020
945-8021
945-8022
Z
< 945-8024
945-8026
945-8027
945-8028
945-8029
945-8030
945-8031
945-8032
945-8034
945-8036
945-8037
945-8038
o 945-8039
0 945-8040
945-8041
945-8042
945-8044
945-8046
945-8047
945-8048
945-8050
945-8052
Table 3.10-2: Configuration Evolution
Gross Conceptual Evaluation
• >.
Views _, _ "_
_o,_
• 0 ,-' -_ I o')
4-) -,-4 _ c"CL _0 o
0 ,--I .H C • ,--I :D • "_ C
X •
• • X
X X
• X
X X
X X •
X X
X • X • X •
x x x •
x • •
• x
x x
• • x x
x • x
x x x
x • • Ix
X • X
• X
X • • •
X •
X X
X ×
X •
X X •
X • X
X X
X X •
X • • X
× • X
Second Detailed
Level Evaluation
Evaluation
...Propulsion
Trade
_-Propulsion
Trades
945-8023
945-8025
-_945-8029A
945-8033
/Propulsion_'945-8033
Trade
_945-8035 _945 8055945-8051 -
--_-945-8043_-945-8045
,945-8054
2
945 8049 /
_'-945:8053
Preferred
Design
_945-8055
NOTE: X = Varied Feature
• = Elimination Feature
3-109
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
Four candidates using the selected propulsion concept were chosen for
detailed evaluation.
Selection of Preferred Design--Four candidate configurations were
evaluated using methods described in Section 3.10.3.2. Boeing Model
945-8055 was selected and is the preferred spacecraft system described
in this report.
3.10.3.1 Candidate Spacecraft Configurations
In addition to the preferred configuration described in 3.10.2, three
other spacecraft configurations were selected for detailed evaluation.
The first of these, Model 945-8045 (Figure 3.10-6), is similar to the
preferred design except for solar-panel location, shape9 and ratio of
fixed solar-panel area to deployed solar-panel area. Another differ-
ence is the location of the electronic assemblies on the Sun side of
the solar panels as opposed to those of the preferred design_ which are
located on the dark side of the solar panels. The high-gain antenna is
rotated 180 degrees from its location on the preferred configuration.
The spacecraft is 9 inches shorter and weighs 22 pounds less than the
preferred design.
The second candidate configuration, Model 945-8054, is shown in Figure
3.10-7. This configuration differs from the preferred design in that
it has a conical primary structure rather than a cylindrical body, a
reduced diameter of the electronic assembly bay (80 inches versus 120
inches) and a reduced potential radiator area, a Sun-side location of
electronic assemblies9 different solar-panel location and shape, and
different ratio of fixed area to deployed area. The Planetary Vehicle
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Adapter attaches to the spacecraft at the lower mid-body location rather
than at the base of the primary structure. The spacecraft weighs approxi-
mately 50 pounds more than the preferred design.
The third candidate configuration, Model 945-8033, is quite similar to
the preferred design. Major differences between the two configurations
are the requirement for a solid-motor exhaust shield to protect solar
panels from excess heating by solid motor exhaust plume, the solar-panel
shape and the number of deployed panels, and the moment arm of the science-
scan-platform deployment mechanism. The spacecraft weighs i0 pounds less
than the preferred design.
3.10.3.2 Evaluation
Measures of value of spacecraft configurations used for rating designs
against the competing characteristics defined in Section 1.6 are:
I) Probability of Mission Success--Configuration features that tend to
enhance reliability of spacecraft functions, including:
a) Simplicity of design applied to deployments, load paths,
installation volumes, and interfaces;
b) Modularization of independent functional elements of the space-
craft_
c) Failure modes that allow a high probability of completing other
functions needed for mission success_
d) Provision for use of redundancy in the spacecraft and weight
and volume margins available for additional redundancy.
2) Performance of Mission 0bjectives--Configuration features that tend
to increase the capability of spacecraft systems to meet stated
mission objectives, including:
3-i13
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a) Mass properties (weight, moments of inertia, and C@) that pro-
vide the ability to enlarge launch time and mission duration
windows and to establish and maintain low trajectory and
attitude dispersions;
b) Minimum misalignment of scanning, pointing, and inertial
reference devices because of deflection or mechanical tolerances
in spacecraft mounting structure and deployment elements;
c) Provisions for long-term orbital operations. These include
adequate margins in expendables, solar-panel area and the control
of equipment thermal environment to moderate and uniform levels.
b)
Cost Savings--Configuration features that tend to simplify or
eliminate costly functions md facility provisions associated with
acquisitionl assurance9 and activation of the spacecraft system,
including:
a) Modularization of independent elements of the assembly, which
provides minimum sensitivity of production and test schedules
to the spacecraft module interface;
The use of developedand flight-proven design_9 with emphasis
on applications of Mariner C arrangement concepts and components;
c) Spacecraft arrangements that minimize cost of interfacing
elements of the Voyager system. Effects of spacecraft arrange-
ments of these interfaces include loads, moments, and separation
requirements imposed on the launch vehicle and Flight Capsule;
receiving, assembly, countdown, and mission operational require-
ments imposed on the launch and ground facilities; flight-
acceptance testing and type-approval testing facility requirements.
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4) Contribution to Subsequent Missions--Ability to accommodate increased
capsule size and weight and an increase in quantity and variety
of scientific subsystem elements with minimum redesign. Key features
include:
a) A structural design that can be simply modified for load
increases;
b) Excess volume for the addition of science equipment and support-
ing subsystem growth elements$
Ability to increase solar-panel area with minimum redesign;
View-factor requirements insensitive to capsule diameter and
solar-panel area.
c)
d)
5) Additional 1971 Capability--Margins of weight and volume that
cannot be used efficiently to improve the baseline mission and that
allow for growth to additional performance in the 1971 mission.
All four comparison configurations are capable of performing the 1971
mission. The configurations were evaluated and the results are summa-
rized below.
Probability of Mission Success--Configuration 945-8055 rated highest
on inherent simplicity and the ability to accommodate subsystem redun-
dancy. Simple deployments_ good c.g. control margins_ and solar-panel
protection of equipment and many science instruments from the solar
environment and orbit-insertion exhaust were the primary features of the
945-8055 configuration that led to its high rating.
Performance of Mission Objectives--All four configurations exceeded
mission performance requirements. The two with the solar panels
on the Sun side of the equipment_ 945-8033 and 945-80559 rated slightly
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higher on the basis of more uniform temperatures of critical science
equipment and mounting structure throughout the mission.
Cost Savings--None of the arrangements anticipates difficulties in develop-
ment, fabrication, or system integration. The two configurations with
the smallest overall width, 945-8033 and 945-8055, are compatible, with
solar panel deployed, with existing full-model test facilities (e.g.,
the Boeing space chamber at Kent, Washington) and, therefore, would be
less costly.
Contribution to Subsequent Missions--Configurations with equipment on the
Sun side, 945-8045 and 945-8054, tend to be less sensitive to the size
of the capsule and whether it is attached or separated.
Additional 1971 Capability--Configuration 945-8055 rates best in this
characteristic because of weight and volume margins, CO control, and
solar-panel growth capability.
The evaluations are based on study of the detailed characteristics of
each configuration. Consideration of all features results in the selection
of Model 945-8055 as the preferred configuration. Table 3.10-3 shows
the most significant configuration features analyzed in the study, the
major variables imposed on each feature, the primary impact of each
variation mode on the design, and the evaluation of each configuration
on the basis of these effects.
Supplemental data is presented to support evaluation of major effects.
Panel thermal characteristics are shown in Figure 3.10-8. The effect
of insertion-motor heating on panel location is shown in Figure 3.10-9.
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Effects of solar-cell degradation and loss of solar-panels are shown
in Figure 3.10-10. Equipment radiator efficiency, as a function of
location, is shown of Figure 3.10-11. Important solar-panel design
features relevant to the evaluation are summarized as follows:
945-8033 -- Aft position (away from capsule); six folds, 7.l-percent
area loss in one deployment failure;
945-8045 -- Forward position; three folds, 24.6-percent loss per failure;
945-8054 -- Forward position; four folds, iS.8-percent loss per failure;
945-8055 -- Aft position; four folds, 10.9-percent loss per failure.
3.11 SELECTION OF PREFERRED SPACECRAFT SYSTEM
This section contains an evaluation of several possible Spacecraft
Systems and explains selection of the system to best accomplish the
Voyager Program objectives. The evaluation was necessary to ensure
inclusion of total system considerations in choosing a Spacecraft
System. Three Spacecraft Systems were established based on recommenda-
tions of system-level trade studies (Section 3.11.5) and preferred
designs of each system part: i.e., propulsion subsystems (Volume C),
the Spacecraft Bus subsystems (Section 3.10 and 4.0 of Volume A) 9 the
uoa _uusys%ems kvolume m)_ and trajectories koec_lons_..... 3.1 and o.z of
Volume A). The three systems were compared and the best was chosen.
Study conclusions are presented as recommendations with emphasis placed
on visibility of the data and the rationale used in arriving at the
conclusion. A similar study was performed in Phase IA Task A and was
reported in Section 3.10 of Volume A and Section 3.2 of Volume B,
D2-82709-I and -2. It is proposed that these studies be continued
throughout phases IB and II as a means of continual assessment of the
Spacecraft System against objectives.
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3.ii.i Summary
The Spacecraft Systems selected for final evaluation are:
i) Configuration 945-8055, a modi_led Wing VI Minuteman second stage
solid motor as the orbit-insertion motor with a monopropellant mid-
course subsystem sized for the 1975-1977 missions, and an 0SE sub-
system which is an adaptation of the Mariner 0SE. This system will be
identified through this section as the "Spacecraft System--Solid."
2)
3)
A combination of Spacecraft Configuration 945-8029, a shortened
Titan IIIC transtage and the preferred 0SE subsystem. This system
will be referred to as the "Spacecraft System--T-IIIC."
A combination of Spacecraft Configuration 945-8012, a minimum modifi-
cation to the LEM descent propulsion system and the preferred 0SH.
This system will be referred to as the "Spacecraft System--LEA4." "
The propulsion subsystem variations caused the most significant differ-
ences at the Spacecraft System level. The 0SE was held constant because
the effect of its variations on the Spacecraft System is less significant
than the other subsystems. The type of trans-Mars trajectories and the
orbit around Mars also were held constant to form a basis for the
comparison of the Spacecraft Systems. The trajectories used provide an
arrival velocity between 2.82 and 4.5 kilometers per second; the orbit
around Mars has a 1000-kilometer periapsis and a period of 13.8 hours.
The three Spacecraft Systems were evaluated by assessing each system by
evaluation criteria that measure their capability with respect to the
five competing characteristics of the "Preliminary Mission Description",
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October 15, 1965 (see Section 3.11.2). Table 3.11-1 lists the criteria
used, summarizes assessment results, and compares the assessments to
system requirements or goals. The results are for Spacecraft System
weights as shown in Section 1.5 (Spacecraft Bus, 2100 pounds;
science, 400 pounds; propulsion, 15,000 pounds; adapter, 1500 pounds;
and a 2000-pound capsule). The effect of the launch vehicle and Science
Subsystem are also shown in the probability of success assessments to
allow comparison with mission goals. Spacecraft System--Solid was se-
lected as the preferred system because of its low technical risk, and
the most weight available for reallocation to further enhance mission
success and the lower priority criteria.
Figure 3.11-1 compares estimated probabilities of mission success (P)
s
for the preferred system with the goals stated in Section 2.1.2. The
curves show two interpretations of mission success; each curve considers
both Planetary Vehicles° The top curve is the probability of mission
success based on the assumption that science payload failures have no
effect on success. It shows that all Ps goals can be met on this basis.
The lower curve is based upon the assumption that at least one of each
orbital scientific experiment must survive in one of the two Planetary
Vehicles for mission success. This curve shows that the probability
of obtaining data is high and that the goal for 30 days in orbit can
be met.
The weights allocated by JPL are higher than required for the 1971 mission
for the propulsion subsystem and the adapter, but are marginal for the
Spacecraft Bus. In studying the effect of reallocating the weight, it
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Table 3.11-1:
Criteria
Probability of Success_
Successful Mission Operation
i) Launch and Injection
2) Separation and Transit
3) Place in Mars Orbit and
Correct (i of 2 Vehicles)
4) Capsule Separation and
30-day Orbit Operation
(i of 2 Vehicles)
Technical Risk
Schedule Risk
Weight Available for Possible
Reallocation (ib)
Performance of Mission
Objectives
Maneuver Accuracy
(Orbit Period Error Sub_.@quent
to Orbit Trim-Seconds) 127
Potential _V Margin (m/sec} j
Orbit Versatility
Cost Savinqs
Contributions to Subsequent
Missions
Additional 1971 Mission
Capability
Additional or Redundant
Experiments
Alternate Mission Capability
Goals
0.85
0.84
0.78
0.65
Minimize
Minimize
Maximize
Minimize
Maximize
Maximize
Maximize
Maximize
Maximize
Maximize
Evaluation Summary
Spacecraft System
Solid T-III LHM
0.87
0.86
J I
0.85
Low
0.83
Moderate
Very Low
Moderate
81o
5O
140
II
II
Best
Good
710
252
260
Very Good i
Not Evaluated
About Equal
Good
Very Good
700
68
250
Good
Very Good
See Section 3.1.2.2 of Volume C for orbit conditions
Based on trading monopropellant only (would be approx, i000 ibs.
and 350 m/sec if both solid and monopropellant were traded)
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was found that all Spacecraft Systems are improved but that their order
of preference does not change.
3.11.2 Evaluation Criteria
The evaluation criteria used in Table 3.11-1 are defined in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Probability of Success--This is the probability that the system will
operate within allowable tolerances and obtain the data required to
accomplish the mission objectives. Measures of probability of success
are:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Probability that the Spacecraft System and Science Subsystem will
operate for a specified time and obtain the desired data;
Probability of a partial success, i.e., obtain part of the desired
data;
Technical risk--a measure of deviation from the state of the art;
Schedule risk--a measure of the risk of not meeting the launch
date if all systems are within the state of the art;
Weight available for possible reallocation--the Spacecraft System
weight that can advantageously be reallocated using an increase in
the probability of mission success as the highest priority.
Performance of Mission Objectives--Assessment is made on the basis of
how well each system can accomplish the mission objectives assuming a 1.O
probability of success, e.g., orbit accuracies and the range of possible
orbits around Mars.
Cost Savings--Assessment is made on the basis of the differences in total
costs for the total Voyager 1971 mission.
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Contributions to Subsequent Missions--Assessment is made on the ability
of the basic system to perform subsequent missions in terms of sufficient
excess propulsion capability.
Additional 1971 Mission Capability--This term is the capability of the
system beyond that required to accomplish minimum objectives of the 1971
mission, measured in terms of additional or redundant experiments and
alternate mission capabilities.
3.11.3 Selection Rationale
This section describes the assessment of each Spacecraft System against
each criterion and the process used to select the preferred Spacecraft
System.
3.11.3.1 Assessment of Spacecraft Systems against Evaluation Criteria
Probability of Success--The probability of success for the three Space-
craft Systems is nearly the same in all areas except technical risk
and the weight available for reallocation. The Spacecraft System--Solid
is rated as having the lowest risk. The hydrazine monopropellant system
is of the same basic design concept as the Mariner propulsion system.
Because the solid motor orbit-insertion propulsion system is hermetically
sealed, the propellant is maintained in an environment similar to that
in Earth storage. Since motors of this type have demonstrated high
storage and operational reliability, it is considered to have low tech-
nical risk. The systems using the Titan IIIC transtage and LEM propul-
sion systems are rated as having higher technical risk. Both systems
require several modifications to adapt them to the Voyager mission_ and
the effect of the space environment on long term storage of bipropellant
3-125
BOEING mSPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
propulsion systems is unknown. In addition, propellant leakage may
result in residue that could cause component failure.
For evaluating probability of success, it is assumed that weight avail-
able from the unused propulsion subsystem allocation could be reallocated
and used on the Spacecraft Bus to further maximize Ps" Therefore, the
system with the highest weight margin was rated best. The values shown
in Figure 3.11-1 were calculated for the nominal orbit around Mars. When
using orbits approaching minimum and maximum periods (3 and 24 hours per
Figure 3.i-26), certain redundant electrical components must be turned
off after 30 days in orbit (see Section 4.1.1.5). Losing this redundancy
would cause Ps to be degraded from 0.83 to 0.81.
Performance of Mission Objectives--For this criterion, the Spacecraft
System--Solid is about equal to Spacecraft System--LEM. The maneuver
accuracy of the Spacecraft System--Solid is best followed by that of the
Spacecraft System--LEM. Potential AV margin is best for Spacecraft System--
T-IIIC closely followed by Spacecraft System--LEM. Orbit versatility is
a measure of the ability of the spacecraft to achieve certain orbits around
Mars. The comparison is based on different combinations of launch and
arrival dates that can be achieved for each system when considering minimum
AV, effect of orbit period, and orientation. All systems are about equal
with respect to this criterion, as explained in Volume C, D2-82709-8.
Cost Savinqs--Due to the lack of firm cost data, cost differences could
not be used in the evaluation.
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D
D
Contributions to Subsequent Missions--The criterion used is the growth
potential of the vehicles in terms of their capability in performing
subsequent missions. All systems are designed for the most difficult
missions; thus, all are rated equal.
Additional 1971 Capability--On the basis of potential weight that could
be reallocated to increase redundancy in experimental equipment or to
add experiments, the Space System--Solid is best. On the basis of
alternate mission capability, it is rated lowest due to a lower _V margin
and the lesser flexibility of the solid insertion motor.
3.11.3.2 Selection of Preferred Spacecraft System
The preferred Spacecraft System was selected using two procedures. The
first considers the ratings of each system against each criterion, with
consideration for the priority of the competing characteristics.
With this method, the Spacecraft System--Solid is best in proba-
bility of success; for performance of mission objectives, contributions
to subsequent missions, and additional 1971 mission capability, all
systems are about equal.
The second procedure is an application of Fishburn's independence-in-
utility theory (Reference 5) in which relative values and an additive
rating procedure are used.
D
Reference 5: Fishburn, P.C., "Independence in Utility Theory with Whole
Product Sets," CORS/ORSA Joint Conference, Montreal, Canada,
May 27, 1964. Also used by Boeing in the study "System
Criteria for Launch Vehicle Systems, " NAS8-I1429, May 1965.
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This method involves:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Assignment of relative or weighted values to each of the competing
characteristics and their subelements_
Conversion of the individual assessments of Table 3.11-i to values,
giving the full value to the best system, zero to the least promising,
and an intermediate value to those between_
Determination of total assessment: i.e., the sum of the individual
values for each Spacecraft System_
Identification of the preferred system;
Determination of the sensitivity of the selection to a change in
assessments and relative values.
Table 3.11-2 shows results of applying this system to the data of Table
3.ii-i. Sensitivity studies showed that the selection is not sensitive
to the weighted values assigned unless the priority of the competing
characteristics is changed. This evaluation confirms Spacecraft System--
Solid as the preferred system.
3.11.4 Reallocation of Spacecraft System Weiqhts
The evaluation of Section 3.11.1 uses the weights available for possible
reallocation as one of the evaluation criteria. This section presents
the results of a study to determine potential uses for the available
weight and shows an example of reallocation for each Spacecraft System.
3.11.4.1 Summary
Table 3.11-3 shows the reallocations made and the effect of these reallo-
cations on the two evaluation criteria that are most affected, Ps and
performance of mission objectives. It is shown that Ps can be materially
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Criteria
Probability of Success
Successful Operation
Technical Risk
Schedule Risk
Reallocated Weight
Performance of Mission
Objectives
Maneuver Accuracy
Potential _V Margin
Orbit Versatility
Cost Savings
Contributions to
Subsequent Missions
Additional 1971 Mission
Capability
Additional or
Redundant Experiments
Alternate Mission
Capability
Table 3.11-2: SELECTION SUMMARY
Total Assessments
Maximum
Values
417
217
lO0
50
5O
236
76
80
8O
180
iii
56
28
28
Spacecraft System Values
Solid
217
i00
50
50
76
0
80
180
iii
28
0
892
T-Ill
217
0
50
0
0
80
8O
180
IIi
0
28
LEM
217
0
50
0
68
73
80
180
iii
0
28
746 807
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improved for all Spacecraft Systems, that the _V margin is decreased for
all systems, and that the Spacecraft System--Solid and LEM can obtain
improved performance when using 3- and 24-hour orbits.
It is concluded that all of the Spacecraft Systems are improved by the
reallocation_ but that their relative ratings are not changed.
Table 3.11-3: REALLOCATION OF WEIGHT
WEIGHT ALLOCATIONS
ALLOC. BUS SCIENCE ADAPTER PROPUL-
PER SION
Sect. 2100 400 1500 15,000
1.5
New 2355 920 850 14,875
New 2313 897 880 14,910
New 2255 920 600 15,225
APPLIED TO Ps 6 MO.
SPACECRAFT IN ORBIT
SYSTEM W/SCIENCE
PERFORMANCE OF
OBJECTIVES
IMPROVE
AV 3 TO 24
MARGIN HR
M/SEC ORBIT
PERF.
Solid .49 130 no
T-IIIC .48 173 no
LEM .51 115 no
Solid .70 Ii yes
T-IIIC .69 0 no
LEM .70 16 yes
3.11.4.2 Weight Available for Reallocation
Figure 3.11-2 indicates for the three alternate systems the weights that
are available for reallocation while meeting the Planetary Vehicle weight
of 21,000 pounds, a capsule weight of 2,000 pounds, and an orbit-insertion
AV of 2.2 kilometers per second. The figure indicates that for the Space-
craft System--Solid, the bus weight could be increased by 810 pounds (from
the allocated 2,100 pounds) to a maximum of 2,910 pounds. This increase
necessitates an increase in propulsion weight of 1,160 pounds from the
present weight of 13,680 pounds to 14,840 pounds to retain at least a
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2.2-kilometer-per-second AV capability. Alternately, the weight margin
could all be allocated to the propulsion; in that case, a maximum propul-
sion weight of 15,650 pounds is possible.
3.11.4.3 Weight Reallocation
Reallocation of weight was considered in the order of priorities of the
competing characteristics. The following paragraphs summarize the items
considered.
Probability of Mission Success (Ps)--Additional redundancy in the Space-
craft Bus and the Science Subsystem was studied. This was studied
using a method developed by Dr. Frank Proschan of the Boeing Scientific
Research Laboratories (Reference 6), in which the components selected
result in the maximum increase in reliability per unit of weight added.
Figure 3.11-3 shows the improvement possible over the preferred configur-
ation as Spacecraft Bus and science payload components are made redundant
and shows that the addition of more than 103 pounds of Spacecraft Bus com-
ponents or 346 pounds of Science Subsystem equipment will result in little
further improvement. In making reallocations, another 50 and 174 pounds,
respectively, must be added to provide for required structure and elec-
trical power.
Performance of Mission Objectives--Two items were considered. One was
the use of additional propellant for midcourse corrections and orbit-trim
maneuvers (max _V). The other was the addition of 102 pounds to the
electric power subsystem to avoid turning off certain redundant electrical
components prior to the end of the mission when in orbits approaching
expected minimum and maximum periods (3 hours and 24 hours).
Reference 6: Proschan, Frank, and Barlow, R.E., Mathematical Theory of
Reliability, John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
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Contribution to Subsequent Mission--0nly the addition of 500 pounds to
the spacecraft adapter (Solid and T-IIIC Spacecraft Systems) was con-
sidered. This would allow a design that could be used without chanqe
for the 1975 to 1977 missions.
In reallocating the weights as shown in Table 3.11-3, only the items
under Ps and performance of mission objectives were used.
3.11.5 System Concept Trade Studies
Trade studies were conducted to determine the optimum method for meeting
system and subsystem requirements and to provide a basis for selecting
the preferred design. The process followed was to:
i Identify the required trade studies from reviews of the Task A
2)
4)
5)
6)
effort and the Task B statement of work;
Sequence the trades so that independent trade studies would be
conducted prior to dependent ones_
Establish the evaluation criteria, related to the competing charac-
teristics, for performing the trade_
Conduct the trade and select a recommended approach_
Verify that all pertinent trades were performed_
vu_ u_*_ u±Quu _5uuy l_DU±bb in bll_ d_Slg[l.
The trade studies reported in this document and in Volumes B and C are
based on the mission description and first-level functional flows. As
the program proceeds9 further trades will be performed, including those
at lower functional levels, to achieve optimum system performance and
compatibility.
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The system concept trade studies conducted during Task B (except for pro-
pulsion and mission trades) are summarized in Table 3.11-4. The competing
characteristics were of primary consideration in trade study decisions.
Detailed discussions of each of the listed trades are found in the refer-
enced subsections of Volume A, or if noted in Volume By and propulsion
trades are discussed in detail in Volume C. Mission trades are summarized
in Section 1.7 of this document.
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3.12 PLANETARY QUARANTINE
This section describes the techniques employed for complying with the
planetary quarantine probability apportionments listed in Section 2.5.
The following procedures are proposed to ensure that the probability
allocation (shown in parentheses) for each contaminating event is not
exceeded.
Fairing of Saturn IVB Stage Nose I0.2 x 10-5)--The S-IVB stage will be
retrofired after Planetary Vehicle separation to place it on a Mars
nonimpact trajectory. The forward nose fairing will be released prior
to trans-Mars injection and the S-IVB/aft nose fairing on a Mars nonimpact
trajectory.
Capsule Canister Impact <0.i x 10-5)--Capsule canisters (or biobarriers)
will be separated while the Planetary Vehicle is on a nonimpact trajec-
tory.
Flight Capsule Contributions (2.3 x 10-5)--The Flight Capsule will be
sterilized, and procedures will be developed to ensure that sterility is
maintained throughout test and integration.
Flight Spacecraft Accidental Impact (i.0 x 10-5)--The aim points will be
biased for each spacecraft. Insertion command will not be given unless
the resulting orbit satisfies this constraint.
Propulsion Subsystem Exhaust Products (0.4 x 10-5)--Although preliminary
information indicates that engine sterilization requirements may be
obviated, it appears prudent at this time to continue to plan for the
sterilization of some of these systems.
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Orbit-Insertion Subsystem I0.2 x lO-5)--The solid propellant and associ-
ated components of the orbit-insertion engine will not require steriliza-
tion or treatment to satisfy the planetary quarantine constraint. The
TVC fluids (freon and nitrogen) will be sterilized by filtration and
aseptically loaded. Tanks and associated plumbing for these systems will
be decontaminated prior to assembly and maintained in this condition dur-
ing assembly, checkout, and launch operations. The decontamination pro-
cedure may be accomplished either by: (i) ethylene oxide treatment or
(2) heat sterilization, according to NASA/JPL Specification XSO-30275-TST-A.
Either procedure will be acceptable to satisfy the planetary quarantine
constraint.
Orbit-Trim Subsystem (0.2 x lO-5)--Neither the propellant (hydrazine)
nor the orbit-trim subsystem will require sterilization or decontamina-
tion. Hydrazine is sporicidal, and components in contact with the pro-
pellant will be sterilized.
Reaction Control Subsystem Exhaust Products <0.i x lO-5)--Internal sur-
faces of the reaction control subsystem hardware (tanks, valves, nozzles,
tubing, etc.) will be decontaminated prior to assembly and maintained
in this condition throughout assembly, checkout_ and launch. Either
EYO treatment or heat sterilization treatment, according to NASA/JPL
Specification XSO-30275-TST-A, will be suitable for accomplishing decon-
tamination.
Spacecraft Meteoroid Impact E_ecta <i.0 x lO-5)--Analysis indicates
that biological contamination of Mars resulting from ejecta from the
spacecraft external surfaces and appendages being subjected to meteoroid
impact may not be a problem. Recent studies of the bactericidal effects
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of ultraviolet radiation and the emissivity of spores indicate that the
exposure to solar radiation and heat pulse encountered during entry through
the Mars atmospheremight reduce the viable organism survival probability to
a level approximating the allocation. However, validation of the conclusion
that decontamination of external surfaces is not required must be based on
further tests conducted during Phase IB.
3.13 VOYAGERFLIGHT-EQUIPMENTCLEANLINESS
The approach to ensure flight-hardware cleanliness is concerned with avoiding
contamination that could adversely affect the mission. Twotypes of contami-
nation, particulate and biological, are of special concern. Controls on
personnel, processes, and packaging during assembly and test will be exercised
to ensure that cleanliness levels prior to encapsulation in the nose fairing
will meet the requirement of no particles larger than 4 mils. Investigation
to date indicates there will be problems in meeting this requirement, with
reasonable cost, for internal surfaces of equipment. Further work will be
done in this area. The following procedures will be used.
i) After a trial assembly of all mechanical interfaces, the Flight Space-
craft equipment will be disassembled to the lowest practical level,
cleaned, and reassembled in a Class i00,000 laminar downflow facility.
If components received from another facility are found to be externally
contaminated, they will be cleaned to meet the conditions of clean-room
assembly. All subcontractor components intended for direct clean-room
assembly will be required to be assembled in Federal Standard 209, Class
i00,000 rooms, and to meet specified particulate-contamination require-
ments. In the case of autopilot gyros and similar equipment, a Class
i00 bench environment (Fed. Std. 209) will be required during assembly.
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2) The liquid and gaseous elements of the reaction-control and propulsion
subsystems, and associated components of these subsystems, will be
internally precleaned and then assembled in a Class i00 environment.
Procedures for cleaning, inspecting, packaging, and handling of the
subsystems and their components have been established in the Lunar
Orbiter Program. Failure to meet the standards will result in
disassembly and reprocessing.
3) All remaining Flight Spacecraft components will be cleaned, inspected,
packaged, and shipped in accordance with existing Boeing procedures
established in the Lunar Orbiter Program.
D
3.14 MAGNETICS
This section discusses the Flight Spacecraft magnetic field in relation
to requirements and describes the magnetic-control plan and testing
facility.
D
3.14.1 Maqnetic-Control Plan
Section 2.2.3 lists the requirements on the Flight Spacecraft magnetic
field. The magnetic-field requirements will be met by_
i) Specifying nonmagnetic materials;
2) Minimizing, through design, the contributions of electrical
components;
3) Subsystem testing for monitoring compliance to requirements using
the analytic model;
4) Flight Spacecraft magnetic mapping to demonstrate compliance.
5) Maintain records and obtain JPL approval for use of magnetic materials.
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3.14.1.1 Materials
Structural and Mechanical--Selection of materials for mechanical and
structural application will consider magnetic permeability, magnetic
remanence, Curie temperature9 and geometry. Materials can be separated
into three categories from magnetic to nonmagnetic:
Category I: Nonmagnetic_ permeability < 1.01_ remanence_ zero_
Category II: Magnetic_ permeability > i.i_ remanence_ very high_
Category III: Slightly magnetic_ permeability >l.01_ <l.l_
remanence_ slight.
Category I materials may be used without constraint and will fulfill the
requirements of most of the vehicle structure.
Category II materials will be restricted in usage to applications where
no less magnetic material will perform the desired function. The require-
ments for usage of these materials will be justified in detail and speci-
fic project authorization obtained.
Category III materials usage will be minimized because properties of
materials in this category vary from sample to sample and with processing
history. The use of these materials cannot be eliminated because existing
qualified parts and components of systems, such as propulsion and atti-
tude control, are fabricated from these materials.
Electrical Components--The magnetic field of typical electrical compo-
nents is due to soft and hard permanent fields (Fields 1 and 2 on Table
3.14-1), induced fields (Field 3), and stray electromagnetic fields
(Field 4).
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Table 3.14-1: MAGNETIC FIELDS OF TYPICAL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
Typical Component
Possible Field
i 2 3 4
Typical Field
At 3 feet (Gamma)
Capacitor X X X 10-2
Transformer X X X
Resistors X X X 10 -3
Traveling-Wave Tubes X X X X 14 to 26
Inductors X X X
Motors (with Shield) X X X X 1
Solenoid Actuators X X X i 9o 5
Power Supplies X X X 3 to i0
Cordwood Circuitry X X X 1
Transistors (f_._ per pkg) X X X 2 x 10 -3
Television X X X
RF Circulator Switches X X X X i0
Lead Wires X X X
Connectors X X 10 -2
Isolators X X X i0
The externally induced field (Field 3) is generally small for properly
controlled conditions of Field i, 2, and 4.
Soft permanent fields and stray electromagnetic fields will be of pri-
mary concern because they are large and contribute significantly to
total magnetic-field instability.
Effects of hard permanent fields will be minimized by designing for the
most efficient magnetic circuit, by confinement where required, and by
using magnetic shields. Sources with the greatest dipole moments are
placed as remote from the magnetometer as possible. The effect of these
fields on stability will be minimized by limiting use of ferromagnetic
materials.
The effect of stray electromagnetic fields will be reduced by proper
design of the electronic layout and the power-transfer system, elimina-
tion of ground loops_ and compensation of each offending magnetic loop.
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The area of any current-carrying loop will be minimized. Tightly twisted
wires, individual ground and signal-return wires, and coaxial cables will
be used. Components with relatively large electromagnetic fields will
be designed to operate in a back-to-back field-canceling mode.
Components susceptible to perming by stray electromagnetic fields will
affect the total magnetic-field stability. Stray fields will induce a
perm into these components. The design of these components will include
selection and control of materials that will minimize this effect.
3.14.1.2 Analytic Approach
An analytic approach that will predict the magnetic field of the Flight
Spacecraft at the magnetometer location was studied. The approach out-
lined was based on the analytic methods reported in a Texas Instrument
Inzorporated study (Reference T). The purpose of this prediction tech-
nique was to provide guidelines for the geometry, location, and composi-
tion of the magnetic components of the Flight Spacecraft to meet the
magnetic requirements at the magnetometer.
An analytic model was developed during the study. It was determined
that the analytic model could be used to estimate the effect of magnetom-
eter boom length on material selection. It is recognized that use of
the model early in the program, before detail design is complete, would
require input-data assumptions to be made. Using conservative assump-
tions, the analysis can be used to determine allowable materials as a
Reference 7: Green, Arthus W., Or._ and Burch, 3ack J., "A Stochastic
Approach to the Problem of Allowable Magnetic Moments in
a Space Vehicle," Texas Instruments Incorporated_
Dallas, Texas.
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function of boom length and the effect of various boom lengths on costs
and Flight Spacecraft performance.
3.14.1.3 Maqnetic-Testinq Facility
The JPL magnetic requirements will be met by using the system, component,
and assembly test facility, and the magnetic-material test facility.
The system, component, and assembly test facility will be capable of
mapping and deperming the Flight Spacecraft or the Planetary Vehicle.
Tests on the PTM will help determine potential problems.
A magnetic-material test facility will be used to support magnetics
research, design investigations, and quality control on materials, parts,
and subassemblies. This facility will allow supplemental activity to
the work being done at JPL in an effort to ensure that problems will not
appear at the system level.
3.15 SPACE-RADIATION EFFECTS ON VOYAGER SYSTEM
This section is concerned with the radiation effects on components,
assemblies, and subsystems due to the predicted space-radiation environ-
ment for the Voyager mission.
The radiation effects likely to be most important to the Voyager are
surface and ionization effects rather than bulk damage to electronics.
Much data exists on basic radiation response of electronics and materials
intended for Voyager (Table 3.15-1), and more data on specific devices
and materials, especially surface phenomena, is being obtained.
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3.15.1 Semiconductor-Device Response
Ionization from charged particles may cause temporary loss of transistor
gain, increased leakage current, and reduction in breakdown voltage.
Special surface treatments and manufacturing techniques can reduce these
effects. Screening and selection of devices, as well as the above tech-
niques, will result in devices that meet Voyager environment requirements.
Solar-cell assemblies will be affected by both the solar wind (low
energy) proton and by solar ultraviolet radiation. The NP silicon
cells selected for Voyager are more radiation resistant than PN. Exper-
imental data indicates that quartz covers for solar cells will not be
degraded by the predicted fluxes.
A detailed evaluation of electronic components, including safety margins
and ratios of damage threshold levels to Voyager environment levels, has
been accomplished (Table 3.15-i).
3.15.2 Voyager-System Materials
Thermal-control-coating performance will depend on the combined effects
of particulate and electromagnetic radiation on the absorptance and
emittance properties of the coating. Presently, the combined environ-
mental effects are being studied on selected thermal-control coatings
to ensure Voyager thermal-control-system reliability.
Subsystems using semiconductors are the main concern because of their
susceptibility to radiation damage. Radiation response of these
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components will be minimized by selecting low-radiation-response devices
and analysis of allowable outputs and inputs from semiconductor circuits
to ensure that radiation-induced spurious signals do not cause allowable
ranges for proper performance to be exceeded.
table 3.15-1:
ELECTRONICS
Transistor
Number
Silicon
Transistors
2N930
2N708
2N2150
2N2331
SP8300
(2N708)
Diodes
IN649
IN485B
AM 602
IN746A
Capacitors
CTM
VKR
Resistors
IK
iO R-IOOK
THRESHOLD FOR PERMANENT RADIATION DAMAGE FOR TYPICAL
NPN
NPN
NPN
NPN
NPN
Mylar
Ceramic
Coated Metal Film
Glass-Metal Film
Damage Safety Margin
(Interplanetary Mission) _
30
120
3.5
50
160
>i00
>300
>i0
>500
>i00
>105
>104
>104
|
eSafety margin is the factor by which the radiation environment
must be increased to observe damage.
3.16 DATA SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The data system for the Voyager 1971 Mars mission is shown schematically
in Figure 3.16-1. It acquires, processes, and displays tracking, engi-
neering, and science data, and transmits and verifies spacecraft commands.
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Figure 3.16-1: Voyager Data System
3-.I.49 & 3-.I.50
BOEING_SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
Data taken from the two Planetary Vehicles is identical except for radio
frequency. This section describes nominal modes of operation--alternates
can be found in the detail subsystem (Section 4.1, Volume A) and MDE dis-
cussions (Section 3.5, Volume B).
Telecommunications--Data from each Planetary Vehicle is biphase modu-
lated on two subcarrier channels, mixed with the tracking data_ and
transmitted on the coherently phase-modulated S-band carrier frequency.
Planetary science and capsule-entry data are biorthogonally block-
encoded for transmission on the upper frequency subcarrier. Four record-
ers store the planetary science data output of the DAE. Playback of
these recorders and from the capsule recorder is selectable. Playback
data rates are 7200 bits/second for the first 80 days in orbit and 1200
bits/second thereafter.
Cruise science (real-time or recorder playback) and capsule engineering
are multiplexed with spacecraft engineering for modulation on the lower-
frequency subcarrier or for recording during spacecraft maneuvers. The
data rates are 80 bits/second during cruise, 288 bits/second for the
first 80 days in orbit 9 and 60 bits/second thereafter.
Upon ground reception, the data are recorded and furnished to the MDE
processing equipment for subcarrier demodulation, bit synchronization,
decommutation9 timing generation, and serial-to-parallel conversion.
The station computer processes these outputs and the tracking data
for display and teletype (TTY) or high-speed data-line formats for
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transmission to the SFOF. The capability to edit and format display
data and select priority measurements for transmission to the SFOF is
essential. Following receipt at the SFOF, the data are initially pro-
cessed for real-time displays and to provide alarm monitoring. The
data are then transferred to disc and permanent storage for subsequent
non-real-time display and analysis. Modified JPL analysis programs are
used to correlate and compute data for mission and system control and
evaluation.
During prelaunch, ground reception of all data is by open loop to DSIF 71
or STC hangar_ engineering data is also transmitted by umbilical to the
LCE. During Earth orbit, support by ETR or the Apollo global network
will be required because DSIF coverage is limited. In addition, if real
time data is desired during early flight phases, such as post separation
or Sun acquisition, a special problem will arise (see the Telecommunica-
tions Link Analysis in Section 4.1.8). Subsequent to Sun acquisition,
the DSIF stations will receive telemetry and will begin the trans-Mars
operations.
Based on received tracking and telemetry data, ground commands may be
issued to correct non-nominal values of flight conditions, such as
trans-Mars trajectory, orbit insertion, and orbit trim, or to take mal-
function correction action. The latter commands will be prescribed for
given sets of failure mode diagnostics and trend predictions. When a
command is initiated, SFOF computing formulates the required message for
transmission. Following verification, the command is sequenced and
transmitted via TTY to the appropriate DSIF, where the received message
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is verified and sequenced for transmission to the Planetary Vehicle. At
the proper time, the command is gated to the DSIF ground equipment and
again verified. The ground equipment encodes the command, modulates
the carrier, and checks the command transmission. When received by the
spacecraft radio system, the command is sent to the command detector
whose output is the demodulated command data. These data are trans-
mitted, through selection logic, to the command decoder. The decoder
checks spacecraft address, parity, and format; decodes the data;
and routes it to the DAH, C&S, or subsystem function as required by the
command message. The command is also gated to the telemetry for re-
transmission to the ground. Proper execution is verified by observing
telemetry and tracking data.
System Timinq--A representative timing diagram for the data system is
shown in Figure 3.16-2. The reference timing for the system is the
spacecraft clock--all data are computed in spacecraft time for presen-
tation and control. Versatility in the ground system will be necessary
to merge real-time and stored data (transmitted in reverse order) from
several ground acquisition sites, two spacecraft, and two capsules.
This function is critical because the data require cross-correlation,
and the selection of "best" data with correct time tagging is essential.
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3.17 SYSTEM RELIABILITY SUMMARY
This section introduces the governing approach to Task B reliability
studies and brings together and summarizes the dispersed reliability
discussions so as to give overall system clarity. Activities covered
include the issuance of design requirements and the evaluations performed
to determine compliance with these requirements.
D
The reliability approach to Task B was the same as for Task A with the
following additions:
i) An increased emphasis on design reliability in all areas to prevent
catastrophic failure modes, implementing preferred redundancy modes,
malfunction detection, and switching techniques.
2) A detailed examination of imperative mission functions to provide
a basis for maximizing the probability of mission success.
3) Examination of noncatastrophic failures to accomplish partial
mission success.
Detailed backup documentation covering design data and analyses will be
incorporated into the following existing documents: D2-82724-I, "Voyager
Reliability"; D2-82724-2, "Voyager Failure Mode and Effects Analyses";
D2-82743-3, "Voyager Program Reliability Analyses and Prediction Standards."
|
Implementation of the above approach is depicted in the sequential flow
diagram in Figure 3.17-1. A resume of the activity results follows:
i) Derivation, development, and issuance of reliability design require-
ments, objectives, and guidelines (Section 3.17.1).
2) A summary evaluation of the preferred design, including a numerical
evaluation by mission phase that is further broken down to the
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3)
subsystem and major component level, and a description of the
methods employed to determine compliance to the "no single catas-
trophic failure mode" (NSCF) and partial success requirements
(Section 3.17.2).
Detailed summaries of the reliability assessments of each subsystem
of the preferred design, including numerical and qualitative evalu-
ations, block diagrams_ redundancy implementation, critical failure
modes, and key reliability features (Section 3.17.3).
Although not a primary Task B requirement, brief evaluations were
performed on the Saturn V launch vehicle, the Science Subsystem, the
Tracking and Data System (TDS), and the Mission Operations System (MOS)
equipment. Evaluations of these systems are included to show total
mission relationships.
In the design area, particular effort was directed toward evolving a
simple and conservative deslgn--one whose imperative mission performance
was immune to single failure. Special attention was given to developing
functional independence_ alternate functional paths, and a simplified
method to implement alternate paths.
3.17.1 Reliability Requirements
Qualitative and quantitative reliability requirements and guidelines
were developed for Task B. These requirements and guidelines were
interpreted and applied to the various Voyager design areas; they served
as the formal reliability direction to Task B. As standards for reli-
ability development during Task B, two standardized missions have been
adopted: a nominal mission for numerical reliability evaluations, and
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a minimum or "imperative" mission to assist in evaluating critical
failure modes. These missions and their associated requirements are
described in the following sections.
3.17.1.1 Qualitative Requirements
The objective to maximize the probability of success for the 1971 Voyager
mission required the development of "hard core" mission objectives--
distinct from broader mission objectives--so that imperative functions
could be identified and design priorities established. Table 3.17-I is
a summary of these mission functions.
Within the above framework, the following requirements and preferences
were levied on the Voyager design:
i) No single failure mode of an electronic or electrical part or com-
ponent will cause the loss of an imperative function (NSCF);
2) Design simplicity will be given preference over improved performance
beyond the imperative level;
3) Maximum use of conservative design (e.g., derated application_
within state-of-art9 proven hardware);
4) Maximum independence of functional elements;
5) Redundancy preference in the following order:
a) Cooperative multichannel 9
b) Alternate path or functional 9
c) Block or standby;
6) Where sensing and switching is required_ the following order of
selection will govern:
a) Automatic_ fail-safe 9 on-board circuitry9
b) Detection via telemetry--data-switch via ground command.
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
!>
Table 3.17-1: MINIMUM MISSION-IMPERATIVE FUNCTIONS
I
Separation of spacecraft and launch vehicle
Attitude reference acquisition
Attitude control
Interplanetary-trajectory correction
Mars-orbit injection
Mars-orbit correction
Capsule orientation and separation initiation
Spacecraft science data acquisition and transmission to Earth
Capsule science data acquisition and transmission to Earth
Imperative mission functions are those functions that must be
accomplished (with some possible degraded performance allowed)
to preclude a catastrophic mission effect. A catastrophic mission
effect is one that prevents the acquisition and transmission
to Earth of scientific data by the spacecraft during Mars
orbital operations. The requirement that no single failure mode
of an electrical or electronic part or component will cause a
catastrophic effect on the mission will, therefore, apply to
each of nine imperative mission functions defined above. A
further breakdown of lower-level imperative functions or events
is given in Table 3.17-4.
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7)
The first selection will be used in all cases where potential failure
can immediately imperil the spacecraft. The second selection may be
used for potential failures that do not immediately imperil the
spacecraft and only if a higher Ps results. The second method may
also be used as a backup.
Design implementation that retains the maximum portion of system
performance if a noncatastrophic failure occurs.
3.17.1.2 Numerical Requirements
Numerical reliability requirements, in the form of reliability allocations,
were used during Task B to provide control of overall reliability levels,
reference framework for reliability trades, and an index of complexity
levels and possible problem areas.
In exercising this control, numerical evaluations were based on the
nominal mission summarized in Table 3.17-2.
Table 3.17-3 lists the preliminary reliability allocations used during
Task B. These allocations were derived by adjusting the revised allo-
cation of Task A to account for: (i) the introduction of equipment to
implement additional functions9 (2) the scale-up of existing equipment,
and (3) the introduction of additional alternate or redundant equipment.
3.17.2 Preferred System Evaluation
The system-level evaluations performed to determine compliance to estab-
lished design direction are discussed below. These qualitative and
quantitative evaluations were performed against the requirements and
standardized missions summarized in Section 3.17.1.
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Table 3.17-2:
MISSION PHASE
Launch and Transit
Countdown _>
Launch and Injection
Transit
Planetary Vehicle Orbit
Achievement
Mars Entry >
Capsule Separation
Obtain Data on Mars
Environment
Orbiter
STANDARDIZED NOMINAL MISSION
MAJOR PHASE EVENT A Time
IHours)
Final preparation
Boost and inject two Plane
tary vehicles into inter-
planetary transfer
trajectories
Separate from launch
vehicle, acquire attitude
reference, and cruise
including one or more
trajectory-correction
maneuvers
Inject Planetary Vehicle
into Mars orbit, including
one or more orbit-correction
maneuvers
27
1
5012
72
Orient the Flight Capsule
and initiate capsule-space-
craft separation sequence
Receive data from capsule
and transmit to Earth
48
5
Receive, store, and trans-
mit data from science pay-
load to Earth
720
The countdown period of the first mission phase was separated
only to facilitate reliability calculations
A Time
IHoursI
27
28
5040
5112
5160
5165
588O
Covers spacecraft function only as indicated in event description
This activity is concurrent with first part or orbiter phase.
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Table 3.17-3: PRELIMINARY RELIABILITY ALLOCATION-- _i_
PHASE IA, TASK B
'stem Element
Allocated Reliability
System Subs, rstem
Power Subsystem
Computing & Sequencing Subsystem
Command Subsystem
Guidance & Control Subsystem
Attitude Reference
Autopilot
Reaction Control
Radio Subsystem
Telemetry Subsystem
Data Storage Subsystem
Structural & Mechanical Subsystem
Pyrotechnics Subsystem
Temperature Control Subsystem 4_
Cabling Subsystem
Spacecraft Bus (Subtotal) 0.821
0.980
0.970'970
0.994
0.996
O.999
0.999
0.970
0. 990
O. 940
0.998 (0.999 ea.)
0.999
0.996
O.999
Planetary Vehicle Adapter
Propulsion Subsystem I_.
Science Subsystem _3_>
(6 Primary Experiments")
Reliability Contingency
Flight Spacecraft Reliability 0.621
0.999
0.995
0.800
0.950
Midcourse
Orbit Injection
Orbit Trim
Flight Spacecraft Performance
No Meteoroid Damage
Flight Spacecraft Ps (Total)
m s
0.611
(a)
(b)
0.993
0.990
Ps (at least 1 out of 2
Spacecraft)
Spacecraft OSH (Mission
Critical) 0.990
(c) Launch Vehicle Ps 0.900
(d) MOS & TDS (Mission Critical) Ps 0.980
(e) Launch on Time(Launch Vehicle System) 0.990
(a)x(b)x(c)x(d)x(e) 0.734
0.849
0.997
0.997
0.999
>
Allocations based standardized on nominal mission (see Table 3.17-2).
Probability of success for commands to Spacecraft is estimated at 0.999
when considering joint capability of two subsystems. For simplicity_
they are carried in series yielding a conservative Ps"
Evaluation of all experiments listed in Table 3.17-8.
Combination of Spacecraft Bus and Propulsion Temperature Control
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Technical data presented includes: (i) a description of the design
response and methodology employed to ensure compliance to qualitative
requirements, and (2) a numerical evaluation of the preferred system
shown by mission phase and further broken down to the subsystem and
major-component level.
3.17.2.1 Qualitative Evaluation
NSCF Evaluation--An adaptation of the fault-tree analysis technique in
conjunction with system level FM&H analyses has been used to ensure
design compliance to the NSCF requirements and as a tool for controlling
functional dependency. The fault-tree analysis, developed to detect
and eliminate unsafe events during Minuteman mission operations_ consists
of relating potential failure sequences to the occurrence of an undesired
event.
For the Voyager mission_ undesired events are the loss of any of the
imperative mission functions defined in Table 3.17-1 and illustrated
in fault-tree form in Figure 3.17-2. A further breakdown is given in
Table 3.17-4. This information is developed by considering each of the
imperative mission functions individually and then combining the identified
events into a mission sequence. Subsystem functions that are necessary
for several imperative mission functions--such as "supply power" and
"provide temperature control"--are not repeated_ although such functions
must be continued throughout the mission. For example, orbit trim is
omitted because, for the preferred design, the events involved are
the same as for midcourse correction. The fault-tree technique uses
event logic diagrams to identify and relate basic system faults that
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contribute to the end-fault condition defined by the undesired event.
The fault-tree analysis is developed in terms of failures rather than
successes. In a success tree, two parallel systems would feed through
an "or" gate to indicate that either system can provide a success. In
a fault tree, these two systems feed through an "and" gate to indicate
that both systems must fail in order to cause a mission failure. Diagrams
are traced downward from the undesired event on a fault tree to determine
the existence of an "and" gate on each path, which indicates that a
double failure must occur in order for the path to propogate toward the
undesired event.
The basic technique can be expanded to any degree, allows introduction
of probabilities on each event, and is amenable to computer analysis for
more detailed analyses in later program phases.
Figure 3.17-3 illustrates the use of this technique to ensure compliance
with the requirement that no single failure of an electrical or electronic
part or component will cause the catastrophic event, "fail to acquire
attitude reference." Probabilities need not be entered in the fault
tree to determine compliance with qualitative requirements. However,
the tree is developed to a level that ensures functional independence
between two alternate function paths. For many complex systems, the
initial fault tree must be developed far below the first "and" gate on
each path. The tree is then solved by either a computer program or by
Boolean algebra technique to determine functional dependencies between
the different branches of the tree. The analysis shown in Figure 3.17-3
is not for the preferred configuration and shows some noncompliant areas
for illustration purposes.
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During Task B, informal analyses were conducted on each subsystem to the
degree permitted by the design definition. Results of these analyses
are discussed in more detail under the respective subsystem write-ups
of Sections 3.17.3 and 4.0. The complete analysis using the fault-tree
technique for each imperative mission function will be completed during
subsequent program phases.
Partial Success Evaluation--One Boeing approach to the evaluation of
partial success combines the results of reliability analyses 9 failure
mode and effects analyses, and functional analyses to arrive at indices
of function criticality. These are then used to indicate areas where
elimination of failure modes would be most fruitful in accomplishing a
maximum of mission objectives. These efforts result in reliability
reallocations with concomitant design changes and weight and volume
reallocations.
The criticality-analysis method is accomplished in three steps:
l)
2)
3)
Integrate the data quality or value with the expected data quantity_
Determine the dependency of data objectives on selected functions_
Combine function-loss effects with function-loss probability.
The steps in this method are discussed in greater detail below. The sample
graphs on Figure 3.17-4 clarify this approach.
Data quantity and quality--Each type of data sought in a mission has a
predictable rate of acquisition under normal operating conditions. With
these assumptions, the amount acquired of each data type can be plotted
as a function of mission time.
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quality is a measure of the value of each type of data and varies over a
period of time. For example, the TV pictures from the first spacecraft
orbit have more effect than those transmitted from the 400th orbit.
Such time-varying values result from customer-contractor discussion of
mission objectives, just as the relative importance of each type of data
is decided. Thus, data quality considers both the importance (weight)
that the customer attaches to each type of data and a time variation in
data value. Data-quantlty and data-quality curves are then combined
mathematically, point by point, for each data type to obtain a set of
curves of weighted data objectives versus time.
Data Objectives and Function Definition--At any time in the mission that
a selected function fails t the data objectives dependent on that function
are lost from the time of failure onward. Thus, for each subsystem
function, a curve can be constructed showing the proportion of weighted
data objectives attained if a function failure occurs (Sketch A of Figure
3.17-4).
Effect of Function Loss and the Probability of Function Survival--The
likelihood of the function failing at any point in the mission must be
considered. This entails developing probability of function survival
versus mission time curves (Sketch B of Figure 3.17-4). These curves are
then combined point by point with the appropriate impact-of-function-loss
curves to obtain a failure-criticality curve for each function (Sketch
C of Figure 3.17-4). A bar chart is then prepared to compare criticality
values of each function at selected points in the mission (Sketch D of
Figure 3.17-4). A visual comparison of these bars indicates areas needing
development attention.
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Details of this method have been developed and will be incorporated in the
backup documentation mentioned earlier.
Redundancy Hvaluation--Hvaluation of compliance to redundancy-sensing-
and-switching preferences is discussed for each subsystem and major com-
ponent in Sections 3.17.3 and 4.0.
3.17.2.2 Numerical Hvaluation
The preferred system was evaluated using the nominal mission described
in Table 3.17-2. Data standards9 mathematical models_ and detailed
success criteria used to develop these evaluations are summarized in
Section 3.17.3 and in more detail in the backup documents.
Figure 3.17-5 shows the cumulative probability of success for the pre-
ferred system as a function of mission phase. Included in the proba-
bilities are: reliabilities of the spacecraft elements9 launch vehicle,
MOS and TDS, critical Flight Spacecraft performance probabilities_ and
probability of no meteoroid damage. The plotted path beyond the launch
and injection phase is for at least one Flight Spacecraft success. Table
3.17-5 displays the end-point data as a function of system element and
compares those data to the allocation given in Section 3.17.1.2.
The evaluation of the preferred system considered the partial functional
redundancy existing between the computing and sequencing and command
subsystems. Therefore_ Table 3.17-5 shows a single evaluation that
jointly covers the two subsystems. The evaluation includes all functions
of both subsystems9 including the effects of the partial redundancy.
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Table 3.17-5: SU_W_ARY OF PREFERRED-SYSTEM RELIABILITY
EVALUATION
System Element
Power Subsystem
Computing & Sequencing Subsystem
Command Subsystem
Guidance & Control Subsystem
Radio Subsystem
Telemetry Subsystem
Data Storage Subsystem
Structural & Mechanical Subsystem
Pyrotechnics Subsystem
Temperature Control Subsystem 4_
Cabling Subsystem
Spacecraft Bus
Planetary Vehicle Adapter
Propulsion Subsystem
Science Subsystem ((3_imargExperiments)
Reliability Contingency
Flight Spacecraft
Flight Spacecraft Performance
No Meteroid Damage
Flight Spacecraft Ps (Total)
P (at least i out of 2
S
spacecraft)
Spacecraft OSE (Mission Critical)
Launch Vehicle Ps
Launch on Time(Launch Vehicle System)
MOS and TDS (Mission Critical) P
S
Ps (Mission Total)
Allocated >
Reliability
0.821
0.980
0.970
0.994
0.970
0.990
0.940
0.998
0.999
0.996
0.999
0.999
0.995
0.800
O. 950
0.621
0.993
0.990
0.611
0.849
0.990
0.900
O.99O
0.980
0.734
Assessed
Reliability
O.9932
P
0.9914
b
0.9945
0.9820
0.9978
0.9490
0.9984
0.9999
0.9990
0.9960
0.9045
0.9990
0.9962
0.8001
0.7202
0.9930
0.9900
0.7080
0.9147
O.990
0.900
0.990
0.980
0.7907
Allocations based on Standardized nominal mission (see Table 3.17-2).
Probability of success for commands to the Spacecraft Bus is
estimated at 0.999 when considering joint capability of two
subsystems. For simplicity, they are carried in series yielding
conservative Ps"
Evaluation of all experiments listed in Table 3.17-8.
Combination of Spacecraft Bus and Propulsion Temperature Control
Subsystems.
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A comparison of the allocated and assessed values on Table 3.17-5 shows
that the preferred-system reliability and Ps exceed the objectives set
forth at the beginning of Task B. These assessments will serve as a basis
for a revised allocation to be used during follow-on program phases.
3.17.3 Subsystem Evaluation Summary
Evaluation results are organized by individual subsystem, with each
section containing material relating to:
i) Reliability expressed as a function of contained components and
mission phase_
2) Failure mode and effects analysis summary and critical life
characteristics_
3) Key reliability features, including a resume of redundancy em-
ployed_
4) Summary evaluations of alternate configurations.
The major elements of guidance and control, attitude reference,
autopilot, and reaction control have been treated as individual sub-
systems for this section of the system reliability summary. In addition,
discussions of the planet sensor, guidance scan platform, limb and
terminator detectors, and pointing controllers (high-gain antenna) are
incorporated with the attitude reference subsystem write-up.
Substantiating data are contained in Section 4.0 and the series of
referenced backup documents.
3.17.3.1 Power Subsystem
The reliability allocation for the power subsystem was 0.980. The pre-
ferred configuration, which is the result of a trade study involving
3-177
BOEING-- SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
seven configurations, has an assessed reliability of 0.9932. Figure
3.17-6 shows component reliabilities and redundancy schemes in a re-
liability block diagram, along with the mission phase hazard plot and
the reliability mathematical model.
A fault-tree analysis and failure-mode and effects analysis (documented
in Section 4.0) were conducted to determine the effects of failure and
to establish a design that eliminates the effect of any single electronic
part failure on mission success. The preferred subsystem incorporates
several techniques of redundancy, including overdesign of solar arrays,
active parallel components, and voting logic. Selective use was made
of devices for failure sensing and switching, current limiting, and
circuit overload protection with reclose capability. Power is avail-
able to recipient subsystems through a triredundant bus configuration
whereby each subsystem is connected to two independent buses. The
Flight Capsule derives power from two redundant, raw d.c. circuits.
The power subsystem components, assembly, and installation were analyzed
for life-limiting characteristics. Battery charge-discharge cycles
are well within state-of-the-art capabilities for battery life. All
batteries are of the hermetically sealed type to eliminate reduction
in battery life because of electrolyte loss. Overdesign of solar array
panels gives extended panel life where meteoroid damage is considered
the major cause of failure.
3.17.3.2 Computing and Sequencing (C&S) Subsystem
The allocated reliability for the C&S subsystem was 0.970. A prefer-
red configuration was evolved with an assessed reliability of 0.9860.
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The C&S subsystem reliability block diagram is given in Figure 3.17-7
along with the mission hazard curve.
The C&S subsystem will provide all command operational signals auto-
matically from launch to end of mission without using ground commands
other than those required for interplanetary-correction or orbit-trim
maneuvers. The command subsystem, which provides updating of the C&S
prior to interplanetary maneuvers, also acts as backup to all recipient
subsystem inputs and outputs during nonsequential modes of operation.
The preferred C&S subsystem was selected for its capability to supply
subsystem operational signals through multiple paths. Redundant com-
puters, operating synchronously in parallel with internal cross check-
ing, ensure against mission loss from a single failure and meet all
special operating requirements.
Solid-state electronic comparators are used to sense and initiate data
transfer if a failure occurs. Reliability of the comparator circuitry
(dotted lines in the block diagram) was considered as an integral part
of the computers and memory storage units. There are no external
sensing-and-switching devices required in the C&S subsystem.
A total of five configurations were analyzed, each having varying de-
grees of redundancy. The use of two inJependent, parallel, synchron-
ous processors with an estimated total reliability of 0.99 was rejected
because erroneous signals could be inadvertently generated and trans-
mitted to a subsystem. A triplicated subsystem with parallel majority
voting gates having an estimated reliability of 0.972 was also rejected.
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Yhis mechanization called for two of the three computer and sequencers
to be operable at all times. A third configuration using standby re-
dundancy was rejected because of mission specification requirements.
Another alternate configuration using quad redundancy logic was dis-
carded because of excessive weight, electrical power, and overall costs.
q
A review of the preferred subsystem equipments indicates that there are
no life-limiting characteristics that would cause malfunctions or have
a significant effect on mission success.
3.17.3.3 Command Subsystem
The reliability allocation for the command subsystem was 0.97, and,
by using specific redundancy techniques, an assessed value of 0.9847
for all command capability was achieved. The preferred-subsystem
simplified reliability block diagram and mission-hazard curve are
given in Figure 3.17-8.
q
The preferred configuration (see design section for details) comprises
two complete, parallel command detectors and decoders with selection
logic that permits either detector to operate with either decoder
(that is, the subsystem will successfully operate if both a detector
and a decoder fail).
To reduce interface complexity and cable weight, the redundant decoder
outputs, through a combiner circuit, become a single-thread inter-
face with the other spacecraft subsystems. Yhis is permissible be-
cause the command decoding functions of the command subsystem is pri-
marily a backup for commands normally executed by the C&S subsystem.
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Another feature of the subsystem design is that the issuance of errone-
ous commands from a single failure is prohibited by a combination of
dual operation codes and parity checking. In terms of its primary
(update C&S) and secondary functions, a detailed assessment of the pre-
ferred design yielded reliabilities of 0.9999 and 0.9872_ respectively.
The probability to update the data automation equipment is also
0.9999.
Reliability of command functions has been augmented by_
i) The capability of the C&S subsystem or the command subsystem to
actuate a given command independently,
2) The capability to gain access to spacecraft subsystems through
either of the redundant radio-subsystem receivers and redundant
low-gain antennas
3) The capability of either decoder to accept command words from
either detector.
Three candidate configurations were evaluated. The single-thread design
resulted in a reliability level of 0.94367 an independent alternate path
concept (i.e., no crossover between decoders was assessed at 0.9842)
and the preferred configuration shown in the reliability block diagram
in Figure 3.17-8 was assessed at 0.9847.
The preferred-subsystem equipment circuit mechanizations were reviewed.
They show that there are no life-limiting parts or components that would
significantly affect the overall mission.
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3.17.3.4 Attitude-Reference Subsystem
The initial reliability allocation for this subsystem was 0.996 versus
a predicted reliability of 0.9965. Figure 3.17-9 shows the reliability
hazard over the course of the mission. Specific subsystem components
and the method of redundancy mechanization are discussed below. The
system has been mechanized throughout to satisfy the requirement that
no single failure mode will have a catastrophic mission effect.
The three dual-axis gyros are mounted orthogonally so that all three
axes of attitude data can be obtained from any two gyros. All gyros
are operated continuously, and any failed gyro can be removed simply
by shutting off the power.
Catastrophic failures are detected by monitoring the speed control and
pickoff-angle signals. Excessive drift is detected by comparing the
value of signals for the same axis from different gyros, since two axes
are uniquely defined by each gyro.
Any gyro or torque-loop failure will show up in both axes of the
gyro because a drift in one axis will show up as an error in the other.
The integrator is the single point at which a failure will not show in
both axes. These integrators have been designed so that any failure
will be of the "open" or "no output" variety, so that this failure will
not be catastrophic but will only show as a reduction in gain.
The accelerometer is only included for improved accuracy and is backed
up by a redundant timing signal in the C&S, which provides minimum and
maximum thrust termination times for the midcourse-correction and orbi_
insertion maneuvers. The C&S timing signal is the controlling func-
tion in the case of accelerometer malfunction.
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components and mechanization approaches are presented in Section 4.1.
There are no life-limiting characteristics in the equipment that would
cause premature mission termination.
3.17.3.5 Autopilot Subsystem
The allocated reliability for the autopilot subsystem was 0.999. As
mechanized, the system consists of two identical systems with polarity-
splitting of the electronics to isolate failures to one-half a single
system. This approach uses cooperative multichannel redundancy so
that a single failure will result in, at most, a loss of only half the
system. Even if this loss occurs, the other half can maintain control
and will have half the response rate. For simplicity, the reliability
block diagram and reliability predictions for this system (Figure 3.17-10)
includes only the autopilot functions. A complete system reliability
block diagram would show the actual mechanization of independent chan-
nel isolation through the N2 jets, jet vanes, and secondary injection
components of the reaction control subsystem.
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The Sun sensor has four redundant cadmium sulfide cells that interface
independently with the four independent autopilot channels. Failure
of any one of the cadmium sulfide cells will have the same system effect
as a failure in one of the redundant autopilot channels. (See below)
The Canopus sensors use two identical Barnes (NASA/JPL design)
units similiar to those used on Mariner IV. On-board failure detec-
tion and switching has been employed, with the constraint that a detector
or switch failure cannot cause a catastrophic mission effect. Monitored
failure indications are:
i) A loss of acquisition signal,
2) Occurrence of a large error signal without loss of acquisition.
Both conditions will cause switching to the redundant tracker, except
when inhibited during occultation or gyro-hold modes of operation.
Switching from either sensor to the other can also be performed by
ground command.
The Earth sensor has been incorporated as an additional method of
verifying Canopus acquisition. It is not considered essential to mission
success_ therefore, redundancy was not considered necessary.
The guidance scan platform planet tracker and limb and terminator sensor
unit make up the Mars sensors. Both are desirable for optimum mission
performance, but neither is essential for mission success. This unit
has a reliability of 0.9851.
Figure 3.17-9 shows the reliability block diagram depicting the above
relationships. Specific trade-offs involved in selecting the above
J
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3.17.3.6 Reaction Control
The initial reliability allocation of 0.999 was based on a projection
of Phase IA allocations and assessments. The selected subsystem evalu-
ation, summarized in Figure 3.17-11, shows a subsystem reliability of
0.998+. This reliability is broken down by mission phase in the mission-
hazard curve.
Experience with similar systems on the Mariner, Ranger, 0G0, 0S£, 0A0,
and $yncom vehicles has furnished design direction for this subsystem
and an indication of expected reliability.
The selected subsystem uses a cooperative multichannel approach to
gain redundancy. The system comprises two separate thruster systems,
each containing 1.5 times the gas requirement for the total mission
and each functioning during any maneuver (Figure 3.17-11). This sub-
system configuration provides alternate paths of functional operation
for all but one failure mode.
One trade study involved the capability to switch a lower-level pressure
regulator into each N2 feed system. This appreciably reduced the
average number of cycles per thruster, which resulted in a reliability
assessment of 0.999 for the subsystem. However, such a configuration
change involves the addition of pyrotechnics.
A highly desirable feature of the preferred subsystem is that it does
not require malfunction detection and switching equipment.
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Life-limiting characteristics include: (i) the total supply of N 2 and
the leak rate of the system, (2) the number of cycles of the thruster
valves and pressure regulators, and (3) contamination introduced into
the plumbing during fabrication. These items affect total system life_
however, they are not expected to significantly degrade the probability
of success for the Voyager mission. These characteristics will become
more significant as the projected missions become longer.
An extremely rapid leak, including tank rupture, is the only nonredun-
dant failure mode for the subsystem. To minimize this type of failure,
a relatively high safety factor is incorporated in the design, and
rigorous quality control and proof testing are incorporated in the
production of the pressure vessels.
3.17.3.7 Radio Subsystem
The radio subsystem was allocated a reliability of 0.970. The relia-
ability assessment of 0.9820 for the preferred-design configuration is
further displayed on Figure 3.17-12. Although the relay radio (GFE) was
not evaluated in detail_ its reliability is expected to be approximately
as shown in the summary figure.
Extensive functional redundancy ensures reliability of %he radio sub-
system. Switching capability provides functional cross-connect
flexibility to ensure operating mode reliability. Provision for back-
up modes allows additional success expectancy in acceptable, although
slightly degraded, modes. For example, two antennas transmit telemetry
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and ranging data. Redundancy control is provided by sensing and auto-
marie switching plus programmed sequence instructions from the computer
and sequencing subsystem for mode initiation at the appropriate mission
point. The redundancy control will also accept ground-station commands
to enhance mode initiation, as required.
Several trade studies were performed to determine the appropriate
balance between performance and reliability. A typical study evaluated
alternate S-band receivers, so that the effect of either active or
standby redundancy in the receiver circuitry could be estimated.
Based on the proposed reliability program disciplines and the proposed
design_ no parts or materials used in the radio subsystem will exhibit
life-limiting failure mechanisms during the mission. The traveling-
wave tube amplifier normally is sensitive to failure because of cathode
depletion. Although no life data are available on YW_'s in the 50- to 100-
watt categoryglife data on i0- to 13-watt devices indicate lifetime
of about 30,000 hours. Because there is a close generic relationship
between the i0- to 13-watt devices and the higher-power tubes9 it is
expected that the Voyager tube will exhibit suitable lifetime character-
istics.
3.17.3.8 Telemetry Subsystem
The telemetry subsystem was allotted a reliability of 0.990. Based on
the reliability block diagram in Figure 3.17-13_ the preferred design
configuration is assessed to have a reliability of 0.9978.
The functional alternate path concept ensures reliability for these
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functions (i.e., the block-encoded upper-subcarrier planetary science
data and the lower-subcarrier cruise science, flare, capsule, engineering,
and maneuver data are functionally independent). The upper channel is
also fully redundant.
Failure independence in synchronization is maintained by independent count-
down circuits off the master sync bus from the power subsystem master
oscillator. Loss of master sync is precluded by a multivibrator capable
of a free-running mode if the master sync fails. Also, loss of one power-
input bus causing complete subsystem failure has been obviated by using
dual a.c./d.c, converters which operate off independent power buses.
Results of trade studies performed in Task A are applicable to the
preferred design presented here (see Section 4.0 for details). Based
on the proposed reliability program disciplines, no parts or materials
used in the telemetry subsystem will exhibit life-limiting failure
mechanisms for at least three times the total mission period.
3.17.3.9 Data Storage Subsystem
The data storage subsystem was allocated a reliability of 0.94. The
reliability block diagram (Figure 3.17-14) shows that the reliability
assessment for the preferred subsystem is 0.9490. Figure 3.17-14 also
presents the preferred design's cumulative mission reliability at salient
points during the mission.
The reliability of 0.9490 (subsystem design details are given in
Section 4.0) was achieved by using functional redundancy with s_,itch-
ing capability that provides for backup modes of operations for the
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TV and field and particle recorders at critical points during the
mission.
The preferred design uses the capsule relay data recorder for backup
of both TV recorders after capsule data has been relayed to Earth.
This mechanization increases the probability of success of the TV re-
corders from 0.916 to 0.998. The preferred configuration also signi-
ficantly improves reliability of the field and particle recorder
(from 0.9815 to 0.9997) by utilizing the maneuver recorder as a backup
after it has performed its primary function. Because the IR scanner
and the IR-UVspectrometer are single thread, a failure in either will
result in a substantial loss of capability. However, significant
quantities of these data can be real-time transmitted, thereby pro-
viding a degraded but useful alternate.
Special efforts have been made to ensure that the data storage sub-
system has no life-limiting characteristics that would significantly
affect mission success. This effort was directed toward eliminating
or nullifying the effects of principal failure modes in the magnetic
tape recorders (wearout of belts, tapes, and heads are most critical).
3.17.3.10 Structure and Mechanical Subsystem
Reliability predictions indicate that the 0.998 allocation for this sub-
system is attainable. Figure 3.17-15 shows the predicted reliability
of the subsystem and its components.
The structure and mechanical subsystem consists of the spacecraft struc-
ture and a number of mechanisms not identified as part of other
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subsystems. Specifically excluded from the subsystem are the mechanisms
for solar-panel deployment and high-gain-antenna pointing, which belong
to the power and radio subsystems.
Because it is a diverse collection of structures and mechanisms, this
subsystem cannot be subjected to customary reliability prediction
methods; therefore, the prediction appearing in Figure 3.17-15 was made
with the benefit of several simplifying assumptions. It is assumed
that in-tolerance performance of all components is essential to mission
success. It is also assumed that all components are functionally in-
dependent and that no redundancy or backup capability exists. These
assumptions are conservative and yield a conservative prediction.
The lack of statistically significant failure date for comparable
structures and environments precludes any detailed numerical assess-
ment of subsystem structural reliability. A realistic assessment of
the risks involved, using the best available engineering judgment,
seems to be the only reasonable approach. Figure 3.17-15 shows an
overall structural reliability of 0.999 on this basis. Reducing the
failure risk to a minimum involves the following: conservative materials
allowables and loads, proven stress-analysis techniques with major at-
tention to points of stress concentration, design for simplicity and
easy inspection, design review, stringent quality controls, dynamic
environmental testing, failure analysis and corrective action follow-up.
High mechanical reliability can be achieved by using space-proven devices
and by thorough environmental testing. Where possible, devices are
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identical to those used successfully on other space programs. Redund-
ancy is employed wherever feasible. V-band release mechanisms em-
ploy redundant explosive nuts, separation mechanisms incorporate
redundant ejection springs, and two rotation paths are provided at
each hinge joint. Design of V-band release mechanisms will be ex-
tremely conservative. Testing to demonstrate design conservatism and
functional effectiveness will be accomplished.
Possible subsystem failure modes are listed below. Because various
degree:_ of failure will be associated with many of the listed failure
modes, the effects of a specific failure mode may vary from "no effect"
to "mission failure_" depending on the degree of failure. Therefore,
correlation of failure modes and effects has not been attempted.
Possible Failure Modes
Excessive Yielding
Excessive Deflection
Instability
Rupture
Inadequate Heat Transfer
Inadequate Support During
Launch-Boost
Failure to Release for Deployment
Incomplete Deployment
Failure to Lock in Fully Deployed
Position
Lock-Indication Failure
Premature Release or Deployment
Out-of-Tolerance Performance
f
Possible Failure Effects
Mission Failure
Secondary Failure
Degraded Performance
No Effect
Mission Failure
Secondary Failure
Degraded Performance
No Effect
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3.17.3.11 Planetary Vehicle Adapter
The reliability allocation for the Planetary Vehicle Adapter was 0.999.
Reliability analysis indicates that this goal will be met.
The Planetary Vehicle Adapter supports the Planetary Vehicle prior to
separation from the boost vehicle. Static and dynamic loads are trans-
mitted from the Planetary Vehicle, through the adapter, to the nose
fairing. The adapter incorporates pyrotechnics, transducers, cabling,
coolant ducts, and electrical and coolant in-flight disconnects. The
lower adapter will accommodate installation of a destruct mechanism and
associated cabling from the $-IVB instrumentation unit.
As with the Planetary Vehicle structure, the assessment of Planetary
Vehicle Adapter reliability utilized a considerable amount of engineering
judgment. The assumption was made that failure of any major component of
the adapter would result in adapter failure. Accordingly, the adapter re-
liability was assessed as the product of the reliabilities of the structure,
the redundant pyrotechnics, the cabling and ducting, the electrical and
coolant in-flight disconnects, and the destruct mechanism. For the
destruct mechanism, inadvertent functioning was the only failure mode
consideration. The probability of this event, based on safety con-
siderations_ was set at less than 10 -6 .
Yhe possible failure modes and effects identified in paragraph 3.17.3.10
for structures are all applicable to the Planetary Vehicle Adapter. Addi-
tional failure modes causing minimum loss are: (i) loss of electrical
continuity between launch and Planetary Vehicles, (2) inadvertent operation
of destruct device, and (3) failure of inflight disconnects to separate.
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3.17.3.12 Pyrotechnic Subsystem
The reliability allocation of the pyrotechnic subsystem was 0.999. The
assessed value of reliability for the mission is 0.99997. A reliability
block diagram and mission phase hazard chart for this subsystem is shown
in Figure 3.17-16. Yhe block diagram shows the use of complete redundancy
where each section of the subsystem takes power from a separate 2.4-kc
bus and can fire one bridge wire in each electroexplosive device (EED).
Each EED has two bridge wires--either can fire the device. The diagram
also shows the mission reliability of the major subsystem components.
3.17.3.13 Yemperature Control Subsystem
The temperature control subsystem uses space-proven louver concepts, in-
sulation, and shielding materials. The assessed reliability for the total
mission is 0.999 (Figure 3.17-17), which exceeds the initial allocation
of 0.996.
The temperature control subsystem is divided into two sections. One
section is the louvers and insulation that control the temperature of the
Spacecraft Bus, and the other section consists of the louvers, solar
shield, 120-inch shell insulation, and capsule shield that control the
temperature of the propulsion area. Heat for spacecraft temperature
control is derived from the heat dissipated from electronic equipment
and the solar heat that penetrates the insulation and shields. The
Spacecraft Bus electronic bays have 13 louver assemblies with 18
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individually actuated louvers. The propulsion temperature control has
5 louver assemblies with i0 individually actuated louvers. If one louver
blade fails, it will affect the temperature near the adjacent louvers
and they will operate and partially compensate for the failed louver.
The louvers are open while in the Earth's atmosphere_ they gradually
close because of reduced solar-heat absorption as the spacecraft goes
toward Mars. This indicates that a failure in the closed position after
the spacecraft leaves the Earth's atmosphere will not affect the tempera-
ture of the Spacecraft Bus. A failure in the open position after the
spacecraft leaves the Earth's atmosphere is compensated for by louver
design--several louvers may fail as long as there are four good louvers
between failed louvers. More failures than this will lower the tempera-
ture, which may degrade the spacecraft's operations. There are no known
life-limiting characteristics associated with the louvers. Wear is not
a problem because the number of louver operations will be low.
Multilayer insulation can lose some of its layers or can be penetrated
by meteoroids without degrading performance to the point where it will
affect system performance. The insulation has no known life-limiting
characteristics.
In addition to the temperature control system described above, a network
of heaters, activated by ground command, can compensate for any equipment
that is off. This also provides temperature protection for the remaining
equipment in the event of any equipment malfunction or loss of heat in
parts of the spacecraft.
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3.17.3.14 Cabling Subsystem
Reliability of the cabling subsystem (Figure 3.17-18) was assessed at
0.996. The critical circuits use redundant wires so that a single pin
or wire failure will not prevent mission success.
The cabling consists of approximately 5000 wires and 300 connectors.
It was assumed that 15 percent of the signal wires are redundant
and all the pyrotechnic circuits are redundant. After a parti-
cular pyrotechnic circuit is fired, it was eliminated from the
calculations.
Further definition of the cabling subsystem is required to determine
if the reliability allocation of 0.999 is compatible with the overall
assessment. Connectors and cables will be selected to meet the space
environment. The connectors will use crimp-type pins. All cables or
wire bundles will be adequately clamped to withstand vibration.
Electronic cabling to deployed mechanisms will be protected against
micrometeoroid damage. There are no known critical life-limiting
characteristics associated with this subsystem.
3.17.3.15 Propulsion System
The evaluated reliability of the propulsion system is 0.9960 compared
to an initial allocation of 0.995. The probability of any malfunction
resulting in catastrophic failure has been minimized by design
modifications to the Task A subsystem, which include: (i) elimination
of the need to sense malfunctions and switching, (2) designing
configurations so that the only components whose individual malfunctions
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would result in catastrophic failure have negligibly small
probabilities of failure, and (3) increasing emphasis on alternate
paths by which functions may be successfully completed.
The hazard chart of system reliability versus mission time is shown
in Figure 3.17-19.
The system provides thrust for trajectory correction maneuvers, orbit
insertion, and orbit trims. Four monopropellant liquid-rocket engines
perform two midcourse corrections and two orbit-trim maneuvers. A
single solid-propellant rocket motor performs the orbit-insertion
maneuver. All engines have thrust vector control (TVC) capability.
For a detailed description see Volume A, Section 4.3.
D
D
Alternate paths of operation have been provided and can accomplish
required functions. The block diagram in Figure 3.17-19 shows the
alternate paths and redundancy features. In the monopropellant
engine, pressurizing gas is delivered from the supply to the propellant
tanks through valve legs redundant for the fail-closed mode. Fail-open
and leakage backup is provided by quad pressure regulators. Propellant
valving from the tanks to the engines is redundant for the fail-open,
fail-closed, and leakage modes. Engine redundancy is provided by the
capability to perform course corrections with any three of the four
engines. TVC can be accomplished with any three of four independently
controlled jet vanes on each engine. Orbit-insertion TVC for the solid-
propellant motor is designed with redundancy in pressurization valves,
pressure regulation, and roll-control valves. Components of the
propulsion system that depend on low failure probability rather than
3-209
BOBING-- SPACB DMSION
D2-82709-6
_IJECTION I L MO_OKl
_ _ I _ ALVES i
ORBIT INSERTION SYSTEM
I FILTER
| FILTER
MII_OURSE AND ORBIT TRIM SYSTEM
* 3 OF 4 MOTORS REQUIRED
** 3 OF 4 REQUIRED FOR EACH MOTOR
*MOTOR AND I
JET VANE** I
* MOTOR AND
JET VANE**
AND
JET VANES**
*MOTOR AND JJE VANES**
RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAMS -- PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
>..
I---
g
.,<
iii
e,,,"
Z
o
:E
iii
>
.,<
__1
::E
u
(])
.-)
• 99996 "'..
CO U NT-(i_ _
DOWN, I
LAUNCH
AND _.
I NJEC-
TION SEPARATION AN D_%'I
TRANSIT
(28.0
 ouRs)[(5012 HOURS)
MISSION PHASE
INJECTION AND MARS ORBIT
CORRECTION (72 HOURS)
SPACECRAFT AND CAPSULE
SEPARATION, RECEPTION AND
TRANSMITTAL OF CAPSULE DATA
(48 HOURS)
.9984 NO PROPULSION
REQUIRED
i
0
HAZARD CHART
Figure 3. 17-19:}Preferred Propulsion Subsystem Reliability Summary
3-210
}BOEINO_SPACE DIVISION
D2-82709-6
redundancy to function successfully include: tanks for pressurizing
gas storage_ piping, filters, propellant tanks_ propellant expulsion
bladders_ and the solid-propellant rocket engine.
The operating life of the preferred propulsion system is not limited
by wearout or fatigue of operating components. Depletion of stored
propellant or pressurizing gas because of excessive leakage during the
nominal mission would prevent completion of the propulsion subsystem
function. The probability of this occurence has been accounted for
in the analyses.
D
Reliability evaluations were conducted for the three candidate
propulsion system configurations: (i) modified Minuteman/monopropellant,
(2) Titan III-transtage/monopropellant_ and (3) LEM-descent/mono-
propellant.
Similar components in all the configurations were assigned the same
failure rate in the analyses. The reliability figures represent the
potential probability of success of the configuration types. They do
not reflect the test experience actually obtained for the transtage or
Minuteman engines. Results of these evaluations are shown on a
component comparison basis in Table 3.17-6 (details are given in
Volume C).
D
Table 3.17-7 summarizes the single-effect failure modes of the
preferred propulsion configuration. Listed single-effect failure modes
are the ones that cause some degradation in mission success or cause
loss of mission. All functions performed by equipment backed up by
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redundant performance capabilities have been eliminated from these
summaries, with the exception of two listed on the bottom of Table
3.17-7. These two are noted as marginal slngle-failure effects.
Table 3.17-6: PROPULSION SYSTEM RELIABILITY TRADE STUDY ASSESSMENTS
Tank, Pressurization
Valves, Pressurization
Filter, Pressurization
Regulator, Press.
accumulator
Check Valve
Relief Valve
Tank, Prop.
Filter, Prop.
Valves, Prop.
Engine, Liquid
TVC
Engine, Solid Engine
TVC, Solid Engine
Settling Mono System
n I t x 106
Solid Plus
Mono MC
(n I t x lO6)
855
6
1
Negligible
N/A*
Negligible
i0
896
2
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
5O
2227
N/A
4047
LEM Plus
Mono Settling
(n)_ t x 10 6)
855
28
3
23
1
17
1710
6
1350
Negligible
N/A
N/A
5653
9646
* N/A--No% Applicable
Transtage Plus
Mono Settling
(n X t x 106)
855
12
2
Negligible
Negligible
15
821
26O
2000
2
N/A
N/A
5368
9335
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3.17.3.16 Spacecraft Operational Support Equipment (OSE)
The mission success criteria for the Voyager Project, and the definition
of mission phases, dictate that reliability of the OSE be established
in two categories related to two different operational phases, namely:
(a) a reliability requirement that will be a measure of the probability
of reaching and maintaining a state of readiness to launch (prelaunch
reliability), and (b) a reliability requirement associated with the
equipment used during the mission (starting with the terminal count-
down or mission reliability).
qualitative Reliability Consideration--Appropriate parts of the qual-
itative requirements summarized in Section 3.17.1.1 are levied on both
categories of OSE, with emphasis on protection from overstress or
degradation of the spacecraft. Design compliance with these require-
ments will be evaluated by the methods described in Section 3.17.2.2.
Category i, Prelaunch Reliability--Generally, the 0SE of this category
includes the equipment required for assembly, handling, shipping, ser-
vicing, testing, and checkout of spacecraft subsystems. Numerical
reliability requirements to be associated with this equipment and pre-
launch operations have not been established. These requirements will
be greatly influenced by such factors as the philosophy advanced for
preventive and corrective maintenance, work-around capability, time
and equipment availability during critical prelaunch periods, and
definition of critical prelaunch periods with attendant 0SE operational
requirements.
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D
D
Category 2, Mission Reliability--A reliability goal of 0.99 has been
allocated to this category of equipment. For this purpose, reliability
has been defined as the probability that the OSE will successfully per-
form its required function throughout the mission, starting with the
terminal countdown of the launch and transit phase of the mission. For
compatibility with overall mission success relationships, successful
performance is considered to be:
i) Performance of the required functions without an OSE failure
that causes a failure in the spacecraft;
2) Performance of required functions without failure of OSE to
detect those spacecraft malfunctions for which the OSE is
designed to detect;
3) Performance of required functions without a failure that would
cause the mission to be rescheduled once the terminal count-
down has been started.
The foregoing reliability estimate is believed to be consistent with
reliability experience with equipment having similar operational en-
vironments and functional and parts complexity. Reliability evaluations
and allocations to specific equipment items to be performed later in
the program will be influenced by consideration of qualitative
requirements and design constraints. It is intended that this equipment
category will be subjected to appropriate reliability disciplines com-
parable to those imposed on the spacecraft equipment.
D
3.17.3.17 Science Payload Subsystem
The science payload, which is GFH, is used to gather scientific data
during the interplanetary transit phase and while orbiting Mars.
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Because the science payload is GFE and the reliability is controlled
by GFE specifications, the evaluations are used only to determine the
overall effect on mission reliability. A total of ]5 experiments
are to be conducted; of these, seven will be conducted during the
Mars orbit only and are considered for this reliability assessment to
be primary to mission success. These seven planetary experiments
are listed in Group IV of Table 3.17-8 and have an assessed reliability
of 0.8001. Four of the seven experiments will operate only during a
portion of each Mars orbit.
When the nine interplanetary experiments are included, as listed in
Group V of Table 3.17-8, the total assessment becomes 0.5031. Groups
I through III of the table show the reliability for other experiments.
All 16 experiments operate independently so that a failure of any
single experiment will not jeopardize the other experiments. Two
units are common to all the science experiments_ the data automation
equipment, which is used to sequence and condition the data_ and the
science power switching, which controls power to all the experiments.
A failure in science power switching may affect only one experiment
because the power to each experiment is controlled by separate relays
and relay drivers. The failure rate for the science power switching,
which was used in Groups I through IV of Table 3.17-8, was adjusted
to compensate for this independence. The data automation equipment
processes data in both real and non-real time. A failure in one mode
of collecting data will not affect the other mode. Also, the data
automation equipment has sections that work with one specific
experiment. These specific sections may fail without affecting the
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II
III
IV
V
TABLE 3.17-8: SCIENCE PAYLOAD RELIABILITY RANGE
Infrared Scanner Only
Data Automation Equipment
Infrared Scanner
Science Power Switching (15 percent used)
Total
0.0653
O. 0068
0. 0044
0.0765 0.9264
Photoimaging Device Only (T.V.)
Data Automation Equipment
Photoimaging Device (one experiment only)
Science Power Switching (15 percent used)
Total
0.0653
0.0294
0.0044
0.0991 0.9057
Infrared Scanner & Photoimaging Devices
Data Automation Equipment
Infrared Scanner
Photoimaging Devices (two experiments)
Science Power Switching (45 percent used)
Total
0.0653
0.0068
0.0589
0.0132
0.1442 0.8657
Planetary Only
Data Automation Equipment
Infrared Scanner
Photoimaging Devices (two experiments)
IR Spectrometer
UV Spectrometer
RF - Noise Detector
Ionosphere Sounder
Science Power Switching (73 percent used)
Total
0.0653
0.0068
0.0589
0.0194
0.0407
0.0045
0.0063
0.0211
0.2230 0.8001
All Experiments
Data Automation Equipment
Infrared Scanner
Photoimagining Devices (two experiments)
IR Spectrometer
UV Spectrometer
Bistatic Radar
RF - Noise Detector
Ionosphere Sounder
Cosmic-Ray Telescope
Magnetometer
Plasma Probe
Trapped-Radiation Detector
Cosmic-Dust Detector
Ion Chamber
Gamma Ray Spectrometer
Gravimeter
Science Power Switching (i00 percent used)
Total
0.0653
O. 0068
0.0589
0.0194
0.0407
0.0426
0.0045
0.0063
0.0308
0,0833
0.0736
0.0346
0.0121
0.0691
0.0596
0.0501
0.0293
0.6870 0.5031
3-217
BOEING mSPACE DrVISION
D2-82709-6
other sections of the data automation equipment. Electrical power for
these experiments is furnished through redundant power buses. No life-
limiting characteristics are anticipated at this time.
3.17.3.18 Launch Vehicle
Although the launch vehicle is not primary to Boeing's Task B effort,
its reliability was assessed to provide overall-system visibility. The
launch vehicle consisting of S-IC, S-II, and S-IVB stages, an instrument
unit, and a nose fairing must inject the two Planetary Vehicles into
acceptable interplanetary transfer trajectories.
success of 0.90 was allocated for this function.
was performed by analyzing each stage.
A probability of
Assessment of the 0.90
Chart A of Figure 3.17-20 shows reliability assessment, derived from the
design assessment, for the Saturn V stages. Chart B shows current esti-
mates (based on latest firing data) for the Atlas-Mercury and composite
Mercury-Gemini shots. These data provide typical booster maturity points.
Chart C represents a typical booster-reliability-growth curve showing the
cumulative reliability for 33 firings of the Titan II booster. By com-
bining the data of Chart A (as a starting point), the typical growth
of Chart C, and the maturity range of Chart B, the Voyager 1971 launch-
vehicle reliability was forecast as shown in Chart D. This analysis
indicates that an objective of 0.90 for the Voyager launch vehicle is
feasible. This conclusion is further supported by the experience of the
Saturn I and manned space shots, where conservative design, component
screening, and rigorous control achieved significant gains in booster
reliability.
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3.17.3.19 Mission Operations System (MOS) and Tracking and Data
System (TDS)
Although these systems are not primary to Boeing's Task B reliability
effort and have not been evaluated in detail, the reliability for the
combination of the NDS (including the mission-dependent equipment) and
the TDS is expected to be such that their combined probability of
success (Ps) in support of the Voyager mission is 0.98.
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